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THE

DOCTRINE OF THE WILL,

DETERMINED BY

AN APPEAL TO CONSCIOUSNESS.

BY HENRY P. TAPPAN.

"Necessity is not intrinsical to the nature of every thing, God and all creatures, or essential to all action; but there is something ἐφ' ἡμῖν, or we have some liberty or power over our own actions: which is the defence of distributive or retributive justice, dispensing rewards and punishments throughout the world."

Cudworth.

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PREFACE.

To form theories is too often rather the sport of fancy than the labor of philosophy. Deductions from theories, however logically made, instead of correcting errors already introduced, only perpetuate them in an elaborate and stately manner. In the following treatise I have not aimed to form a theory, but in honesty and simplicity, to examine facts; and through facts, to arrive at principles.

Although I claim not infallibility for all the processes and details of my investigation and thinking; I do claim, to have presented in the main, the true doctrine of the will, as determined in the only legitimate way.

Neither do I claim entire originality for my labors. It is only in theorizing, that at this age of the world, we can gain this distinction. Genuine philosophy is engaged in adjusting, explaining, and applying the labors of those who have preceded us; or in making advances in the researches which have already been

9886

promisingly opened to view. Original discoveries so far from being precluded in this way, are really invited: and when they appear, they will have the two-fold merit of having fully considered the truths already known, and of having placed them in a subordinate position by a reach of mind beyond them.

The Review of Edwards' Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will, which I have already given to the public, necessarily anticipated some points discussed in the present volume. There, however, they were brought up incidentally, and for the purpose of placing the work reviewed, in a true point of view: here they are taken up as a part of a full and methodical discussion.

Edwards' work, consists not of psychological investigations, but of acute logical deductions from an ingenious theory.

In reviewing his work, I could not but enter largely into purely logical considerations. As the present effort claims to be for the most part psychological, I have referred to the Review when logical points came up, which had been there fully discussed. Still, what I now present to the public, will be found to be not a mere continuation of the Review, but an independent treatise, and complete in itself as a psychological argument.

When I commenced my undertaking, I intended to comprise my lucubrations within the compass of one

volume; and when I had so far departed from my original plan as to contemplate two volumes, I thought myself at the end of my scheme: but as in the case of many wiser men than myself, thought has outgrown forecast, and I must now threaten the public with a third volume, containing the application of the doctrine of the will to morals and religion.

What I have written, I throw not out as a bait to logomachists, either in philosophy or theology: but I submit it to the cool, candid, and generous perusal of those who love truth, and who fear not to think.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

		Page.
Sect. I.	Consciousness defined,	1
II.	The perfection of consciousness as a form of intelligence,	6
III.	The true mode of interrogating consciousness,	11

CHAPTER II.

OF CAUSE.

Sect. I.	Preliminary view of definition in general,	17
II.	Marks by which we distinguish a first truth,	20
III.	Space, time, and substance, given as examples of first truths,	21
IV.	Cause, a first truth,	24
V.	How do we arrive at the idea of cause?	35
VI.	What are the experiences, or phenomena, in connection with which the idea of cause is first given?	36
VII.	Principle of causality,	48
VIII.	First, or Infinite Cause,	51
IX.	Physical causes,	53

CHAPTER III.

OF THE WILL.

Sect. I.	Definition of the Will,	60
II.	By what do we distinguish the action of the Will?	60

Page.

Sect. III. Contingency of the Will, - - - - 62
IV. Of Choice, - - - - - - 67
V. Choice and Volition distinguished, - - - 73
VI. Is every act of Volition pre-determined by the Will? - 77
VII. Freedom of the Will, - - - - - 79
VIII. Absolute and Conditional Freedom, - - - 94
IX. Self-determination of the Will, - - - - 99
X. Where and how do we first obtain the idea of Self-determination? - - - - - - 116
XI. Does Actual Existence presume Necessary Existence? 119

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE INTELLIGENCE AND THE WILL.

Sect. I. The Will distingushed from the Intelligence, - - 122
II. The Action of the Will in the direction of the Intelligence, - - - - - - - - 124
III. The Developments of the Intelligence in the direction of the Will, - - - - - - 134
IV. Objects and Laws, - - - - - - 138

CHAPTER V.

OF THE SENSITIVITY.

Sect. I. What is included under Sensitivity, - - - 142
II. Sensations defined and distinguished from the Intelligence and Will, - - - - - 142
III. The Emotions and Passions distinguished from the Sensations and Intelligence, - - - - 152
IV. Emotions and Passions distinguished from the Will, - 154
V. The Distinction between the Emotions and Passions, and the Will, particularly illustrated, - - - 156
VI. Desire, or Relative Emotion, and Passion, - - 161
VII. Whether a given Passion can be resisted only by an opposite Passion, - - - - - 165
VIII. Preceding Distinctions summed up, - - - 172

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE PERSONALITY, - - - - - - 174

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SENSITIVITY AND THE WILL.

Page.

Sect. I. The Action of the Will in the direction of the Sensitivity, - - - - - - - - 183
II. Moral and Natural Ability and Inability, - - 207
III. The Action of the Sensitivity in the direction of the Will, - - - - - - - - 215

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF A WILL NECESSITATED BY THE SENSITIVITY, OR IDENTIFIED WITH IT.

Sect. I. Philosophizing by Physical Analogies, - - - 233
II. In the condition of corrupted humanity, "the Will is as the most agreeable," - - - - - - 235
III. The actual Predominance of the Sensitivity accounted for, - - - - - - - - 237
IV. Of the Calculation of Future Events, - - - 244
V. Theories of a Moral Government, - - - 249

CHAPTER IX.

OF MOTIVES.

Sect. I. Motives Defined, - - - - - - - 281
II. The Strongest Motive, - - - - - 297
III. Of the Indifference of Will to Motives, - - - 300
IV. Why does the Will choose one thing rather than another? 304

CHAPTER X.

CONCLUSION, - - - - - - - - - 315

CORRECTIONS.

Page 73, line 16 from the bottom, *for* giving, *read* going.
138, line 8 from the bottom, *for* effected, *read* affected.
139, line 2 from the top, *for* show *read* shows.
143, line 4 from the bottom, *for* inquiry, *read* inquiring.
179, line 12 from the bottom, *for* for, *read* from.
Ibid, line 3 from the bottom, *for* theorum, *read* theorem.
219, line 13 from the bottom, *for* consciousness, *read* conscience.
226, line 11 from the top, *for* phenomenas, *read* phenomena.
245, line 11 from the bottom, *for* if any, *read* in any.
272, line 9 from the bottom, *for* first, *read* last.
293, line 6 from the bottom, *for* particuly, *read* particular.
305, line 14 from the bottom, *delete* it, *after* referring.
310, line 10 from the bottom, *insert* is, *before* constituted.

DOCTRINE OF THE WILL.

CHAPTER I.

OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

SECTION I.

Consciousness Defined.

I. Consciousness is the necessary knowledge which the mind has of its own operations. In knowing, it knows that it knows. In experiencing emotions and passions, it knows that it experiences them. In willing, or exercising acts of causality, it knows that it wills or exercises such acts. This is the common, universal, and spontaneous consciousness.

This definition may appear to some to be an identical proposition. The mind knows its knowledges, the mind knows its emotions, the mind knows its acts of causality, may seem to be implied, if not affirmed, when we say, the mind knows, feels and wills. Therefore, we would farther observe :

II. By Consciousness more nicely and accurately defined, we mean the power and act of self-recognition : not, if you please, the mind knowing its knowledges, emotions, and volitions ; but the mind knowing itself in these.

Consciousness in every knowledge, emotion and

volition, brings to view two terms, SUBJECT and OBJECT. The subject is that which knows; the object is that which is known. The subject is that which feels; the object is that in view of which, the emotion or passion springs up. The subject is that which wills or causes; the object is that existence or modification of existence which is caused, or made to appear. To suppose these two terms not to exist, would to our consciousness be contradictory; because knowledge, passion, and causation, cannot be thought of or defined without them. What is knowledge? It is a percipient perceiving; perceiving something of course. The percipient is the subject; the something perceived the object. What is causation? It is a power producing phenomena. The power is the subject; the phenomena the object. What is emotion or passion? It is an affection of the sensitivity; but that which is affected is the subject; that on occasion of which the affection arises is the object.

Knowledge, causation, and emotion, involving subject and object, are primary facts. There is nothing in which we are more at home.

If it should be said that the mind recognizing itself, is implied in the very knowing, doing, and feeling; and that hence there is the same tautology in affirming that the mind knows itself, as to affirm that it knows its operations: I reply, that although subject and object are implied in all these mental operations and affections, yet the knowledge of them is not implied, and really can be possible only on condition of consciousness, or a faculty of self-knowledge. It

is conceivable that acts of knowledge, and of causation, and emotions, and passions, might take place as results of a certain fixed constitution and mechanism of being, without the faculty of knowing the antithesis of subject and object. The antithesis would indeed exist, but in this case the subject would not have the power of knowing it, just as now the object has not the power of knowing it; and consequently, would not have the power of defining its operations and affections; it would be absorbed in these without the power of distinguishing itself from them.

Now that we have this power or faculty of consciousness or self-knowledge, is a fact which is universally granted. It appears in the very structure of language. I see—I do—I feel; that is, I see an object; I do in reference to an object; I feel on occasion of an object and its qualities—give it clearly. The use of the *Ego* is the affirmation of the subjectivity of which we are conscious.

Consciousness is not a power or faculty of knowledge distinct from the reason. It is only a peculiar form or exercise of reason—or reason in a peculiar relation. It is reason knowing itself, and its triune coördinates in the one mind or soul; it is the subject becoming its own object.

The first act of consciousness is to distinguish subject and object. Subject and object, as distinguished, the one from the other, both become objects of knowledge. It is the same faculty which knows both; but the faculty is named differently, accordingly as it is directed now towards the object simply, and now towards the subject taken as an object.

When it is directed towards the object simply, it is named perception, or understanding; and its act is called perceiving, or observing. When it is directed towards the subject taken as an object, it is called consciousness, and its act is called self-knowing, or reflection. The last is a metaphorical term, and represents the mind as bending back to look upon itself.

In object we have all the phenomena of nature—all phenomena but those which relate to subject or myself; or to subjectivity in general.

Subject thus distinguished from the object, and forming the sole object of self-consciousness, contains all the phenomena of mind—both those which relate directly to object, and those which arise only upon occasion of object.*

III. Consciousness may be distinguished into natural or spontaneous, and philosophical or reflective.

The first is that which is common to all men in the natural development of their minds, under the circumstances in which they chance to be placed. All men are conscious of mental phenomena, as belonging to *them* in distinction from physical pheno-

* The distinction here alluded to is important. Phenomena of mind, which relate directly to object, are perceptions of natural phenomena, and induction and generalization, emotions arising from these phenomena, or volitions to produce these phenomena. Phenomena of mind, which arise only upon occasion of object, are the intuitive perceptions of the reason—those first truths which are the foundations of all logic and science. These may be called phenomena of the mind only, under the conception that they are perceived by the mind. After we have come to know them, we feel assured that their existence is antecedent to, and wholly independent of, our acts of perception. These first truths are perceived upon occasion of object, as, space upon occasion of body; time upon occasion of succession; cause upon occasion of phenomena.

mena, which do not belong to them. They may be unable technically to speak of the antithesis of subject and object, but they know what is contained under these terms, as well as the distinction between their personal being and the world without.

The philosophical or reflective consciousness, is that more perfect consciousness which appears, when by a special, and it may be laborious effort, we turn the mind back to notice its operations, with a nice, particular, and analytical observation.

These two forms of consciousness are analogous to the two forms of observation which exist in reference to the external or objective world. All men do naturally and spontaneously observe the phenomena of the world around them, and draw conclusions more or less true and useful: but there is an observation which we distinguish from this as philosophical observation, because it is close, particular, analytical, and thoughtful in an eminent degree. It is an observation which leads to investigation, and brings to light the powers and laws of nature. So this philosophical consciousness brings to light the powers and laws of mind. This consciousness, which we have called also reflective, is, indeed, reflection itself. The mind in this form of its intelligence, instead of looking out upon the world, bends back to look upon itself.

It is thus by consciousness that psychology or the philosophy of mind, becomes possible. The operations and affections of our being, viewed in the antithesis of subject and object, are capable of being understood in their various characteristics and relations. In order to know myself I have only by conscious-

ness carefully to recognize myself, in every operation and affection of my mind, as distinguishable from the object of these operations and affections. Investigations in mental philosophy, are simply investigations of facts.

SECTION II.

The perfection of Consciousness as a form of Intelligence.

I. It is a great error and prejudice that mental philosophy is peculiarly obscure, difficult, and uncertain. The knowledge of ourselves will readily be granted to be of the utmost importance to ourselves. *A priori*, therefore, we might expect that under the constitution of an infinitely wise and good Being, it would not be peculiarly obscure, difficult, and uncertain.

All our knowledge must relate either to subject or object; that is, to that which is ourselves, or that which is not ourselves. In its nature also, it must be knowledge of subjectivity in general, or of that which is the basis and cause of phenomena; or of phenomena themselves.

Objects are known by the faculty of perception, or the intelligence taken under its general designation. The subject, or myself, is known by the intelligence under the peculiar form and designation of consciousness. Subjectivity in general is also known as well as the phenomena which it accounts for. Now, consciousness does not appear less perfectly adapted to its par-

ticular office than perception, in reference to any office that can be named as belonging to it out of consciousness. The phenomena and facts which are viewed in relation to object, seem not more certainly such than those which are viewed in relation to subject; *e. g.*, it does not seem more certainly true, that such and such forms, relations and qualities, are in objects, than that I have such and such perceptions and emotions, and that I make such and such volitions. Inasmuch as subject must be granted to be an object of knowledge, its phenomena may stand as clearly in the view of the mind as the phenomena of object in general.

The faculty of knowledge, whatever direction it may take, proves itself to have taken a legitimate direction when positive knowledges, and well grounded beliefs are the result. But no knowledges, and beliefs are more firm than many respecting the subject in particular, as well as the subjective in general. Nay, the phenomena of the senses may be presented under various illusions—*e. g.* the reflection of the setting sun may be mistaken for a conflagration; but the feelings, thoughts, and volitions of our minds, as simple phenomena, cannot be mistaken.

II. There is one point of view in which this comparison may be placed which is absolutely decisive.

The perception of the objective by means of the senses, men generally think clear enough; but the consciousness of the subjective they represent as obscure and doubtful. But where is the perception of the objective? Is it not within us? Yes, truly, all our knowledge of the forms, relations, and qualities

of the objective world are within us. We know this world by sensations, and sensations within us. Body is defined by primary and secondary qualities inhering in substance. Of primary qualities we reckon resistance and form. They are those without which body cannot be conceived to exist. Of secondary qualities, we have a great variety, as those of color, taste, smell, &c. These are not essential to our conception of body. The secondary qualities plainly are named from sensations produced in us—*e. g.* Sourness is the name of that modification of body, or that cause inhering in the substance of body which produces in us a certain sensation; and so of all the other secondary qualities. But the primary are known and named in the same way. By resistance, we mean an experience within ourselves produced by a resisting cause inhering in the substance of body. Form is but the extension of a resisting point; and magnitude, but a collection or conglomeration of resisting points. The world without, or body, is then really known by effects produced within ourselves, and effects known in our consciousness. If consciousness then were not a legitimate source of knowledge and a source to be relied upon, we should be destitute of all real and certain knowledge.

III. Wherein does our knowledge of the phenomena of mind differ from our knowledge of the phenomena of body? There is really no difference either as respects the conditions, the processes, or the certainty of the knowledge. The conditions of all knowledge are certain experiences appearing within us, that is within our consciousness, and primitively

wholly irrespective of any agency of our own. Upon these experiences, our intelligence from its inherent force and capabilities forms judgments and knowledges. Some of these knowledges respect the objective and some the subjective. The knowledges which respect the objective are knowledges of that which is exterior to ourselves, or of that which is not ourselves. The knowledges of the subjective are knowledges of ourselves. Certain experiences through the senses of seeing, hearing, tasting and smelling, and the experience of muscular resistance, form the conditions and means of knowledges of time and space, of body, of relative position and distance, and of various modifications or qualities of body. Again, these same experiences in connection with the intelligence from within acting upon them, and forming the above named judgments or knowledges, and the springing up of emotions and feelings as consequents of these knowledges, and the putting forth of an activity to determine, appropriate, change and modify, form the conditions and means of knowing mind or spirit, power and causality. In relation to both object and subject, there are spontaneous experiences first presented in the general and natural consciousness, and these experiences are followed by the action of the intelligence according to its own constitution and laws, appropriating these experiences to find both object and subject; and the one is found just as necessarily, and naturally, and certainly, as the other.

This view of consciousness justifies us in presenting it under a very comprehensive form.

IV. First: Consciousness is the common and broad field of all experience, thought, knowledge, and activity. In our consciousness we know both the objective and the subjective—both the world and ourselves.

Secondly: When, as above, (page 3,) we distinguish consciousness as a form of the general intelligence—a form in reference to ourselves—a self-knowledge in antithesis with ordinary perception or objective knowledge, we intentionally limit it for the sake of convenience, and to avoid doing violence to the established modes of psychological representation. But, under the more comprehensive view which we here take, instead of presenting consciousness as a mere form of the intelligence, we make it the very birth-place of the intelligence itself, and the arena of all its movements and developments; the birth-place, too, of the will, and of the emotions and passions. In consciousness we know, we feel, we do. But then, again, in this very comprehensive view we are brought back to our first definition of consciousness, as the power and act of self-recognition; for the whole play of our being, our experiences, thoughts, volitions and emotions, as presented in consciousness, are presented as ours, and we are distingushed to ourselves with all our capacities and faculties, from the vast variety and complication of particulars which make up the objective world. In consciousness we have all knowledge, activity and passion; and in consciousness we have the perpetual recognition of self in all knowledge, activity, and passion.

Thirdly: Consciousness, as comprehending all

intelligence, may be distinguished into the interior and the exterior. Consciousness, when contemplating its phenomena in connection with the subject, and as revealing the constitution and laws of the subject, and of the subjective in general, may be called the interior consciousness. Consciousness, when contemplating its phenomena in connection with the objective, and as revealing its constitution and laws, that is, revealing the system of external nature, may be called the exterior consciousness. In the one consciousness, our aim is to know ourselves, and to know all causality, all spirit, all pure and necessary truth, as far as it is possible to know them. In the other consciousness, our aim is to know body in space, and events in time, with their relations and successions. The interior and exterior consciousness embrace all possible knowledge.

SECTION III.

The true mode of interrogating Consciousness.

I. If we take the most comprehensive view of consciousness as the birth-place of all our knowledges, feelings, and activities; and as the broad field in which all phenomena are presented to us; the phenomena springing out from ourselves, and therefore phenomena of the subject; and the phenomena coming in upon us, and therefore phenomena of the object;—in laying down rules for interrogating consciousness, we are, indeed, laying down universal rules of obser-

vation, induction, and investigation. All phenomena are here grouped together, and they are all within the bosom of consciousness. The first rules given under this point of view are, undoubtedly, the two following: They are drawn directly from the Baconian system, and have been expressed in different forms, and are well and universally known among philosophers:—

1. Observe all the phenomena, and only the phenomena—omitting none, and conjecturing none.

2. Observe all the characteristics of each particular phenomenon, and only the characteristicts—omitting none, and conjecturing none.*

This act of observing the phenomena and their characteristics, is an act of determining the intelligence to patient and persevering attention. This observation, being supposed, the results must depend upon the capacity and reach of the intelligence. What is to be known must depend upon the faculty of knowledge.

II. Now it is a fact indisputable that the faculty of knowledge, fixing itself in attention upon the phenomena of the consciousness in general, does make the distinction of subject and object, or to use the phrase of Cousin (which to say the least is convenient) of the *me* and the *not me*, and knowledge receives at once its most general division of nature and spirit. Men have agreed as to vast number of particulars which are to be regarded as objective or nature; and observation, investigation and discovery have pro-

* Cours de Phil., Tom. II., Sec. 16. Par M. Cousin: or Henry's Translation, Ch. 1st.

ceeded, without interruption in reference to these. Indeed the definition of nature has become very simple. All the phenomena of sensation and resistance make up nature. The laws of these phenomena have been assigned by the reason. The science of nature has therefore attained a high degree of completeness.

Now, not only are the general rules above given in reference to all phenomena indiscriminately—rules which apply to investigations in psychology—but the rules which have been particularly applied in natural philosophy, admit no less legitimately and strictly of application in the philosophy of mind. Thus, it is a rule in physics that we begin our investigations with the simplest, most obvious, and best understood phenomena. But, this rule will apply with equal force, to psychology. Both mind and matter are known only by means of their phenomena, and of course, in relation to both, it must be true that we are to begin our researches with those phenomena which are indubitable, or which are attended with the least degree of doubtfulness. But, without going into particulars on the subject of this comparison, we remark that, generally, that inductive method which since the time of Bacon has been so highly extolled, and so successfully applied in the field of nature, can most manifestly be applied in psychological researches. All researches in nature go upon the admission that every phenomenon has a cause, and that every cause has a rule of action. And the whole aim of these researches is, to ascertain the causes of the phenomena, and the laws of the causes: Thus gravitation is a

cause of phenomena: the law of the centripetal force is a law regulating the gravitating power. Now, the phenomena of mind must have causes and laws in like manner; for the axiom above named is a universal axiom, embracing all phenomena. And what are researches in psychology, but researches in order to ascertain the causes and laws of the phenomena presented? All the rules of the inductive method, therefore, we adopt to regulate our interrogations of the consciousness under its technical limitation, as the faculty and act of self-knowledge.

III. But we have already settled, that subject and object appear in all our sensations, knowledges, activities, emotions, and passions. It must follow, therefore, that in examining the phenomena of consciousness in reference to self-knowledge, we are not examining altogether new phenomena, but that in addition to phenomena diverse from those we term natural, we are really compelled likewise to examine the natural. The phenomena of nature are related to the development of the subject or the mind. The qualities of body, (as I have already noted,) both primary and secondary, are experiences within ourselves; and how can we know ourselves, unless the sensations by which we know the secondary qualities, we take care to mark as phenomena of our own being—and the resistance by which we know the primary, we take care to mark as a resistance experienced within our own being to a force contained in our own being, and developed in the muscular organism? To know ourselves, we are to examine every thing which appears in consciousness in its subjective relations, that

is, in its interior relations; thus making the consciousness, by the peculiar direction given it, an interior consciousness. Every phenomenon of consciousness is necessarily immediately and primarily apprehended by the intelligence in two relations, the objective and the subjective; the subjective being always myself; the objective being pure objectivity or matter, or that which is subjective in its nature, and taken as objective in relation to myself. All mind, all life, all causality, all truth, are subjective in their nature, because antecedent to all phenomena; but taken as objects of my mind, by an act of contemplation, they become objective to me; and as calling forth, in the act of contemplation, and in the coördinate acts, the energies of my being, become occasions of developing the faculties of myself, considered in this way the sole subject. How, then, do mental and natural philosophy differ in their methods? They differ not at all in their methods. They differ only in their direction and extent. The one aims at the subject, myself; the other aims at pure objectivity, or the material world. The one considers all the phenomena of consciousness in their subjective relations; the other considers only the phenomena introduced by the senses, and that in their objective relations merely. Where universal subjectivity is arrived at, we have metaphysics, which is the science of the causes and laws of being in general. It is to be observed, likewise, that in natural philosophy we are compelled to avail ourselves continually of metaphysics. The very idea of cause, and the axiom that every phenomenon must have a cause, belong to me-

taphysics. In all our researches after truth, we are engaged with our one mind; we are in a universe of one Creator, who is the infinite mind comprehending all intelligence, and the infinite cause comprehending all power: we may not, therefore, separate; it is only permitted us to distinguish and define, in order that we may the better know and comprehend.

CHAPTER II.

OF CAUSE.

SECTION I.

Preliminary View of Definition in general.

THE end or scope of definition, is to make any given object clearer, plainer, and more distinct to the intelligence. Adopting the usual division of logicians, we represent definition as either nominal or real. A nominal definition is merely substituting one name for another,—the name substituted being supposed to be better understood. A real definition aims to explain the nature of the thing, by enumerating its parts, assigning its classification, pointing out its substance, describing its properties and relations, or fixing its limits and distinctions. A real definition may be accidental or essential.

When accidental, it explains merely those accidents or properties of an object which are not constitutive of it, and without which it can be conceived—*e. g.* the name, time and place of birth, employment, and dress of an individual, are merely accidents.

When essential, it explains that essence and those

properties of an object which are constitutive of it, and without which it cannot be conceived—*e. g.* mind and body are essential parts of an individual. Again—

An essential definition is *logical* when it assigns the object, its place under generical and specific classification—*e. g.* man is logically defined an intellectual animal—animal being the *genus*—intellectual the *differentia*—or that which distinguishes him from other animals.

An essential definition is *physical*, when, where the object admits of it, the physical parts are enumerated, meaning by physical parts those which are presented to the observation of our senses.

An essential definition is metaphysical when it assigns essence and properties to the objects, which are metaphysical—meaning by metaphysical that which is not known by observation of the senses, but by reason or intuition—*e. g.* man is a *spiritual* being, body is a resisting *substance.* From this it appears that a logical definition is dependent upon antecedent, physical, and metaphysical definitions.

Now it is plain, that in order to define we must have some prior conceptions by which to define: in a mere nominal definition we must have a prior word already better understood than the word we are about to define. In a real definition we must already have a clear knowledge of the essences, properties, and accidents we make use of for this purpose. A definition, therefore, which we are at this moment framing, must be preceded either by definitions already made, or by conceptions which do not require or admit of antecedent definitions.

Where present definitions presume antecedent definitions, these antecedent definitions, must be preceded by other antecedent definitions, or by conceptions which do not require, or admit of antecedent definitions: we must, therefore, in all cases, at length come to conceptions which do not require or admit of antecedent definitions; for a retrogression of definitions *ad infinitum*, is an absurdity. We must have a place of beginning; a starting point of thought.

That these starting points of thought—these primary conceptions and beliefs do exist, none, probably, will be disposed to deny. They are logically necessary to account for, explain and define all our other knowledge, and they are plainly revealed in our consciousness. All thinking men at least, and indeed the multitude to a considerable extent, speak of them as first truths or intuitions. They are like the light, which, while it reveals all objects of sight, can find nothing by which it can be more plainly revealed. That we cannot explain or analyze light, does not prove any thing against its existence: we know it must exist, because we see all things by means of it.

Indeed, we must affirm in general, that whatever is clearest to our minds, and really best known, must be incapable of explanation, definition, or demonstration: for if explanation, definition, and demonstration were required in reference to the objects and subjects supposed, then it would follow that there must be something beyond them still clearer and still better known, viz: that by which the explanation, defition, or demonstration is to be effected, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

Nothing can be more important in philosophy than to ascertain these primary conceptions. The great aim of philosophy is to arrive at these primary conceptions.

SECTION II.

Marks by which we distinguish a first truth.

But by what marks shall we know a first truth, or a primary conception of the mind? It is not enough that it is distinctly in our consciousness, for mere chimeras, as, for example, the stories of Sinbad the Sailor, are distinctly conceived of. The marks are as follows:—

1. It must be affirmed by the intelligence with a positiveness, from which it is impossible to escape: *e.g.*, $2 + 2 = 4$. This is an affirmation of the intelligence from which it is impossible to escape—we are compelled to admit it; we cannot make an opposite supposition and say, $2 + 2 = 5$.

2. It must be a truth or conception, which, while it is thus positively and irresistibly affirmed by the intelligence, is still plainly incapably of being proved, explained, or defined by any thing antecedent and better and more clearly known; for it is this very quality of inexplicableness, or indefinableness, or indemonstrableness, which makes it a first truth, or a primary conception of the mind.

3. It must form the basis of certain knowledges and conclusions; it must explain them, and account for them.

SECTION III.

Space, Time, and Substance, given as examples of first truths.

I. *Space.*—We cannot define this nominally; there is no word which can better express the idea; if there were some other word, it would be immediately adopted. When the word is spoken every one knows what is meant by it. It cannot be logically defined, because it comes under no species or genus. It cannot be physically defined, because it is composed of no physical parts. It cannot be metaphysically defined, because it possesses no metaphysical essence and properties, other than those expressed in the one word—space. And yet is it possible for us to escape from this idea? Will any man say there is no space? He cannot define it, because there is nothing by which it can be defined. And that he cannot define it does not argue that it is obscure or doubtful, but that it is an object of the clearest and most positive knowledge. It neither requires nor admits of definition. So much for the first two marks. It possesses the third likewise; it is the basis of certain knowledges, and conclusions; it explains them and accounts for them. Thus body cannot be known or defined without space: it has its position, form, magnitude, relations, and motions *in space.*

The science of geometry would likewise be impossible without the idea of space, for all its figures are drawn in space.

II. The same course of observation may obviously be pursued in relation to the idea of time.

III. Let us follow out in the same way the idea of substance.

1. It is a positive affirmation of the intelligence. We conceive of ourselves as substance. All the thoughts, volitions and affections of which I am conscious, I cannot but refer to the substance which I call the human spirit, or myself. The absurdity of making the mind a bundle of qualities has been frequently demonstrated.* These thoughts, volitions, and affections come and go, they are transient ; but the substance to which they belong remains and never loses its identity. So likewise with respect to the qualities of external nature, we refer them to substance. The apple which I hold in my hand, and which I now taste, has certain qualities of which I

* "Because it is only by the aggregate of its qualities that substance manifests itself, it does not follow that substance is nothing but an aggregate of those qualities. It is evident that the aggregate of qualities into which Locke resolves substance, is altogether impossible without the supposition of substance. Royer Collard has perfectly exposed the various aspects of this impossibility. (Fragments of Lectures of M. Royer Collard, published in Jouffroy's edition of the works of Reid, vol. iv. p. 30.) I shall bring forward but a single one. Among all conditions which are requisite to the possibility of this aggregate, look at one which is clearly unquestionable; it is, that there should be some person, some mind, to make this collection, this combination. Numbers placed under each other do not make addition. Arithmetic does not itself perform the whole; it demands an arithmetician. Now, Locke, by denying substance, has destroyed the arithmetician necessary, in order to make this addition. The human mind no longer exists as an integrating quality, capable of finding the sum of the different quantities of which the collection is to be composed."—Elements of Psychology, p. 120, translated from Cousin.—*Histoire de la Philosophie*, by Rev. C. S. Henry. D. D.

am sensible, and these qualities I refer to substance. Now, it is impossible for me to escape from the affirmation of my intelligence, that the sensations which I experience from the apple, are in some sense connected with the *substance* of the apple. To deny my own substance, which experiences the sensations, or to deny the substance of the apple from whence they arise, would be equivalent to denying the existence of both.

2. Substance cannot be defined or demonstrated. It cannot be nominally defined, because we have no word which more clearly expresses the idea. It cannot be logically defined, because it does not admit of distribution into genera.* It cannot be physically defined, because it is not the subject of observation. We do not perceive substance, but only the qualities of substance. Nor can it be metaphysically defined, because there are no metaphysical essences and properties beyond that expressed by the simple word substance. And yet when the word substance is used, every one knows what is meant. It is not obscure and doubtful, because it cannot be defined. It cannot be defined, because it is so well known that there is nothing to which it can be referred clearer than itself, and therefore sufficient to explain it.

3. It is the basis of certain knowledges and conclusions; it explains and accounts for them. The sensations I experience from without—the thoughts, emotions, and volitions, which spring from within—cannot be known or defined without referring to sub-

* When we make the distinction of *material* and *spiritual* substance, we merely affix *differentia* to an idea already in the mind.

stance. It is body which is hard and round, hot or cold, sweet or sour; it is mind which thinks, feels, and wills: but we cannot conceive of the body, as itself the hardness, roundness, heat, cold, sweetness, or sourness, which we experience; nor of the mind, as itself the thoughts, emotions, and volitions, of which we are conscious. The body and the mind as the subjects of these various and respective attributes, we call substance; and we cannot conceive of the possibility of these attributes without the substance to which they belong. Substance enables us to explain and account for them. It is therefore a primary conception, a starting point of thought.*

SECTION IV.

Cause a first truth.

Now CAUSE, I believe, will prove another instance of these primary conceptions which precede all definition. What is cause? Can I give a nominal definition of it? I know not that there is any other word that will better express the idea. *Power* expresses the comparative energy of cause; hence we say, a powerful cause. Force expresses the energy

* Hardness, softness, sweetness, sourness, &c., are abstract terms—*i. e.*, terms which express qualities separate from the subject. But the very fact that we call them *abstract*, implies that they belong to *substance*; for a quality could not be said to be abstracted, if it did not belong to substance. An abstraction, also, by common consent, is not a reality; how, then, can a bundle of abstractions form a reality?

of cause, likewise, but particularly as connected with the idea of motion. Cause, then, does not require a nominal definition; the word is sufficiently distinct and intelligible. Can it be physically defined? Cause is not visible; it precedes phenomena. Nor is it divisible into parts. Cause, indeed, exists in physical masses, which are divisible, and may be described by an enumeration of their parts and qualities; but cause may not be confounded with the masses themselves. I appeal to the consciousness of every man, whether the cause of combustion is the same as the physical substance consumed, or dissolved into its elements? No, every one replies, fire is not wood. But is the fire some other body, which, coming into juxtaposition with wood, consumes it? By no means. We conceive of bodies *on fire* coming into juxtaposition with other bodies, and communicatng the fire; but the fire, that which consumes, is no body, and hath no form. We conceive of it simply as cause in relation to certain phenomena.

Again, is the flowing torrent, and the gravitation which is taken as the cause of its flowing, the same? That which flows on, we conceive of as a collection of material particles; but why do they flow? When we have physically defined the water, when we have ascertained the momentum of its movement, we have not made visible, we have not defined the cause. We look at the effects, and we say, simply, there is a cause, and we cannot avoid affirming a cause; and while we physically define the effects, by describing them as they appear and are related in time and space, and metaphysically define them by

referring them to cause, the cause itself remains simply as cause to our thought, neither receiving, nor admitting, nor requiring any physical definition.

When I make a volition to move my arm, and the movement follows, the volition is not the muscular movement. The volition, taken as a cause of the movement, cannot become the subject of physical definition; and if the volition itself have a cause, whether that be considered a self-determining will, or a motive, it is equally impossible to give a physical definition of it.

If it were possible to reduce cause to a mere succession of phenomena, taking the antecedent phenomena always as the causes of the immediately succeeding, then, indeed, we might give a physical definition of cause: *e. g.*, if the water pouring upon the wheel, were all that we mean by the cause of the revolution of the wheel, then the physical definition of the water would be the definition of cause.

This is, indeed, one theory of cause. Let us examine it. It is said that phenomena are presented in a constant succession; and that where any phenomena are related, so that when one appears the other immediately and invariably follows, then the antecedent is called cause, and the sequent is called effect; and that cause and effect express nothing more than this invariable and immediate antecedence and sequence. Respecting this theory, I remark:—

1. Phenomena, undoubtedly, are presented in succession. The relation of antecedence and sequence every where appears.

2. This relation is in some cases invariable and immediate; in others, variable and distant.

3. The very existence of phenomena independently of their succession, independently of any relation which they hold to each other, demands a cause. If we conceive the universe, instead of appearing in its present order, harmony, and beauty, to be a mere chaos of material particles, it would still demand a cause.

4. When these chaotic particles have come into order and fixed relations, then this order and these fixed relations, then the invariable and immediate succession into which the phenomena are brought, demand a cause. We conceive of some power that hath thus arrranged them, that hath made them thus interdependent: *e. g.*, whenever burning matter is brought into contact with combustible matter, the fire is communicated. Now we conceive of a power which has created and correlated the fire and the combustibles; and this power, which we conceive of, is invisible, and distinct from, and antecedent to, the phenomena.

5. When we conceive of physical or second causes, we do not even in this case, as the theory above referred to implies, regard the phenomenon which is the invariable and immediate antecedent, as itself the cause; *e. g.*, a piece of magnetized metal dipped into a box of needles. Here we do not regard the steel as the power which lifts up the needles; we conceive of an invisible influence, which we call magnetism, residing in the steel; and this, and not the antecedent phenomenon, viz. a piece of steel, is the cause. Again; let a match be applied to gunpowder, we perceive nothing beyond the match and the gunpowder:

there is no visible *nexus ;* no visible correlation of their substances ; but still we conceive of such a *nexus ;* of such a correlation ; and the cause is this invisible constitution and correlation of the fire to the gunpowder. Physical cause, no less than first cause, or mind, is really invisible. The phenomenal, or that which appears in the consciousness, either through the senses or from the action of the mind within, is universally conceived of as subsequent to, and dependent upon cause ; cause being that without which it could not exist, and being that which accounts for its existence. If for a moment we were to suppose the cause to become visible, then in taking the form of a phenomenon it would demand to be accounted for ; it would indeed cease to be a cause. Now, if cause be not any thing presented to observation, but be that which accounts for every thing observed, accounts for it is as existent simply, and also as arranged, and related, and moving in time and space, then plainly cause admits of no physical definition.

6. The invariable antecedence and sequence is a mere regular succession of changes or phenomena. Now it is this succession that we are called upon to account for ; and surely we do not effect this by merely affirming the succession of itself, which we would be compelled to do if succession were all that we mean by cause. We account for the succession when we refer it to cause ; meaning by cause, that which comprehends the succession, or is the ground of its existence.

7. "The immediateness and invariableness" of the succession of the phenomena ; *e. g.*, the invariable and immediate explosion which follows the conjunc-

tion of fire and gunpowder, is only an expression of the fixed law and order of the universe, according to which a particular degree and form of causality is connected with certain substances in certain relations. It is an expression of uniform and regulated causality. In the omnipotence which we assign to God, it would evidently have been possible for him to have made a conjunction of particular substances at one moment, the immediate antecedent of a certain change or phenomenon, and at the next moment the antecedent of a totally different and opposite phenomenon. In this case we would not have inferred the absence of cause; for the ever-varying and chaotic phenomena would to our consciousness have still demanded causality; but we would have inferred the absence of settled purpose, wise design, or law; we would have regarded the universe as governed by an arbitrary and wild phantasy. The uniformity is not necessarily the characteristic of cause as such, but of law or design, which regulates it.

8. Regular and invariable succession, is indeed a sign by which we detect the presence of cause; or the visible matter in which cause resides; *e. g.*, a lump of ice placed amid a number of objects among which is fire, is found invariably to dissolve when the fire is present, but to remain unchanged when it is absent. Now we infer that the causality is connected with the fire, not because we see the power exerted, but because we connect with the action of cause some design, purpose, or law. "Nature is uniform in her operations;" where the uniformity appears, there we

judge the causality of nature is at work, as a causality connected with, and regulated by, wise designs.

Does cause admit of a logical definition?

Phenomena, and phenomena alone, are classed into genera and species, on the grounds of resemblance and difference. We indeed speak of a magnetic cause; a healing cause; a consuming cause, &c.; but these *differentia* really refer to the phenomena. The phenomena of magnetism, and of healing, and of combustion, all differ from each other: but cause is but one simple idea, the idea which accounts for the possible and actual existence of these various phenomena. Indeed, we can conceive of the same cause as producing them all; as when we conceive of the Divine Being as the universal and sole cause. This plainly is possible: and in the case of second causes we do actually attribute a vast variety of phenomena to one cause. The phenomena being capable of being reduced to genera and species, while the cause retains all its simplicity.

One cause is said to act in relation to certain kinds of substances, and produces certain kinds of phenomena. Another cause is said to act in relation to other substances, and produces other phenomena; but the idea of cause in all is the same, as that which is the ground of the changes or phenomena, as that which accounts for them, as then and there actually taking place.

Human power, taken under any point of view, is one of perfect simplicity; it is nothing that can be described under any form; it can neither be physically separated into parts, nor logically distributed into

genera: it always manifests itself by volition; and yet how various are the phenomena produced; the phenomena of which volition is the immediate antecedent!

But do we not infer a difference in the causes from a difference in the phenomena? What difference, I ask in reply, can we conceive of? Fire dissolves certain bodies into their component elements; gravitation causes bodies to fall to the earth; but there is no difference in kind in the cause that we can conceive of or define, other than by referring to the different characteristics of the phenomena; and as it is plainly conceivable, and, indeed, is matter of fact, that one cause produces a great variety of phenomena, widely differing in their characteristics, we are not at liberty to infer from the differences of the phenomena, any differences in kind in the causes. There may, however, be differences in degree; one cause may produce a greater variety of phenomena than another; and thus, causes which produce certain phenomena, and act in relation to certain substances only, may be conceived of as simply limited in power, or in their causality, without implying difference in kind. If, for example, I were gifted with the power of regulating the digestive functions of my stomach, or the circulation of my blood, or of moving my ears after the manner of a dog or a horse, it would argue no new power differing in kind, but merely the extension of my causality. My volition now is limited to the movement of certain members, and cannot influence others; if I could likewise move my ears as I do my hands, then my volition would do one thing more than it is now capable of doing. And so on.

Again. Water is known to hold salt in solution: now, if we were to suppose water to have the additional power of dissolving wood, and holding the potassium in solution without any action of fire, we would not be altering in our conception the nature or kind of solvent power in the water. We would only be extending or enlarging that power. It is manifest, that if we had made the experiment of the solvent power of water only upon sugar, we might, with as much propriety, conjecture that if farther tried, it would dissolve wood as that it would dissolve salt.

All these examples are really appeals to consciousness, and go to show the entire simplicity of the idea of cause, and the impossibility of logically defining it as above understood.

Can the idea of cause be metaphysically defined?

If cause be defined at all, it must be defined metaphysically; *i. e.*, by essences and properties beyond sense, and known only by reason. But is there any primary conception or idea of the reason to which it can be referred as comprehending it? There is none unless it be substance or spirit. Shall we say of cause it is substance? Then we run counter to a primary and necessary conception, because we conceive of cause as residing and acting in substance, and not as substance itself; thus the primary and secondary qualities of matter, if conceived of as causes, are causes residing in substance, and are known to us by the effects they produce in us. The powers and faculties of mind are conceived of not as constituting substance, but as residing in it. As cause cannot be defined by substance, so evidently it cannot be de-

fined by spirit, inasmuch as spirit is substance endowed with certain faculties, one of which is cause itself. Hence, we can define spirit in part by cause. So that cause, like substance, is one of those primary conceptions by which we define, but which, because primary, admits of no metaphysical definition. We indeed have various forms of expression which appear like definitions, but which in reality are none unless they be considered as nominal—but then as nominal, they are not clearer than the simple word cause; *e. g.*, we may thus define cause as that which produces all changes or phenomena. But what is it *to produce?* Why, simply to cause. We may define cause as the ground of phenomena, and as accounting for phenomena. But how the ground of them, and how accounting for them? Why simply because it causes them. We may say again, that cause is that which explains all things as existent; but this amounts to the same idea. One form of expression may be more familiar to some minds than other forms of expression, and therefore it may be good rhetoric to prefer one form to another; but, philosophically, we can find no form of expression better than cause, and no idea beyond it by which it can be defined. But are we thence to conclude that cause is obscure or doubtful? By no means. We have already shown that the indefinableness of a primary idea arises from its very clearness and positiveness. There is nothing clearer than itself, which can be referred to in order to define it. This will appear still further, when we consider in the next place whether cause possesses the first characteristic of primary ideas above men-

tioned, viz: that it is affirmed by the intelligence with a positiveness from which it is impossible to escape. Let us try to banish the idea of cause. Let us try to look at phenomena irrespective of cause. I hold up this book; can we regard it as without a cause? To every man's consciousness it is impossible. No more certainly does the book exist, than the intelligence affirms it must have a cause. I may proceed in this way from phenomenon to phenomenon, and I find within me the same affirmation. I may next suppose new changes about to be made; *e. g.*, that this book shall in a few moments be in separate fragments; but I cannot conceive of its being done without a cause. The possible, as well as the actual, the past and future as well as the present, presume cause. But it is unnecessary to induct all possible phenomena. We find in our consciousness the irresistible affirmation of reason, "Every phenomenon presumes a cause."

It remains therefore only to inquire, whether this idea of cause have the third characteristic of a primary conception, viz: That it is the basis of certain knowledges and conclusions—that it explains and accounts for them. This indeed is evident. All natural science is based upon this conception of cause. Here the great object of our investigations is to ascertain second causes and their laws, in order to explain the phenomena of the material world.

In moral science, we always assume that man is the cause of his actions, and it is only in this way that we explain his responsibilities and the procedures of moral government in reference to him. Natural

theology, embracing the knowledge of God and his attributes, is plainly based upon the same conception.

We take cause then as a primary conception or idea of the reason. It cannot be defined physically, for it precedes and accounts for the existence of all that is physical. It cannot be defined by genus and species, because an idea of the utmost simplicity, like time, and space, and substance. It cannot be defined metaphysically, because itself a primitive element of all metaphysics. It is perfectly known in the only way in which it can be an object of knowledge, viz: by the intuition of reason; and as a first knowledge, it explains, together with other primitive ideas, all knowledges that comes after it.

SECTION V.

How do we arrive at the idea of cause?

THE senses cannot be the sole origin of the idea. By the senses we perceive merely phenomena in their constant succession. Place a lump of ice before a fire-grate filled with blazing fuel, and immediately it begins to melt. The change proceeds under your eye until the whole becomes water. The water is at first tepid; then it becomes hot; and next it boils, and finally entirely evaporates. The phenomena succeed each other; but the cause which produces them, the *nexus* which binds them together, is not observed by the senses; but by the law of our intelligence, when the phenomena are presented, we affirm they must have a cause. The intelligence would not make the

affirmation if an occasion were not presented, demanding it. All these primitive conceptions may be said to slumber in the reason; or to banish the metaphor, the reason does not proceed to form and develope them, until experiences take place which have their beginning in the senses, and which call for those primitive conceptions in order to explain them, and to form them into distinct knowledges. The conception of cause is not required until phenomena are given; but the moment they are given, cause must be conceived of, or the intelligence cannot proceed to account for the phenomena, and to form them into science. It is proper, therefore, to say, that phenomena, or the experiences of the senses, are the necessary conditions of the idea of cause, but that cause itself is purely a conception of the reason, given out when the condition is supplied, or the occasion presented which claims the development of the idea.

SECTION VI.

What are the experiences or phenomena in connection with which the idea of cause is first given?

The conviction, the consciousness of life, is first given us in sensation. The eye receives light; the ear receives sound; the smell is touched by fragrance; taste is awakened; feeling and muscular resistance are known. In sensation is the birth of life, and hence in sensation is the waking up of every faculty of being. Perception, thought, reasoning, and all the passions and emotions, have their beginning here.

In affirming this, however, let me by no means be understood to represent sensation as the measure of our being, or as affording all the materials on which its faculties are exercised. The soul we conceive of as endowed with its proper faculties before sensation takes place; but these faculties do not develope themselves, do not come into exercise, until sensation takes place. When sensation takes place, then they start in their career according to their inherent or constituted force and capacity. That sensation, although marking the commencement of their development, and forming the indispensable condition of their activities, does not measure their action, and supply all their materials of action, is gathered from our consciousness. We find in our consciousness ideas and knowledges, which, although acknowledging sense as supplying the conditions of their birth, do not acknowledge sense as their source and origin; *e. g.*, space; time; substance; the finite and infinite; personal identity; cause; the ideas of right and wrong; of justice and injustice; of the beautiful; geometrical lines and proportions. These and others must be referred to the reason, as its own birth, its own intuitions, its positive and irresistible affirmations.

Now, amid our first experiences, and our original developments of the primary conceptions, where does cause appear?

If sensations be first given, we must know them; we must be conscious of them: but to know them, to be conscious of them, from the definition I have given of consciousness, must mean simply to recog-

nize ourselves in the sensations; it must be to affirm, I see, I hear, I smell, I taste, I feel.

But from our constant and daily experience, we know full well, that in order to recognize ourselves in any sensation, in order to affirm, I see, I hear, &c., we must make an appropriation of ourselves to the sensations. This self appropriation is what we mean by attention. We withdraw ourselves from other objects that are occupying, or that might occupy us, and confine ourselves to a particular object, or in other words, to a particular experience or phenomenon of consciousness.

Sensations, generally, easily induce the attention; but still without any great effort we are continually withdrawing our attention from one sensation to another; and when engaged in deep thought, we withdraw attention from sensation altogether.

During the last half hour I have no recollection of having heard various sounds, which I know have all the while been produced within my hearing. A blacksmith has been hammering on his anvil in the rear of my house; and directly in front, carpenters are at work upon new buildings. Now that I recall my attention from my mental occupation within doors, I hear these various sounds loudly enough, but I certainly was not sensible of them before.

There are a thousand similar facts, familiar to every one. Now if these sensations are not attended to, they plainly do not form grounds or occasions of knowledge. While I am not attending to the sounds of the anvil, I am not knowing at the time, nor furnishing myself with suggestions for any future know-

ledge of the blacksmith and his work. What is true in this instance, must be true in every other similar instance; and hence the general conclusion, that whatever may be the sensations produced in us, these sensations become sources of knowledge only when attended to.

If it should be affirmed that the sensations above alluded to were not produced in me, then more importance would be conceded to the act of attention than I am contending for. A person who has been sitting with me has heard these sounds distinctly. It appears, therefore, that the hammering must have been made, and the air put into a state of vibration, and consequently the tympanum of the ear must have received the impression. Now, as all the requisite media of the sensation existed, and as all the requisite conditions were fulfilled, if no sensation was produced in my mind because withdrawn and occupied with something else, then the act of attention must be the power which really creates the sensation. It is quite immaterial to my purpose which view is taken, since it clearly appears that without the act of attention, or self-appropriation, there is no perception, no knowledge.

It follows, therefore, that in the primitive development of our being—sensation being the first experience—in order to any perception or knowledge, any action of the intellectual powers, and consequently in order to the production of any emotion or passion, the sensation must be followed by the act of attention.

What is this act of attention? It is not an act of

sensation, nor an act of intelligence; and yet, without it, the sensation leads to no results, and is not even recognized in the consciousness, and the intelligence springs not into activity. It is the act by which we direct and use the intelligence, with its constituted capacity, when the sensation has presented the occasion: thus, to the sensation which now rises in my consciousness, I direct my intelligence, and I know that the blacksmith is hammering out his iron upon the anvil.

What are the characteristics of this act of attention? Recollect, our appeal is to consciousness. The characteristics of the act must be recognized by each man for himself; but as I believe humanity to be one, and mind to be one, I doubt not but the facts which I faithfully detail from my own consciousness, will meet a response in the consiousness of others.

The first characteristic of this act of attention is this, that it is under our control. We can exercise it, or not, in any given case. The blacksmith is hammering upon his anvil. Now I do not feel compelled to attend to the ringing of the hammer upon the anvil. I may sit and listen to it, or I may get up and walk away out of the hearing of it—or, retaining my place, I may direct my attention to the noise of carpenters at work in front of my house, or I may attend to the shouts and talking of my children who are frolicking in an adjacent room, or I may take up this book: what is it? One of the Tales of My Landlord—the Bride of Lammermoor. I look into it, and I soon lose in its exciting incidents the sense of all outward sounds and sights, and I am away in imagination in

the solitary tower of Wolf's Crag, or by the old gothic ruins of the Wizard Fountain. And when I give my attention in any particular direction, I am clearly conscious that I can withhold it from this direction, and give it in an opposite direction. The act seems entirely my own act, my own doing and creation: there is no compulsion whatever. And even where my attention seems strongly solicited in any particular direction, I can withdraw it, and fix it upon something else: the tale just mentioned is so interesting to me, that I find myself strongly solicited to throw aside my metaphysical speculations; but, although it would be a high gratification to me to do so, I judge it to be my duty to continue my severer studies, and I yield my desires to my judgment.

This characteristic I do not find in the sensation, or in the act of intelligence. The sensation seems produced by something out of myself, beyond my control. I have no power over the motions of the blacksmith; I cannot prevent the vibrations of the air; I cannot change the constitution of my ear; and I have no relief from these sensations, except by diverting my attention: here seems to be the whole of my doing. If I give my attention I must hear. And so, likewise, with the intelligence: if I give my intelligence to these sounds, which is indeed giving my attention to them, I cannot avoid forming a judgment respecting them; I cannot help *knowing* that a blacksmith is at work. There is only one way in which I can prevent this judgment, this knowledge occupying my consciousness, and that is, by directing my attention to some other object. The sensation and

the knowledge I cannot directly control: the act of attention I can directly control. This distinction I am confident every one will understand, and recognize at once in his consciousness.

The act of attention, by the characteristic above explained, is identified in kind with another act, viz., the act of moving the muscles of the body. We cannot make the blood circulate, nor can we stop its circulation; we cannot make the food digest, nor can we directly stop its digestion: we have no more command over these functions than over our sensations. But there are many muscles that we can directly control, and by them move various parts of the body. It is thus that we command the hands and feet, and place the body and head in various postures. Now, this difference between movements in the body which go on without us, and which we cannot control, and those which cannot go on without us, and which we do control, is very obvious. And what do we mean by controlling muscular movements, and by calling them movements which cannot go on without us? Why, simply this, that we are the causes of those movements, just as we are the causes of the acts of attention. And these muscular movements, just like the acts of attention, are movements that we can make, or forbear to make. I can lie perfectly still, or I can get up and run about; I can move this member, or that member; I can talk, or I can keep silent; I can speak these particular words, or other words. When moving any of my members, I am conscious of the judgment or affirmation, that I can forbear to move them, and can move some other mem-

bers. When uttering any particular words, I have in my consciousness the judgment as a positive belief, that I can forbear to utter them, or that I can utter some other words ; and this is what we mean by controlling our intelligence in acts of attention ; and of controlling our muscular system in producing phenomena in the external world : and this also is what we mean by causing them.

But in our consciousness we clearly go back one step more than I have yet detailed. First, with respect to intelligence ; we are conscious not only of directing and controlling the intelligence as to its objects, and as to the extent and continuity of its action, but we are conscious also of making a *nisus*, an effort to do so.

Take any given subject of study ; take Euclid's Elements of Geometry : in order to study this what must I do ? I must withdraw my mind from all other objects ; I must hold my intelligence simply and strictly upon this. If I patiently and continuously hold my attention, the intelligence goes on to reason. It is not in my power to make or deny the truth of the proposition. The intelligence pursues the demonstration and affirms the truth of it irresistibly. I may withdraw my attention ; *i. e.*, I may withdraw my intelligence from the particular subject in hand, and fix it upon something else ; but if I hold the intelligence steadily to the subject, the reasoning proceeds, and the conclusion is given according to the laws of the intelligence itself. Now, in holding the intelligence to the subject, I am conscious of an effort, a *nisus* to do so. I am conscious at sometimes of greater diffi-

culties and obstacles, than at other times: I may be tempted to lay aside Euclid's Elements on some particular occasion, by the charms of a book of poetry, or a collection of tales, or the conversation of a friend, or a ride or walk; or the intelligence may be slow in apprehending—the difficulty may be in the act of ratiocination itself. Under these circumstances, I am conscious of increasing my efforts; I strive to resist the temptations to relaxation; I earnestly endeavor to hold my intelligence upon the study which severely tasks it. What are these efforts to attend to a subject, or to study it? I can only say they are efforts which I make: I may call them volitions, or give them any other name; but in order to be understood, I must refer to consciousness. Who is there that is not aware of these efforts; and who does not comprehend me when I speak of them? They admit of no definition other than to call them the immediate effects, the first demonstrations of myself, as a cause; and all this can be understood only by referring again to consciousness.

Secondly: with respect to muscular movements. Here, also, we are conscious not only of controlling, or causing these movements, but we are conscious of an effort, or a *nisus* to do so. When we get up and walk, when we move the head and arms, when I hold this pen and move it over the paper, there is plainly an effort to do so. Ten thousand of these motions are so easily made, the muscles are so obedient and ready from long practice, that we are unable to mark them all in the consciousness; *e. g.*, the efforts to speak, to walk,

to write, the adjustment of the eye in seeing, &c. When the child begins to walk or speak, when we first attempt to write, or when we commence the acquisition of a new language, the efforts are obvious enough. So also when we make an extraordinary muscular effort, like leaping, running, wrestling, lifting weights, and the various gymnastic exercises, we are conscious of intense efforts. Now, these efforts all seem to come from within; we affirm that *we* make them: they are not made in us like the circulation of the blood, and the various secretions; the latter we do not trace to ourselves; but the former we do trace to ourselves; we affirm that we are the causes of them, and without any farther definition we know what we mean when we affirm that we are the causes of them. This *nisus*, or effort from within, is never more apparent than when we meet with opposition of such a character that we are compelled to increase our efforts: *e. g.*, I put a lever under a mass, and endeavor to pry it up; at first the mass seems immoveable—I produce upon it no perceivable impression: I renew the effort with increasing energy—I make a greater effort; the side of the mass is partially heaved up: I take courage, and collecting all my strength, I make a last and total effort, and the mass is overturned from its place. Now, to an observer there are presented only the mass, the lever, the hand and arm of the man, the successive strainings and swellings of the muscles, the bending of the lever, and finally the removal of the mass. The power is invisible; it is in the man; and how it operates in the man the outward observer cannot see: but what

another cannot see, I am conscious of, viz: the internal effort, *nisus*, or volition, and the successive increase of this *nisus* to the utmost capacity of the physical organization which is directly acted upon. It will be granted that the idea of cause and power is connected with the whole process: the lever must be strong and powerful, or it cannot be employed for the removal of the mass: the physical structure of the arm and hand must be strong and powerful, or it cannot manage the lever; both the lever and the arm with its hand, must have magnitude, firmness, and cohesiveness relatively to the mass, to be removed. But where lies the sense, the knowledge, the realization of force and causality? Undoubtedly within me. Here I have the consciousness of a *nisus*, or effort, to which I myself am the antecedent; which I myself make and account for.

If it be asked with respect to acts of attention, or efforts directing the intelligence, or with respect to efforts directing the muscular system, how these efforts are made, the consciousness only replies, I make them. The consciousness does not bring to light the *modus* of making these first efforts or volitions, no more than observation brings to light the *modus* of any external secondary cause. If, for a moment, we were to suppose that the consciousness did bring to light the *modus* of making these primary efforts within ourselves, then this *modus* becoming a phenomenon of consciousness, would demand with as good reason to be explained as primary efforts or volitions now may be supposed to demand it; and thus we should go on explaining one *modus* by

another antecedent to it, *ad infinitum*. We are *logically* compelled therefore to admit a primary movement whose *modus* is not to be explained by any antecedent *modus ;* and to our consciousness, that is, *psychologically*, the efforts, or *nisus*, called volitions, are just this sort of movement.

If it be asked, What is this *myself* to which I assign the primary nisus? The only reply which can be given is, that this *myself* is the cause of the *nisus*, and that the nisus in relation to it is an immediate phenomenon or effect; and I have already shown that cause, as a primary conception or idea, does not admit of or require a definition. When I say, therefore, that I am the cause of these primary efforts, I understand myself, and no one acquainted with the language in which I speak can possibly misunderstand me.

I have already shown that cause, a primary conception, is known by the reason on condition of certain experiences or phenomena. The reason gives out this conception when it is demanded, on occasion of phenomena, in order to account for them.

I then asked the question, What are the experiences or phenomena in connection with which the idea of cause is first given? We are now prepared to answer this question. We have shown, 1. That sensation is the first condition of the development of our intelligence, and consequently of our various emotions and passions, for these are consequent upon the perception of objects and their qualities. 2. That sensation becomes to us a condition of knowledge only by an act of attention, or an act appropriating the intelli-

gence to the sensation. 3. That this act of attention, by its characteristic, is identified in kind with the act, by which we appropriate our muscular organization for the production of external phenomena. 4. That both in the case of acts of attention and of muscular exertion, the consciousness distinctly recognizes *nisus*, or volitions, which are primary phenomena, or effects, and know of no antecedent but myself, and that I cannot but regard this myself as the cause of the primary *nisus*.

It must follow, therefore, that the idea of cause is given in connection with the first act of attention, which precedes and forms the condition of the first perception or knowledge. We cannot go back by recollection to our first sensations, and to the dawn of reason; but from the present facts of our consciousness, we cannot but conclude that in the very dawn of reason is the incipient knowledge of cause; that the experiences by which we first know cause are not experiences of external observation, but experiences from within. I FIND, FIRST OF ALL, THAT I MYSELF AM CAUSE.

SECTION VII.

Principle of Causality.

THIS principle is as follows, EVERY PHENOMENON MUST HAVE A CAUSE. This principle is affirmed by reason—it is a first, an intuitive principle. It cannot, however, be first revealed. Plainly, a know-

ledge of phenomena, and a knowledge of cause must have existed in the consciousness before the proposition could have been framed, "every phenomenon must have a cause." But it must also be true that before I can affirm of myself, "I am a cause," I must have had the idea of cause; and yet this idea of cause is not known in the consciousness until a phenomenon is actually in the consciousness in relation to myself as a cause. So that on the one hand, until a particular cause has developed some phenomenon, the judgment or axiom cannot exist that, "every phenomenon must have a cause;" and, on the other hand, without the idea of cause, I could not affirm of myself in the consciousness of a primary *nisus*, or effort, or volition, I am the cause of it, and it in relation to me is an effect.

We must conclude, therefore, that in the earliest development of our being, there is a simultaneous action of reason, sense, and causality. Sense supplies conditions—causality appropriates reason, or intelligence in the act of attention; and in the very act by which reason is developed, reason knows and characterizes that which appropriates it, by giving out the idea of cause in relation to the individual, and then immediately generalizing the idea into the axiom or principle of causality.

The distinction which Cousin has drawn between the logical and the chronological order and conditions of our ideas in their origin, is clear and satisfactory.*

* Cours de Philosophie, Tome II., Leçon 17.

According to this distinction, the idea of causality is the logical condition and antecedent of the judgment, "I am a cause:" that is, this judgment could have no place in the intelligence, had not the intelligence developed the idea of causality; without this idea the judgment would be logically impossible. But, on the other hand, had not a particular cause gone into action, and produced phenomena, there would have been no occasion for the development of the principle: that is, the idea of cause being in itself no phenomenon which begins to exist, but an eternal principle, and a principle which explains phenomena when they do begin to exist, cannot, according to the constitution of our being, make its appearance in our intelligence, until by the actual existence of phenomena in time, its presence is required; and thus the particular cause, with its phenomenon, becomes the chronological condition and antecedent of the development of the principle of causality. To sum up these observations in brief, I could not affirm cause of any thing without the idea of cause; but I could not develope the idea of cause without the occasion of a cause actually producing a phenomenon: and thus the reason and causality in man in their first development act together, and conditionate each other, in the unity of the human mind; the causality in its first movement giving occasion for the reason to come forth, and the reason in its first movement, and upon this occasion, revealing the great principle of causality itself.

The idea of cause, and the principle of causality, are thus primitive developments of the reason or in-

telligence; and with the primitive development of reason is connected the action of myself as a cause, so that with the very birth of the idea of cause, is the knowledge of myself as a cause. I KNOW MYSELF AS A CAUSE BEFORE I KNOW ANY OTHER CAUSE. All, therefore, that I know of cause in its *kind* or *nature*, is realized fully and primarily in myself.

SECTION VIII.

First and Infinite Cause.

THE idea of the infinite being given in the primitive development of the reason, unites itself with the idea of cause. The infinite cause is God. I do not mean that this is the whole idea of God, but that God, so far as he is cause, is the infinite cause.* This idea of God, as an idea which cannot be collected from that "which is seen," but as simply an irresistible con-

* The idea of God, as an infinite cause, does not imply the power of creating that which is manifestly in its nature absurd and impossible; *e. g.*, the power of making all the angles of a triangle equal to three right angles: neither does it imply that God is the author of the volitions of free agents, if by such agents, we understand beings endowed with a contingent causality. It is only by admitting the idea of a contingent causality, that the dogma which affirms God to be the author of sin, can be set aside. If the volitions of a created agent arise from causalities antecedent to the will of such agent, then these volitions cannot but depend ultimately upon the efficiency of the first cause: but where the volitions arise immediately from a will which is contingent, and may determine itself to either good or evil, then the particular determination rests solely with this will. The will demands the first cause to account for its existence, but it itself accounts for its own volitions.

ception and affirmation of the reason, forms the *à priori* evidence of the being of a God. The being of God is thus a first or intuitive truth.

A FIRST CAUSE, and self-existent, is known logically on the basis of the principle of causality, "*every phenomenon must have a cause.*"

The causality of the human mind accounts only for its *nisus* or volitions. The sequents of the volitions, and the phenomena of the world generally, demand some other cause to account for them. I affirm, without hesitation, that I am the cause of the *nisus*, or volitions, which stand in immediate connection with myself; but I cannot affirm that I am the cause of the muscular system which obeys my volition, nor of its *nexus* with my volition; nor can I affirm that I am the cause of the sensations, perceptions, and emotions, which appear in my consciousness; nor of the external world, which they reveal to me.

There must be causes other than myself. To these causes other than myself, I must refer the existence of the universe; of the phenomena of the universe, and my own existence. That I myself am a cause is settled; but I am not self-existent; I therefore had a cause; I am a cause, caused. Now, wherever there are causes like myself, finite and dependent, and not self-existent, they must, like myself, demand an antecedent cause. This antecedent cause, if it be finite and dependent, and not self-existent, must in like manner demand an antecedent cause, and so on, until we arrive at a self-existent cause. This self-existent cause must at length be arrived at; since an infinite series of causes, without any first, is a logical absurd-

ity. That there cannot be more than one self-existent first cause, appears from this. The existence of an infinite cause is an affirmation of the reason; but an infinite cause must be a self-existent first cause, from its very definition; it could not be infinite, if it were created and secondary. If, then, there were more than one self-existent first cause, there would be a plurality of infinite causes; but this is a logical absurdity. A first cause manifestly is implied in an infinite cause.

The above is the *à postoriori* argument; it of course is dependent upon the *à priori*, or at least upon an *à priori* principle, for such the principle of causality must be considered.

SECTION IX.

Physical Causes.

Physical causes are those which are assigned to account specifically for all those phenomena which are not accounted for by the human causality. This human causality, as we have seen, directly accounts for only the primitive *nisus*, efforts, or volitions: every thing else, therefore, must be accounted for by these physical causes. Their characteristics, as generally conceived of, are:—

1. They are constituted secondary and dependent causes, having specific and limited powers. Hence they imply, and are accounted for by the Infinite First Cause.

2. They are causes which act according to uniform and fixed laws. These laws are the designs of the Infinite Wisdom.

3. They are causes without intelligence and the power of choice. They are regulated and determined solely by the choice and intelligence of the First Cause.

4. They are causes of which we may avail ourselves, and which we may appropriate to our own particular purposes, by obeying the general laws which regulate them. It is thus that wind, water, steam, and the mechanical forces generally are appropriated. The first appropriation that we make is that of the cohesiveness and mechanical powers found in the bone, muscle and sinew of the tabernacle in which we dwell. By these more immediate instrumental forces we proceed to appropriate others in the world around, until we gradually form that concentration of mechanical powers by which we exercise an extensive control over nature.

We thus can have but two classes of causes: 1. Self-conscious causes. 2. Causes which are not self-conscious. The first are of two degrees—the finite, and the infinite.

It appears from the above, that we first know ourselves as cause, and that the idea of cause which we have gained in connection with the actual exercise of our own causality, we next transfer to those other phenomena which we cannot connect immediately with ourselves. It must follow from this—

1. That if we are to conclude respecting either class of causes, from the other class, the natural and

true order is not to conclude respecting ourselves as cause from those which are not ourselves; not to conclude from those which are not self-conscious, to those which are self-conscious; but, on the contrary, the natural and true order must be to conclude from ourselves to those which are not ourselves. The knowledge of cause as gained from ourselves, should govern our knowledge of physical causes, rather than that our knowledge of physical causes should govern our knowledge of ourselves.

2. Our knowledge of ourselves as cause, is the most perfect knowledge which we have or can have of cause. This is evident, from the fact that in knowing ourselves we know the first movements, the first *nisus* of ourselves as cause. In the case of a physical cause, we only observe two material substances in contiguity or immediate succession, and then a change or new phenomenon appearing uniformly as the consequence of this contiguity or immediate succession of the two substances; and from the idea of cause in the reason, and from the judgment that law fixed and uniform regulates the movements of nature, we come to assign as cause something which resides in the uniform antecedent, *i. e.*, in the two substances in correlation with each other; for the two substances in their correlation really form the one antecedent of the change, or new phenomenon; *e. g.*, a piece of load-stone and steel filings. Here the antecedent is the contiguous position and correlation of the load-stone and the steel filings; and the change or new phenomenon, the adherence of the filings to the load-stone. Now, in the correlation of the two sub-

stances, we merely conceive of the presence of cause which indeed is invisible. Reasoning from ourselves as causes, we say there must be a *nisus* of power in the cause, but we do not observe this *nisus*. In ourselves we do observe the nisus of power; it is a matter of consciousness.

Again: our knowledge of ourselves as cause, is the most perfect knowledge of cause, because in our own case we can define positively the nature and characteristics of the cause. We can say of ourselves that we are intelligent causes, and free causes, and responsible causes. But what can we say of these second causes? Viewing them as second causes, we say they are not intelligent; they are not free; they are not responsible; but these are only negative characteristics. Indeed, are we certain that they are causes at all? For aught we know, may not all these phenomena be the immediate product of the Omnipresent, the Almighty, the Infinite Cause, acting according to the laws of an infinite wisdom, which it has prescribed for itself and chooses to obey; or, if we conceive of them as really causes, then what are they? They are causes which God has created, and regulated in their respective spheres. They are causes necessitated, and unconscious, and irresponsible. Beyond this negative conception we cannot reach, if we take them as causes.*

But how different, when we come back to ourselves! *Ego sum.* That I am, and that I am a cause, and that I will, or immediately put forth the

* Vide Chapter on Motives.

nisus of power. What do I know more positively or more satisfactorily than this. It is no question, with respect to myself, whether I be a cause or not, or what kind of a cause I am. My existence, my causality, my freedom, my responsibility; these are the first truths, and the constantly recurring, the abiding truths—the incontestible truths of my consciousness. In giving this statement, I do not mean to relieve myself from any part of my undertaken and promised argument; but when I shall have proved freedom and responsibility by the legitimate and only satisfactory method, it will then appear that I have only labored to lead back the argument by which men have gone astray, to the clear light of the most original and simple elements of thought and ratiocination.

Let us suppose, for a moment, that all second causes were to be resolved into mind directly—*i. e.*, let us suppose that every primitive *nisus* of every power were simply volition, having only the causality of spirit for its antecedent—and would not second causes become intelligible at once? They would then become assimilated to ourselves, and we should indeed know them, because we know ourselves. The intelligibility which they now possess, arises solely from—1st, the idea of cause lying within our own reason: 2dly, from their dependence upon the first cause—the Infinite Mind: 3dly, from assimilating them to ourselves by metaphor. Their elements of intelligibility, therefore, lie wholly in mind.

I have been thus particular on this point, because the great error of philosophers has ever been, to throw themselves at once amid physical causes, and after

collecting there the bare facts of material succession, to return with these to their spiritual being, as if they were the true, and indeed the only elements of causality. This is to dip up the flowing stream and to empty it back into its fountain, in order to ascertain the cause of its flowing forth. And what is the result? We have only to look into Hume's speculations to know the result. The bare succession of material facts does not present the idea of cause, or the principle of causality. The *nexus* of the succession and the *nisus* of power are *not seen.* We have the succession, and we have nothing else. We begin with it, and we end with it. Thus the affirmations of our intelligence are stultified by the bare observations of our senses, while these observations are themselves left unexplained. Our knowledges and beliefs become mere impressions, and causality the mere impression of a relation; but no fixed and imperishable grounds of knowledge and belief appear, and the relation of cause and effect has nothing beyong the mere succession itself to account for it.

I have pursued a widely different course. I have taken the idea of cause and the principle of causality as primary conceptions, which are directly known by the reason, and therefore neither admit of proof nor require it, but which are to be taken as themselves explaining phenomena; and to this end are known by us in the particulars of a First, and Infinte, and Self-existent cause, which is the ultimate ground of all existence; of dependent, self-conscious, free, and responsible causes, which are the ground of all human volitions; and of

physical causes,* which are the ground of the phenomena of matter. The causes first and best known to us are ourselves. In our investigations, therefore, we are to begin with ourselves, according to the grand maxim of all investigation, that we are to begin with that which we know best.

I resist all those investigations which endeavor to settle the psychology of our own causality by observations upon physical causes, which must pre-suppose the very point which they are employed to explain. I throw myself directly into the field of my consciousness, and inquire for the characteristics of my own causality where I first know cause at all, and where alone I can truly and legitimately know myself.

* I speak here of physical causes in accordance with generally received notions. In a proper place I shall give another view of them.—Vide Chapter on Motives.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE WILL.

SECTION I.

Definition of the Will.

WILL is employed to express the causality of the mind. I do not deny that it is often employed to express more than this, as affection, desire, and the decision of the judgment; but I mean that this is one usage, and the principal usage. To this usage I mean to confine it in the following investigation. That there is causality in the mind is settled: when I speak of will, I shall refer only to this causality; and although I may not be able to disintegrate the usage of the word will, I hope to disintegrate the mind's causality, so far as to show that it is distinct from the affections and judgments.

SECTION II.

By what do we distinguish the action of the Will?

WE know we are exercising will when we have this presentation in the consciousness, viz: certain

phenomena, and I myself recognized as the cause of the phenomena, either immediately or by instrumentality.

This, indeed, is involved in the definition of will above given. If will is cause, then we know that we are exercising the will when we know that we are acting as causes.

That we do know when we are acting as causes can be easily illustrated; thus, when I take up a book and confine my attention to it, I have the irresistible conviction, that I am myself the cause of the act of attention. It is I that exclude all other objects, and keep this one object before my intelligence. When I rise up and walk; when I move this pen over the paper; or when I make any other muscular exertion I have the conviction that I am the cause of these motions and exertions; and this is the same thing as to say that I will them. If I take hold of a crank, and by turning a wheel set a piece of machinery in motion, I affirm that *I* cause the motion of the machinery. There are, in all instances of muscular exertion, a series of motions or changes, one depending on the other. I am immediately and solely the cause of my volition; but in my muscular system I avail myself of other powers which are subjected to my volition; and in the case of the machinery, I am immediately and solely the cause only of my volition; but here certain mechanical forces are commanded by my volition, by means of an established connection between my muscular energies and the crank and wheel. I am the cause of all these remote movements, in the sense that I am the cause

of the volition upon which these movements depend; that is, I am the moving cause of the whole; the first cause, and the responsible cause; the movements must ultimately be charged upon me, or laid to my account. When, however, we consider the series of movements in the particular antecedents and sequents making up this series, I am not the immediate cause of each movement, of each sequent, here we bring in the physical causes. This distinction is obvious to every one. It may be briefly expressed as follows:—my proper and immediate causality lies in the production of volitions, or the primary *nisus:* my remote causality extends to every sequent which takes place in consequence of my volition, through a chain of physical causes. My responsible causality, that is, my causality in a moral point of view, extends to all volitions, and to all sequents of volitions, which I aim to accomplish by making the volitions.

SECTION III.

Contingency of the Will.

The opposite idea is that of necessity.

Necessity expresses a certain attribute of truth, being, or causality. It may be represented positively or hypothetically. A positive necessity refers to what actually is: a hypothetical necessity refers to what may be supposed to exist. A positive necessity is either absolute or relative.

A positive necessity is that which actually is, and

cannot be supposed not to be, or to be otherwise than it is; *e. g.*, the being of a God; mathematical truths; and all those truths which are generally known and received as intuitive truths.

A hypothetical necessity is the necessity of consequences when antecedents are supposed; *e. g.*, if certain premises be hypothesised, certain conclusions necessarily follow.

A positive necessity is absolute, when it is irrespective of all conditions, and of course irrespective of all will; *e. g.*, all the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; every body is in space.

A positive necessity is relative, when the necessity refers to particular relations; *e. g.*, the nature of physical causes is positively necessary, relatively to us, because we cannot alter that nature; thus we cannot change the law of gravitation, nor prevent the rising of the tides. But these physical causes are not necessary relatively to the Divine will. The same power which ordained them, can at pleasure alter, suspend, or annihilate them.

Now, contingency and necessity are opposite ideas, and negate each other. If all things come under the idea of necessity, then we need not inquire respecting contingency. It is not received, however, as an unquestionable truth, that necessity is both universal and absolute. There is an idea opposed to necessity, multitudes are ready spontaneously to aver. Let us see whether the consciousness recognizes this idea, and is able to define it intelligibly to itself, as well as to find subjects to which it may be legitimately applied.

Contingency is that which is, or may be, but which

might not have been, or might be different from what it is. We plainly have this idea. I appeal to every man's consciousness. This book lying before us, is—but it is conceivable that it might not have been, or that it might have been different from what it is. It is not necessary by a positive, absolute, nor even a relative necessity—nor by a hypothetical necessity. In relation to the will of God, we can conceive of its possible non-existence: He might have prevented it. In relation to the will of the author of the book, we can conceive of its possible non-existence: he might not have written it, or might have written a different book, or might have destroyed it after it was written. But we can form no such conception of 2+2=4. We can form no such conception of the being of God, nor of the existence of time and space. What is true of this book, is true of every production of human art and power. Now, all human art and power ultimately run back to human volitions: the contingency of all the sequents of human volitions must therefore be referred to the contingency of the volitions themselves. If the sequents of the volitions which appear to us contingent, are really so, then the volitions must be contingent likewise; for the necessity of the volitions would necessitate all the sequents, connected with them by a fixed law. Now, what is the testimony of every man's consciousness respecting the volitions? Does it sustain the logical inference above given? Are volitions necessary or contingent? It does not appear to me difficult to answer upon this point. If consciousness is clear and decisive upon any question of psychology, it certainly is clear and decisive here. Let us take any volition whatever; let us multiply

and vary the examples indefinitely, and the result is clearly the same.

I make an effort, or volition, to attend to this book; or to this conversation, or to this subject of thought; and in every act of attention I have this conviction, I might not attend, or I might attend to something else. Again I make a volition to raise my arm, to move my foot, to get up and walk, to sit down, or to make any muscular movement whatever; and in all these volitions, I have this conviction, I might forbear to make the volition, or I might make a different volition. I have no consciousness of any power antecedent to my own causality, compelling or necessitating that causality in any particular direction. I appear to myself the sole cause of my volitions, and I appear to myself a cause acting contingently. In any given case of causality, I cannot but think that I can forbear to do, what I am doing, or can exercise my causality in a way entirely different.

What my consciousness thus testifies respecting myself, I cannot but apply to Deity likewise. If I have this power to do, or not to do, He, as the first infinite mind, must surely have this power. Hence, as I actually do conceive of creation as contingent, that is, I conceive that it might not be, or it might be different from what it is, or might cease to be; so here likewise as in the case of human causality, I refer the contingency of all creation, and of all its changes, to the contingency of the divine volitions. When God said, "Let there be light," it was positively necessary that light should appear, necessary relatively to His infinite power: but we clearly con-

ceive that God was under no necessity of putting forth the volition or creative *nisus*, represented by the phrase, "Let there be light." We may not deny him an attribute which we possess ourselves. A necessitated Creator could not create free agents. A dependent and finite mind cannot exceed the measure of the first and the infinite.

So decisive are our conceptions on this subject, that the moment we suppose mind as cause to be necessitated in the exercise of its causality, we seem to destroy mind itself, and to bring it down to the mere conditions of physical causes. These physical causes cannot but act under their appropriate circumstances, and cannot but act uniformly. Fire must burn when thrown amid combustibles. The various elementary substances of chemistry must unite according to their definite proportions. A stone thrown into the air must fall to the ground. Wood thrown into water of proportionate depth, by the law of specific gravity, must float. Here is no choice on the part of the physical cause. But with ourselves, and with all beings like ourselves, we know it is altogether different. We choose the direction of our causality, and we can vary it every moment. We do not say of ourselves, I must lift this arm; I must move this foot; I must take hold of this chair; I must read this book; but we say I can do this or not, just as I please. And when we use this language, we do not mean that if we make the effort or volition it will be done;—*e. g.*, if I please or will to move my arm, my arm will move; but we mean that the volition or effort itself is entirely within our power:

we can make the volition, or we can forbear to make it, and in either case there is plainly no consciousness of compulsion or necessity. Now, how absurd it would be to say of fire when placed amid combustibles, it can burn or not burn; or, of a stone thrown up into the air, it can fall or not fall. The difference between ourselves as causes, and physical causes is only made out in this way, and in this way is plainly made out, viz: physical causes are necessitated causes—we are contingent causes.

SECTION IV.

Of Choice.

Edwards has defined will as the *power of choosing:* of course every act of the will is an act of choice. But in this definition of the will, when taken in connection with his subsequent discussions, he does not distinguish it from any other cause. Choice in his system is merely selection, that selection which belongs in common to every cause. It is impossible for a cause to act directly where it is not; it is impossible for a cause to do at the same time two acts which in their nature exclude each other. I cannot at the same time sit still and walk; I cannot be travelling in Germany while I am in England; fire cannot at the same time burn and not burn; and fire thrown amid stones and wood, will, according to its fixed nature, select the wood and leave the stones. Whether it be physical or metaphysical cause which

exists, there must be selection and particular determination.* Under this view of choice, we cannot claim it as the peculiar characteristic of will: it belongs as much to physical causes as to any other. We are startled by this conclusion, for we have been accustomed to conceive of choice as peculiar to will. If it is peculiar, we must take a different view of it from that of Edwards and his school. Let us ask our consciousnes, what characteristic of will is this which we call choice? Fire selects but does not choose. I not only select but choose: does the consciousness recognize this distinction? I believe few will be found who are not ready to answer in the affirmative. Choice, then, must differ from selection. Selection expresses only the particular direction of cause, the mere fact that the cause produces a particular phenomenon, and not another. It is manifested in physical causes under the correlation of two substances. Thus, fire and wood are correlated, so that combustion ensues, and the fire may be said to select the wood.

But here the selection is neccessary with a relative necessity, and goes invariably in one direction. Choice, on the contrary, does not admit the idea of necessity, and does not go invariably in one direction. Only let it be supposed that I am compelled or necessitated to do this or that: for example, that I am necessitated to get up and walk, and there is, to our apprehension, no propriety in affirming that I choose to walk. We only appear to ourselves to choose any thing, when it is clearly as much in our power not

* Review of Edwards on the Will, pp. 184 and 185.

to choose it as to choose it. If in any case there is no alternative, and we are absolutely compelled to go in a certain direction, or to do a certain thing, we say there is no choice left to us. If a number of men lay hold upon me, and place me on horseback, and lead off the horse; there is no choice left me whether to ride or walk. The very idea of choice implies that two or more objects are placed before the mind; and the choice is the mind fixing upon the one and not upon the other, when it is known to have the power of fixing upon either. Fire thrown among combustible and incombustible substances, we are sure will fix upon the combustible substances; and in this case we do not suppose that it has the power to fix upon the one or the other; and as it has not this power, we cannot affirm of it that it will exercise choice. But place a man amid a variety of objects, known to be equally within his power, but which yet cannot be all possessed together, and we feel assured that he can exercise the power of choice; because, whatever may be the object upon which he determines, we know that it was equally open to him to determine upon any other. To make this still more plain, take a case where some objects are open to an individual, and others, although in themselves desirable, are entirely out of his reach, and we shall find that we cannot affirm of the latter that he either chooses or refuses them, while we affirm this freely of the former. It cannot be said that I choose or refuse to fly; but it can be said that I choose or refuse to walk. It cannot be said that I choose or refuse to speak Chinese, because I have no knowledge of that

tongue; but it can be said that I choose or refuse to speak English. I can *refuse* to do only what I *might* do; I can *choose* to do only what I *might not* do.

In every instance of choice, a positive and negative are supposed, and the individual exercising the choice, decides between the negative and positive, conscious of the power to decide either way; and conscious at the moment he decides positively that he might decide negatively, and *vice versa;* that is, the positive and negative are both possible to him.

What then distinguishes choice from selection, from that selection which appears in every cause? Contingency distinguishes it, and contingency alone. The selection of physical causes is predetermined and necessitated; they accordingly exercise no choice. The selection of rational agents, on the contrary, does not appear to their consciousness to be predetermined and necessitated; they are always conscious before they make a selection, or attempt to make a selection, that they are placed upon the alternative of a positive or a negative, and that the determination of the selection rests with themselves as causes *per se:* in other words they select contingently, not necessarily; and because their selection has this characteristic, it receives a peculiar and marked designation, and is called CHOICE. It is impossible to distinguish the mere selection of physical or of irrational causes from the choice of rational causes in any other way. This must be apparent to every one who takes the least pains to think on the subject.

That we actually have this power of contingent selection; that we actually do choose, is determined

by the consciousness of men universally, if any thing is thus determined. Let us take any instance whatever; let us take any number of instances, and the testimony of consciousness does not vary. There is before me a basket of various kinds of fruit—apples, peaches, pears, oranges; if I suppose them to be already appropriated, so that I cannot get possession of any of them, then of course choice is out of the question. But if they are placed before me in order that I may take, or not take—take any or all, then I find myself in a condition to exercise choice. In the first place I may choose none at all, or in other words refuse them. I am strongly urged by my appetite; I know the fruit to be wholesome, and yet I am conscious that I can refuse them. Although my appetite is strong, although there is good reason for eating of the fruit, still I feel within me the power of resistance; I know I can deny my appetite; I know I can resist the good reason for eating of the fruit. I believe that I am now telling the story of every man's consciousness; I believe it because I know I am telling the story of my own consciousness; and humanity is one. In the second place, I may choose this fruit or that fruit; I may choose the oranges because I think them most wholesome; or I may choose the peaches, because I like them best; or I may choose the pears, although I do not think them most wholesome, and do not like them best: I feel within me an absolute and uncontrolled power of choice. And what I know to be my own experience, I believe to be every man's experience.

The question about the strongest motive I intend to

consider separately and fully, in its proper place. Logic, rather than consciousness has been employed in the determination of this question. I have already met this question logically ;* what remains to be done will be chiefly of a psychological character. I would only remark here, that, where we choose that which is most agreeable, or that which is most reasonable and proper, we are clearly conscious of power at the moment, to choose the opposite ; and where the most agreeable and the most reasonable are opposed, and form the alternative of the choice to be made, we are clearly conscious again of power to take the reasonable and refuse the agreeable ; or of power to take the agreeable and refuse the reasonable. If it be said that when we choose the reasonable, it is really most pleasing to us, and therefore we choose it only as the most agreeable ; this, on the one hand, is to assume that we are incapable of choosing the reasonable as such ; and on the other hand plainly contradicts every man's consciousness : for who is there, who in the strong mastery of himself, denies his passions and acts in obedience to duty, that does not feel that he is opposing himself to the most pleasing, the most agreeable as such, and acting in view of the most reasonable and proper as such ?

But to sum up the whole in one sentence : when we choose, we are conscious that we have power to refuse, that is, to choose the opposite : to select, or not to select, to select this object, or that object, to select contingently, *this is choice—this only is choice.*

* Review of Edwards on the Will, pp. 168—174.

SECTION V.

Choice and Volition distinguished.

I HAVE already represented contingency as a characteristic of the will, and consequently a characteristic of its primary *nisus*, or volitions. I have shown, also, that in every act of cause there must be selection: now, as contingent selection is choice, how does volition or the primary *nisus* differ from choice?

Choice and volition are indeed very generally used as perfectly synonymous; and in the system of Edwards are always thus used. I conceive, however, of a distinction which I will endeavor to explain. Volition, or the primary *nisus*, is the first action, or the first giving forth of cause to effect: choice, as used in contradistinction to volition, precedes the primary *nisus*, and is equivalent to predetermination or intention. I will suppose again the basket of fruit before me. My friend, who is entertaining me, asks me, "Which kind of fruit do you choose?" I reply according to my taste, or according to my judgment as to the wholesomeness of the fruit, "I choose the peaches, or I choose the oranges." Now this is really an act of choice, really a determination to take the fruit before the will has as yet exerted its causative *nisus*, or volition. Accordingly I hold myself in readiness, and when the fruit which I have chosen is put upon a plate and handed to me, I exert the *nisus* of my will, and receive the plate. The choice precedes the actual volition, or *nisus*, by which I take the

fruit; it is the determination what to do when the moment of action shall have come.

I will suppose again that I am engaged in a game of cricket. I stand at my post in readiness to strike the ball when rolled towards me; several minutes before the ball is rolled, I have determined generally what *nisus* to make. And with respect to many kinds of muscular exertion we all know full well that we are accustomed to place ourselves in a state of readiness to do, and have determined what to do, long before the time of doing arrives.

I may form a purpose or determination, or, in other words, make a choice years before the time for exerting the *nisus* which is to accomplish it. Thus I may now choose or determine to retire into the country ten years hence, (on certain conditions and contingencies of course,) but the volitions by which this is to be accomplished, as yet have no being.

Theologians generally conceive of the Supreme Being as having determined his own actions from eternity. The creative *nisus* was put forth when "God said, let there be light, and there was light." But the purpose or choice was eternal.

It is perfectly fair for any one now to raise the question, What is purpose, predetermination or intention, since choice in its peculiar and distinctive usage is equivalent to these? In the first place, these words do not express a simple act of intelligence or passion. I may perceive that something *ought* to be done, or that something is *desirable* to be done; but still I may not purpose, determine, intend, or choose to do it. I may feel myself strongly urged by good

reasons, and by my passions, and yet I may not determine to do it: and certainly the determination or choice not to do it, is not the perception, it *ought* to be done, nor the desire to do it.

In the second place, as we have above shown, the determination to do, is not the volition, or *nisus*, to do: on the contrary the determination to do may precede the *nisus* to do, by an indefinitely long period of time.

Before a determination is formed, there is undoubtedly an act of volition appropriating the intelligence to the consideration of the object of determination; that is, there is an act of attention. There is also deliberation on the part of the reason respecting the motives and inducements of action; but still these do not make up the determination or choice to act in a particular way, when the time of action shall arrive.

We must appeal to our consciousness, and what we find there we must take; we can take nothing more. Is there any fact of consciousness with which we are more familiar than this: to determine, to intend, to purpose, to resolve, to choose? Do we not comprehend that form of character, which is expressed in phrases like the following: a man of stern determination; a man of upright and fixed intentions; a man of bold and noble purposes; a man of high resolves; a man of unflinching resolution; a man whose choice is wise and unalterable? It is a fact of our consciousness, not only that when the moment of action arrives we can do or not do—that is, we can make the *nisus* of causation or not make it—but it is also a fact, that before the time of action we can

resolve, or determine, or purpose, or intend, or choose what to do. Hence it is proper to say, that we will according to our determination.

This determining, resolving, intending, purposing, or choosing, is plainly an affection of the will; and it is one of those original and primary affections of our being which are known by every one—and which, because primary, does not admit of explanation or definition by any thing else—and which, because so well known, does not require any explanation or definition. We may say, indeed, that this pre-determination, this resolving, is the will holding itself in readiness to act, or the will collecting its energies for action, or the will holding itself steadily in one direction for action: but do we really make this more clear than when we say that the will before it acts or produces phenomena, either within or without, has the faculty of determining or resolving upon its course of action, and that this pre-determination is entirely within itself as a cause *per se*, and a self-conscious cause? That language is most correct in a psychological point of view, which expresses most simply and directly the facts of consciousness, and which leads every reader to his own bosom for the proof of its correctness.

I have already shown sufficiently that this pre-determination of will, no less than the exertion of its causative nisus, is not necessitated, but contingent.

SECTION VI.

Is every act of volition pre-determined by the will?

Choice, or pre-determination, belongs to will, because will is found only in rational beings; or, in other words, choice is the characteristic of will, because will is the causality which belongs to mind. Choice implies the perception of various possible actions, or exertions of the causality of the mind, together with the qualities of these actions; deliberation on the part of mind respecting these various possible actions or exertions of causality; and finally the determination in what direction to make the causative *nisus*. The perception and the deliberation belong to the reason; the determination or choice belongs to the will or causality itself. From this, it appears that every causative nisus which results from deliberation, must be pre-determined; that is, every deliberative act is pre-determined. The whole question thus resolves itself into the question whether all our actions are deliberative. Without entering here into the extended discussion of this point—a discussion which would anticipate matters which more fitly come in, in another relation—I will only remark: 1st, the primitive act of attention, or the nisus, which appropriates the intelligence to our first experiences, cannot be deliberative, inasmuch as it is conditional to the exercise of all intelligence whatever: 2dly, there are many acts which we perform without being conscious of any previous deliberation, or determination—*e. g.*, the instinctive actions arising from sudden fear and

anger. If it should be contended with respect to all the acts above named, that they are necessary acts, this will by no means affect the argument for the contingency of other acts. The Almighty may have so constituted our causality, that in certain relations its *nisus* shall be necessary. The primitive act of attention, as the necessary condition of the development of the intelligence, and those instinctive acts which relate to our preservation under instantaneous and unlooked-for danger, may be such acts; but after the intelligence is developed, and deliberation becomes possible, it is a fact of consciousness that we do deliberate; and then determine or choose contingently—and a fact of consciousness, also, that we put forth the causative *nisus* contingently—that is, when determining or choosing beforehand in what way to exert the causative *nisus*, we are conscious of power to determine or not to determine in any given way of possible action; and when our determination is made up, we are conscious of power to alter it. And so, also, when the moment of action arrives, we are conscious of power to do or not to do, according to the previous determination; and in the very act of carrying it out, we are conscious of power to do the contrary. To grant the necessity of certain actions, because in respect of them we are conscious of no previous deliberation, and of no power to do or not to do, surely cannot weigh against the contingency of those, where this consciousness does exist: on the contrary, the very ground on which the necessity of the acts in question is contended for, implies the contingency of the other class of acts. It is a question, too,

worthy to be considered, whether it be not possible for the will so to subject itself to passion, that the impulses of passion shall become the instinctive law of its determination, and degrade it to the condition of a mere physical power. Man may yield the birthright and prerogative of his spirituality, viz., self-government; he may descend to the condition of a brute: does not the history of humanity present abundant illustrations of such a self-degradation?

SECTION VII.

Freedom of the Will.

The next characteristic of will, is freedom, or liberty. These names are dear to the heart of man. That which they represent cannot be a shadow, nor be difficult to comprehend. The greatest and the noblest have labored, and fought, and bled, and died in the great cause of freedom. Nations have sighed for it, have struggled for it, and have gained it. There is not a man living but what has some knowledge of it, and can speak of it; and under its highest form, it is the natural attribute of every thinking being. The consciousness on this subject must be clear and definite. I shall indeed be greatly disappointed if I do not find it so. All the difficulties which have existed on this subject have, I am persuaded, had their origin in certain metaphysico-theological theories, and have been fed and sustained not by psychology, but by logic. I have no fear of being suspected of undervaluing either

metaphysics or logic; I contend only for their legitimate use. The old abuse of the Aristotelian Organon in physics, by substituting it for observation, and which Bacon has exposed in his Novum Organon, has appeared and produced its effects likewise in the philosophy of the mind. Instead of patiently observing the facts of consciousness, and the actual developments of mind, theories have been formed and employed as logical premises. Deductive logic upon theories, instead of inductive logic upon facts, is the *proton pseudos* of all investigation leading to error.

Let us then endeavor patiently to examine the facts in relation to this subject.

I. We affirm liberty or freedom when we make the *nisus* of our causality, in relation to parts of our being, between which and our causality there is an established connection, and find no impediment to the production of the intended effect, or no such impediment as the *nisus* does not overcome. I am free when my muscular system is unrestrained by any physical force, or met by only such a force as I can overcome; and when there is nothing to prevent me from commanding or appropriating my intellectual powers. When I can go and come, do or not do; when I have unrestrained thought and belief, then I am free. But it is not every form of deprivation of these which is regarded as the opposite of freedom. When a man is deprived of the use of limbs or reason by disease, it is not ordinarily regarded as slavery, but simply as affliction. The deprivation must take place generally by the will of another. A prisoner incarcerated and deprived of the means of knowledge and enjoyment by the civil law, is deprived of liberty. The control ex-

ercised by the planter over the bodies and minds of his negroes makes them slaves. The control exercised by despotic governments over the bodies and minds of subjects, reduces them more or less to the condition of slavery. It may be remarked too, that a condition of abject poverty, where the individual is compelled by hard toil to earn a scanty subsistence, and possesses no leisure, or means of intellectual improvement, approaches the condition of slavery. If this condition, however, results from the unpropitiousness of soil and climate, it would not be considered slavery, but misfortune: if from failure in business, or from being overreached by sharpers, it would not be considered slavery; because the individual may be supposed not to have been deprived of requisite ability for attaining a better condition, but merely to have been negligent and unwary: if from vices, then he is, in a metaphorical sense, regarded as a slave, because his vices stand to him in the relation of despotic masters.

By natural ability, as distinguished from liberty in the way above defined, we mean the constituted connection between the *nisus* of our causality and other parts of our being; and the constituted connection between these and other objects, so that the nisus of our causality may, by their instrumentality, produce phenomena beyond our own individual being.

We have natural ability to move our limbs, and by our muscular exertions to produce effects in the external world beyond ourselves within a certain limit; that limit existing just where the *nisus* of our own causality is overcome by the greater force of some

physical cause; *e. g.*, I have natural ability to lift a stone of fifty pounds, but I have not natural ability to lift a stone of five hundred pounds. We have natural ability also to know within a certain limit; that limit existing just where our constituted powers of knowing have exhausted their capacity, or where the necessary means of developing them fail us; *e. g.*, I have natural ability of knowing the distance, magnitude, and velocity of the moon; but I have not natural ability of knowing its natural history—at least no such ability has yet been developed. The extent of my natural ability in this sense is established by experience. Liberty is the use of natural ability, without any impediment arising from the will of another which cannot be overcome. The restraints and directions of just law, are considered no infringement upon liberty, inasmuch as man is naturally a subject of moral obligation.

It will be seen, upon reflection, that the manner in which we may be deprived of the liberty above defined, is two-fold. 1st, We may be deprived by actual physical force; *e. g.*, by fetters and incarceration. 2d, We may be deprived through our fears, by threatenings of penalties; *e. g.*, the slaves, and the subject of the despot; the fear of certain penalties prevents them from doing many things, although they are not hindered by fetters and incarceration.

The theory of Edwards does not accord with this view of liberty.* According to his view, "Let the person come by his choice any how, yet if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursu-

* Review of Edwards on the Will, pp. 67 and 68.

ing and executing his will, the man is perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom." It follows from this that nothing but fetters and incarceration can deprive any one of liberty; and a slave and the subject of a despotic government are not really deprived of liberty, since they experience generally no impediment to their actual volitions. But really we regard those as deprived of liberty who are prevented by fear of penalties from doing that which is conceived to belong to them by natural right, and which is not inconsistent with moral obligation. They choose, indeed, a lesser evil to a greater; but the fact of being placed upon such an alternative, by the will of another, is the fact which marks this condition as slavery.

II. There is another form of liberty of which we conceive it impossible to deprive any one: this is a liberty inhering in the very constitution of our being, and is that liberty which we mean to express, when we affirm in common parlance, that we are *free agents.* It appears, 1st. In our pre-determinations, purposes, resolves or choices. There is no power less than infinite, that we are aware of, that can prevent me from hypothesising various conditions of being, various circumstances of weal or wo, and choosing or determining any one for myself. I may never have the opportunity or natural ability of carrying out my choice or determination, but the choice or determination I can form and vary, in ways indefinitely numerous. 2d. It appears in the appropriation of my intellectual powers, and the exercise of thought; the indulgence of opinion and belief in given opportuni-

ties. Galileo may be imprisoned by the cardinals, and prevented from availing himself of his books, or of contemplating the heavens through his telescope; he may even be compelled through fear and superstitious reverence of the Church, to make a verbal renunciation of his philosophy, and a verbal denial of his discoveries; but, nor pope, nor cardinals, nor emperors, can hold back and limit his free thought. Here no rule or kingdom, can be established, less than the "kingdom of heaven."

Again. It appears in the simple exercise of volition, or the causative *nisus*. When I have in any given case examined the reason or inducements for any particular action, my intelligence comes to some conclusion respecting it. I judge the action is right or wrong, and will be attended with pleasure or pain. But after this judgemnt is formed respecting the action, I say I am free to determine to do it, or not to do it; and when the moment arrives for the performance of the action, I say, and every man says in like circumstances, I am free to will or cause the action, or not to will or cause it. What means this affirmation of freedom? Here, surely, we have nothing to do with physical impediments between the volition or causative *nisus* and its objects; here our concern is with the production of the volition itself. The question deliberated upon is simply this, Shall I make this particular volition or not? and it is not more certain to me that I thus deliberate, than that I possess the power of determining one way or the other. It seems to me that the power of acting or doing is all within myself. The action, the *nisus* does not ap-

pear to be produced in me by any cause out of myself ; I seem to myself the sole cause : whether the *nisus* exist or not seems to depend entirely upon myself—I can will, I can refrain from willing. Reason may command me to exert my causality in a particular way ; the solicitations of passion may be strong in the opposite direction ; but I feel that I can resist reason, and yield to passion, or obey reason and deny passion ; or I can sternly discard both. With respect to the production of my volitions, I feel that I am a power absolute and arbitrary ; a first cause and a first mover. Some dull, prosing acquaintance calls upon me in my study, just at the moment that I am deliberating whether I shall go on with my studies, or take a drive into the country : it is possible for me without a breach of courtesy to excuse myself, either for the purpose of taking the drive, or on account of my particular and engrossing engagements at home. To my feelings nothing appears more delightful than the proposed drive : but, on the other hand, it seems more reasonable, under existing engagements, to remain at home ; and as to conversing with the proser who has just interrupted me, there is neither a call of pleasure nor of duty. What is more clear to my consciousness, under these circumstances, than that I have the determination of the whole matter within myself? I can take the drive ; I can continue my studies; or I can set aside both of these, and talk to no purpose with my interminable proser : I do not seem to myself to be necessitated by reason, or pleasure, or dulness. If I yield to my feelings, I know that I sacrifice duty ; if I yield to duty, I know that I sacrifice

my feelings; and if I talk with my proser, I know that I sacrifice both duty and enjoyment: but I can do any one of these; I myself am the determiner and the cause.

It is in this contingent power of determination or causation, that the very element of freedom exists. Let me for a moment suppose that some power antecedent to myself produces the nisus or volition; let me suppose that power to reside in the correlation of the ride with my feelings, in the sensation of delight awakened by this correlation; or let me suppose it to reside in the law of duty; or, again, let me suppose my prosing acquaintance to possess this power; and then I seem to myself no longer free; I am a passive recipient of influences; I am necessarily governed by them. Let every man appeal to his own consciousness: Is not this contingent causality what he means by his freedom as an agent, the freedom which is truly his? Is not this what he means when he affirms confidently, *I am a free agent?* Is there any other freedom that can be defined? If it be affirmed that unimpeded volition, or volition followed by those sequents which, by a uniform law, are constituted to follow it, is all that is meant by freedom: I reply that, as a consequence of this, freedom is no peculiar attribute of mind; every antecedent, when followed by its constituted sequent, is free in like manner; fire is free when it burns; the water is free when the wheel turns under its pressure; it is deprived of freedom when the resistance of the wheel is too great for its pressure. It is utterly impossible to escape from this consequence; and it is utterly im-

possible also to escape from another consequence, viz. that if the relation between physical antecedents and sequents be necessary, then the relation between volition and its sequents must be necessary likewise, and thus the very idea of freedom perishes in the above definition.*

I have, it is true, represented liberty as recognized also in the relation between the volition or causative *nisus* and its sequents; but it will be perceived that this is really a representation of the external development, or form of liberty, and not a philosophical analysis: and the question must come up, what idea we distinctly attach to freedom in making this affirmation, and why we affirm freedom of this particular relation?

1st. What is the idea of freedom?

The definition of Edwards, that liberty means only "That power or opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will; without taking into the meaning of the word, any thing of the cause of that choice, or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition," we have already seen is inadequate and not distinctive. It is a definition which gives freedom to physical as well as to mental causality, or which binds all alike with the chain of necessity. This definition does not correspond with our consciousness. It is an indisputable fact, that we conceive of freedom in the relation which we hold to our volitions, as well as in the relation which our volitions hold to their sequents. I am the cause of my volitions, is the testimony of consciousness universally.

* Review of Edwards on the Will, pp. 95—100, and pp. 125—129.

But, am I a cause necessitated? No, replies consciousness, I am a cause contingent, and because contingent, free. This testimony of consciousness may be, and has been resisted by theory, but, nevertheless, it is decisive. The idea of freedom is first gained in the causative *nisus*, and in the pre-determination, or purpose of will. I find that I am here a first cause, a cause *per se*; that I have absolutely within myself the power of purposing or pre-determining, and of making the causative *nisus* or volitions; and that I exert this pre-determining power and this causative *nisus* with entire contingency; that I can determine and cause, or forbear to determine or cause: in this experience I gain the idea of freedom.

An external succession cannot give the idea. In this succession we perceive only antecedents and sequents in uniform relations; we see nothing more. When one physical cause is met by another which overcomes it, there is no new circumstance presented which contains the idea; for a part of the uniform succession is made up in this very way. In the combinations of chemistry by definite proportions, there is both a running together of substances by definite proportions correlated to each other, and the separation of substances before united. In the exhibition of mechanical forces we have a uniform succession of one power overcoming another. But we do not affirm freedom of the greater power, and the want of freedom in the power overcome. It is only another form of the same uniform succession, when the wagon heavily loaded overcomes the efforts of a single team to move it, and when by adding another team the resistance of

the wagon is overcome. There is no new circumstance to give us the idea of freedom when another team is added, as there would be no new circumstance to give us this idea if another wagon were added after the second team, so as to overcome the united strength of both teams.

In forming our pre-determinations, or purposes, and in the causative *nisus*, or volition, there is no resistance overcome, there is no opposing force whatever. I have freedom here as an attribute most unique, both because I purpose and will in entire contingency, and because there is no antagonistic power that to my consciousness impedes or overcomes me in purposing and willing. The motives of action found in reason and passion have no analogy whatever to physical forces, as plainly appears from this one fact, that where a resistance exists to a physical force, to a degree likely to overcome the force, and to produce phenomena in the direction of the antagonistic power, we can conceive of such an augmentation of the physical force as shall finally overcome the resistance of the antagonistic power. But will, on the contrary, acts with the same effect when it determines in opposition to infinite motives properly and intrinsically considered, as when it determines in opposition to slight motives; and its greatest difficulties of action often appear when it is required to determine according to infinite motives. Thus, men determine without any apparent difficulty in opposition to the infinite motives which urge them to seek eternal life; and when they do seek eternal life, although they are sus-

tained by infinite motives, they seem to move with great difficulty and vacillation.

The aids which seem to attend us in making certain volitions, and the opposition we seem to experience in making certain other volitions, really lie in other parts of our being, viz., in the reason or in the sensitivity. I experience strong convictions in my reason, and strong impulses or repugnances in my sensitivity; but, most clearly, these affections in other parts of my being do not go to make up a volition, nor do they go in themselves to prevent a volition. The question still remains with me, Shall I do or not do in this particular way? and I feel within me that I can will against all the motives presented, whether by the reason or sensitivity. Let the motives be increased to ever such a degree, I feel that I have power still to will in opposition to them. To will, to put forth the causative *nisus*, is a simple act, which I can always do; it is created solely by myself, and capable of being in any given direction, notwithstanding any motives whatever for or against. There is no power, that I am conscious of, that makes in me a volition which I determine against. There is no power, that I am conscious of, that can prevent me from making a volition which I determine to make. I speak here only of what we know. I presume not to set bounds to Deity: but to consciousness it is I have represented.

It is, then, this self-conscious power of determining or not determining, of causing or not causing—this contingent power—this power, all-sufficient to move itself and put forth the causative nisus, or to repose

and withhold the causative *nisus*—which makes up the idea of freedom.

Is there, then, no limit to this freedom? There is no limit but that which exists in the limit of our knowledge and thought. In order to do, I must know what to do. There is no causation, unless there be occasions and objects of causation. What I cannot conceive of, I can make no *nisus* to accomplish: but there is nothing that I can conceive of, but what I can make a *nisus* to accomplish. I may make this *nisus* even when I know that there is no possibility of sequents on account of the feebleness of the physical instrumentality; *e. g.*, I may make a *nisus* to upturn a mountain from its seat: no sequent will follow the *nisus* beyond the exertion of my muscles; but the *nisus* is as really made as if my muscular system had the requisite physical and mechanical force to carry out the *nisus*. I am limited as to the *sequents* of my *nisus* by the opposing physical forces; but in the production of the *nisus*, or volitions themselves, there is no limit but what lies in the power of conceiving ends or aims of causality. But—

Secondly. Why do we affirm freedom of the relation between the causative *nisus* or volitions, and their sequents? These sequents do not depend only and absolutely upon ourselves; they depend also upon other causes. In the first place, the effect produced by the causative *nisus* upon the muscular system depends upon the connection established by our Creator between that *nisus* and this system. This connection does not extend to all the muscles; the muscles of the heart and the stomach, for example,

are not affected by volition, and are thence called involuntary muscles. We can, indeed, will to affect these muscles, but it is all in vain, and no motion follows: but with respect to the voluntary muscles, we no sooner will or make the *nisus*, than ordinarily the motion follows. In the second place, the connection between the muscular organism and phenomena in the world without is prëestablished. That our arm and hand should be physically able to produce certain changes, and the different proportions of physical strength assigned to different individuals, can be ascribed only to the will of the great and universal Creator. The connection also between the parts of a series of physical causes; for example, in a piece of extended machinery, is prëestablished.

All that man can do is to avail himself of known forces; and when he places himself at the head of the series, the remote effects are ascribed to him as the first determiner and mover: he is responsible for the effects, because but for his purpose and primary causative *nisus*, they would not have been; but then he is the absolute and contingent cause only of the primary causative *nisus*: whatever takes place after he has arranged the forces according to their known laws, and after he has made the primary causative *nisus*, in respect of these forces, takes place necessarily. We do not, however, ascribe any want of freedom to man because he is confined within certain limits, by the limited capacity of his own organism, the limited extent of his knowledge, or the overmastering resistance of the physical powers around him. On the contrary, we regard him not only as essential-

ly and for ever free in the primary causative *nisus*, which is entirely his own, but we also regard him as free in his external condition and relations when he can avail himself of the external forces according to the established laws of his own being, and the established laws of the universe: He is not deprived of freedom when acting under any check of the Divine laws, whether moral or physical; but is really filling out, freely and happily, the ends of his creation. There is an entire propriety in affirming freedom of the relation between the *nisus* and the muscular organism, or of the relation between the *nisus* and any organism dependent upon, and connected with, the muscular organism; since, if he only obey the fixed and wise laws of the Creator, the effects are certain to take place, and until the laws of the material world be changed, are absolutely controlled by his causality. Thus, in the present order of things, I can just as certainly kindle a fire in my grate, as I can make a *nisus*, or volition, to that effect; and with respect to kindling the fire, I may properly affirm of it, that I can do it or not do it; and so of any other phenomena related to me in like manner.

The reason, therefore, why we affirm freedom of the relation between the causative *nisus*, or volition, and its sequents, is precisely the same as that which leads us to affirm freedom of the relation between our own causality and the *nisus* itself, viz. that with respect to the remote effects, even as with respect to the primary *nisus*, and the pre-determination, it is proper to say I can do or not do: in a word, it is the contin-

gency of the event relatively to our own causality, which connects it with the idea of freedom.

Let it be carefully noticed here that the same event is both contingent and necessary, as viewed in different relations. The event viewed in relation to the physical cause, which immediately produces it, is necessary ; *i. e.*, conditionally and relatively necessary : but viewed in relation to our own causality, which makes the arrangement of the mechanical forces for producing it, and gives the first *nisus* of power, it is contingent. And of all events whatever—events in whose causation we have no agency, it is true also that they are both necessary and contingent. They are necessary relatively to the physical cause, and relatively to the *nisus* of the Divine causality ; but relatively to the Divine causality itself, they are contingent, inasmuch as the Divine causality is under no necessity to produce them.

SECTION VIII.

Absolute and Conditional Freedom.

An important distinction between the freedom affirmed of the relation between the causality and its *nisus*, and the freedom affirmed of the relation between the *nisus* and its sequents, is now to be made.

The first is absolute and indestructible. The second is conditional, and can be impaired and destroyed. I have no doubt that every man's conscious-

ness, honestly and fairly consulted, will give this distinction most clearly.

I can select any subject of thought within the range of my knowledge: thought is absolutely indestructibly free. I can form any purpose, or pre-determination, within the range of my knowledge and imagination: choice is absolutely and indestructibly free. I can make any *nisus* of power within the sphere of the actual and possible, which I know and conceive of; volition is absolutely and indestructibly free. The mighty and awful forces of nature reach not here; the earthquake, the lightning, the winds, and the flood, can neither compel, nor conquer thought, resolve, and volition. No human power, nor power of angels and archangels, can destroy this internal and inherent freedom of the soul: nor can we conceive of Deity himself impairing or destroying it, unless he suspend or alter the laws and constitution of our being. This freedom is of the very nature of the mind, its essential and distinctive property. It seems to me that we might as well deny the soul's spirituality and immortality, as to deny its absolute and indestructible freedom.

But the freedom affirmed of the relation between the *nisus*, or volition, and its sequents, is evidently conditional. I can absolutely make the *nisus* to move my hand, but the nisus will be followed by the motion only on condition that no antagonistic physical cause overcomes the mechanical force of the hand. If the hand is bound with a cord, or manacled, I am not free to move the hand, although I am still free to make the *nisus*, or volition. Again, when I

aim to produce an effect by an extended piece of machinery, I am not free to produce that effect, although I am free to move my hand, and although I am absolutely free to make the volition or *nisus*, if some part of the machinery be fastened or displaced, so as to prevent the communication of the successive forces. The prisoner, in the prison yard, may be free to walk to the massive gate, and to push against it, but he is not free to open it and walk abroad. His internal freedom remains—he can will; but his external and conditional freedom is taken away, with the exception of his limited walk. It is perfectly evident that this second kind of freedom may be impaired in different degrees, and may be entirely taken away: hindrances, impediments, and limitations in the production of sequents which we are naturally constituted to produce, impair it, accordingly as they exist; chains and dungeons entirely take it away. But under chains and dungeons, the free mind, can still think and purpose, and will: it can spread out before itself a glorious prospect of good and great deeds, and of pure and peaceful enjoyments; and it can strive to burst the chains which bind, and the walls which incarcerate its earthly tabernacle. It is free in all but the sequents of its volitions. The bondage is purely physical.

I have already remarked, that men do not ascribe any want of freedom when the *nisus* is not attended with sequents on account of the resisting powers around us. It is a want of freedom only when it is not followed by its *natural* sequents, or those which it is constituted by the Creator to produce. Nor again do men ascribe a want of freedom when the nisus is not

attended with sequents on account of disease; this is accounted simply calamity; and besides disease is really an antagonistic natural cause, which the nisus is not constituted to overcome. It is only the antagonistic force of other human wills, preventing the natural sequents of our own volitions, which is considered as impairing or destroying our conditional and external freedom. Civil and domestic slavery are the only opposites of external and physical freedom, and the reason is very obvious why these can be the only opposites. Physical, or external freedom, is that condition wherein our volitions are followed by those phenomena, which are constituted by the Creator as the uniform sequents of the volitions; *e. g.*, the motions of our limbs are constituted by the Creator, the uniform sequents of our volitions to this effect; but where we find that sequents do not attend our volitions on account of overmastering antagonistic physical causes, as Xerxes attempting to chain the sea, and Canute attempting to command back the approaching tide, or a man endeavoring to pluck up by the roots some gigantic oak, no want of freedom exists, because no power to do these things was ever granted to man: it is the law of his being that he should fail. Now, with respect to these phenomena in the external world which he is physically constituted to produce; if he fail in these, he must fail through a contravention of his given and constituted physical powers, by some antagonistic force, other than the physical powers around him, since his given and constituted powers are estimated only relatively to these powers around him. But what power re-

mains then to contravene his given and constituted powers but that of other minds like his own? There is no third agency unless we bring in God and angels, which would be miraculous, inasmuch as any manifestation of divine and superhuman power, other than in the laws of nature, is all that we mean by the miraculous. It is man opposing man in the exercise of his given natural and legitimate powers, which gives rise to that external condition which we call slavery, whether civil or domestic.* If it should be objected that this opposition of man to man is a natural or physical opposition, and therefore not really distinguishable from the limitations arising in general from the physical powers around us, the answer is not difficult. The opposition of man to man, by which natural liberty is impaired or destroyed, is an opposition carried on, indeed, by means of physical powers; but then the opposition has its origin in, and is constituted by, the will; and as the will is contingent, and a cause *per se*, the opposition is altogether peculiar, and plainly distinguishable from the limitations arising from the physical powers around us. It should be remarked, also, that in the slavery arising from the collision of man with man, a deprivation of natural liberty is that which is particularly purposed and aimed at.

The objection above noticed would be valid, if volitions, instead of being contingent, were caused ne-

* I wish to be understood, in making the distinction of civil and domestic slavery, to include under the former, not merely that deprivation of freedom arising from despotism, but that also arising from judicial sentence.

cessarily; because, in this case, will would be included under the general denomination of physical causes.* Indeed, if will be not contingent, and a cause *per se*, as there is no absolute freedom in that case, so likewise there is no conditional and physical freedom.†

SECTION IX.

Self-determination of the Will.

EDWARDS has endeavored to expose self-determination as a logical absurdity. Let it be remarked that his argument is wholly logical, and not psychological. In my review of Edwards,‡ I have examined his argument in full; and, considered in a logical point of view, I know not that it is necessary for me to add any thing farther. So much, at least, seems to me conclusively settled, that *there is no logical absurdity in self-determination.* What remains to be said on this subject will be chiefly of a psychological nature. Since, however, I am taking up this subject in a new relation, I shall hold myself free to discuss it, irrespective of any hazard I may run of repeating points of argument which were presented in my review.

What do we mean by self-determination?

I. Do we mean by it that every cause really gives being to its phenomena or sequents? Then, surely, no one can deny self-determination to cause, for the

* Review of Edwards on the Will, pp. 117 and 118.
† Ibid. pp. 95—100, and 123—127. ‡ Ibid. pp. 179—196.

very idea of cause, as we have seen, is the idea of that which gives being to phenomena which are its sequents. To deny self-determination in this point of view, would be to deny cause itself: whether it be a first cause, or a second cause, an infinite cause, or a finite cause, a free and contingent cause, or a necessitated cause, it must so far as it is a cause at all, give being to its proper phenomena. If there were something given as a cause, and certain phenomena were assigned to it; and if upon further examination it were found that these phenomena did not receive their being from the cause supposed, then this could not be considered their cause, and would at once be struck out of the category of causes, unless some other phenomena could be traced to it. If, for example, the phenomena now ascribed to magnetism were found not to have their origin in magnetism, then magnetism would no longer be considered their cause; and so with all other physical causes, if none of these supposed causes were found to be really the origin of the phenomena ascribed to them, then they would cease to stand to them in the relation of cause to effect. It would not relieve the question of any of its difficulties to affirm that these phenomena were produced in the supposed cause, that is, that the supposed cause is the recipient of certain influences which produce in it the development of the phenomena; for this supposed cause is either something through which these influences are merely trasmitted without being affected by them, and without affecting them, and therefore without contributing to the phenomena produced by them, or it is something

affecting these transmitted influences, or being affected by them, that is, something cöoperating with them, or else preventing them in the development of the phenomena in question. If the first be true, then the supposed cause is no cause, because really connected with no effect: if the second be true, then the supposed cause is a cause, for the same reason that the transmitted influences are causal, viz., it is connected with phenomena as giving origin to them, either as cöoperating with the influences, or as preventing them: and thus we come back to our original position, that that only can be regarded as cause which really gives being to certain phenomena. If the carrying out of this position were to resolve all physical causes into the first cause, it would not affect its soundness: it is far easier to resolve all physical causes into the first cause, than it is to admit so absurd and contradictory a proposition, as that any thing may really be a cause, and yet not really give being, or be capable of giving being, to any phenome na.

Now, if self-determination be affirmed of the will under the notion of self-determination above given, then it cannot be questioned that the will is self-determined, for to deny this would be to deny the causality of the mind: and in denying causality to mind as such, would be involved the denial of Divine causality, the denial of first cause; in fine, the denial of all cause.

And in relation to the will, no more than in relation to physical causes, would the question be relieved of any of its difficulties, by affirming that the phenomena are produced in the will by other influences of

which it is only the recipient; for here, again, the supposed cause, that is, the will, is either something through which the influences are transmitted without being affected by them, and without affecting them, and therefore without contributing to the phenomena produced by them; or it is something affecting these transmitted influences, or being affected by them, that is something cöoperating with them, or else preventing them, in the development of the phenomena in question.

If the first be true, then the will is really no cause because really connected with no effect. If the second be true, then the will is a cause, for the same reason that the transmitted influences are causal, viz., it is connected with phenomena as giving origin to them; either as cöoperating with the transmitted influences to the production of the same phenomena; or as producing other phenomena by its resistance to the transmitted influences. Now, if these transmitted influences through the will, be motives either of reason or passion, they must, of course, in relation to the will, be subject to one or the other of the above mentioned conditions. If the will is not affected by them, and produces no effect upon them—that is, if the will is in no correlation with them whatever—then the will cannot in any intelligible sense be called the cause of the phenomena ascribed to the motives; because the will acts no part in their production. But if the will is affected by them, or produces some effect upon them —that is, is in such a correlation with the motives, as to cöoperate with them, or to act in repulsion of them—

then the will is clearly a cause, as something giving origin to phenomena.

The theory of human causality explained by Edwards, is in perfect accordance with this view of self-determination. The correlation of the state of the will with objects of action forms the motive, or cause, of the phenomena ascribed to human causality. The will has its action in relation to the object, and the object has its action in relation to the will; and both stand connected with the phenomena as giving origin to the phenomena. One could not, indeed, act without the other, but if both contribute to the production of the phenomena, then causality must be affirmed of both.*

It seems to be overlooked by many that *susceptibility* implies causality as well as *impressibility*: *e. g.*, fire is regarded as cause, because it has *impressibility* in relation to combustibles, as wood or flax; but, on the other hand, in the dissolution of parts which takes place in the wood or flax, there is an action in the constituent elements as they enter into new combinations. Now, if the will were regarded as merely possessing *susceptibility*, while motives exterior to the will possess *impressibility*, then in this susceptibility there would evidently be a causal action described in relation to phenomena. Degrade will, therefore, to as low a rank as you may, unless you deny it all real connection with phenomena, you cannot deny that it determines itself in the sense *of giving origin* to phenomena as its proper sequents.

* Review of Edwards on the Will, pp. 74 and 75, and 194 and 195.

II. But is another meaning of self-determination contended for, viz., the selection of one object rather than another; and in this sense is self-determination denied to will? Then we are no less ready to show that in this sense self-determination must belong to will.

It is granted on all hands, that there is selection in every volition; one thing is willed rather than another; or one thing is caused rather than another: but then it is affirmed that the selection is not determined by the will itself; that granting causality to will in the sense of its being really the origin of its volitions and their sequents, still the giving birth to *such* a volition or *such* an act, rather than another, is not accounted for in the will itself. It is sufficient to reply to this, that the exception is not possible under the admission.

If causality be granted to will, truly and really, so as to account for the phenomena connected with it, then selection must be granted likewise, as inseparable from, and implied in, every act of causality. When causation takes place, there is some particular object of causation; and as there is some particular object, other objects are not objects of causation at this particular time, and in reference to this particular causation. Now, to say that some cause is required to account for the causation in this particular direction, and of course contrary to other directions, is the same thing as to say that the act of causation itself requires to be accounted for by something which is not itself the cause in question: *e. g.*, to say that when fire burns wood and not stones, it is required to account for this selection of the fire, is the same

thing as to say that the causative act of fire must be accounted for by something which is not itself fire. But this is palpably absurd, since it is the very nature of this cause to produce certain phenomena and not others. And the same must hold with respect to every cause whatsoever. It cannot be supposed to act as a cause without selection and particular determination.*

It must, however, be carefully noticed here, that when it is demanded to account for the particular determination of any cause, there is an implication that some other determination is possible; for why should it be demanded to account for the particular determination of any cause, unless some other determination were possible? The question is, Why does the cause do this thing and not the other thing? Then, of course, it is supposable that it might do the other thing. But it is plain that this question is not applicable to physical causes. We do not ask, respecting the loadstone, Why does it attract steel filings and not wood shavings? because we do not conceive it possible for the loadstone to do the one or the other; it is in a fixed and necessary correlation with only the particular class of substances. With the will it is very different. Here all men are ready to ask why this thing was done and not the other thing; "What was his aim?" "What reason had he for his conduct?" "Why did he act thus, when evidently he had opportunity to act otherwise?" In relation to the will, then, the spontaneous consciousness of all men, even of those who deny self-determination to

* Review of Edwards on the Will, pp. 184 and 185.

will, and in the very form of their denial, gives out clearly the contingency of will. The man, when he acted thus, had the power of acting otherwise. What particular end had he in view in acting thus? The implied admission of contingency is an important fact: but then it may be asked whether, notwithstanding all which has just been said respecting the absurdity of calling for something independently of the cause itself, to account for selection and particular determination, this may not still be a fair and legitimate inquiry in respect of will? If it is an inadmissible inquiry in respect of necessitated causes, is it not an admissible inquiry in respect of contingent causes? Now, mark here, that in this state of the question, and which indeed is the only legitimate state of it, it is granted that the selection and particular determination to be accounted for, are the selection and particular determination of contingent causes—of causes that, in acting in a particular direction, may be supposed to have the power and opportunity of acting in an opposite direction. But this plunges those who contend against the self-determination of will in any one direction rather than in another, into a strange dilemma: for these individuals contend, no less earnestly, against a contingent determination; and yet, in order to argue against a self-determination they must grant a contingent determination: besides, if a contingent determination be granted, a self-determination cannot be denied; for a contingent determination implies this very point, viz., that a cause has power, in doing one thing, to do some other thing even opposed to that which it is actually doing—that

is, it is determining itself in one way, when it has power to determine itself in another way.

But to return to the question, whether, in respect of will as a contingent cause, having the power to determine one way or another, we are not called upon to account for its particular determination? I reply, that we are not called upon to account for the particular determination in the sense of assigning any other *cause* than the will itself, which determines. What I have already alleged is strictly true, that every cause must, in exercising its causality, select and particularly determine; it is true no less of will than of any other cause. This inquiry does not respect the *cause* of phenomena, but the *reasons* or *design* of phenomena; or to adopt a language more familiar to the ear of most metaphysicians, it does not respect the *efficient* cause, but the *final* cause. The application of the term cause, under any qualifications, to the reasons or design of phenomena, is not philosophically correct, and therefore can be adopted only out of respect to old usage, and even then it requires explanation. The discussion here cannot be extended any further without precipitating the distinction between the will and the reason—between efficient causes, or causes proper, and final causes or motives; but as this is soon to come up in its place as an important division of the subject, I will pass over it here, and proceed to another meaning of self-determination.

III. Self-determination may be taken to mean the beginning of motion, action or causation. Let there be taken a series of causes so related, that each succeeding cause cannot act unless the cause immedi-

ately preceding first act; and so also when the first cause in the series does begin to act, then all the other causes begin to act in regular succession. Now, if the first cause in the series be supposed to have no causal antecedent whatever, then it would begin to act only by an act of self-determination. Is such a cause possible? Such a cause must be possible, for such a cause is logically demanded in the same way that a first cause is demanded. A first cause must be a self-determined cause, for there is no cause antecedent to it to determine it—that is, its first motion, action, or causative *nisus*, must be entirely its own, because there is no other cause by supposition to cause it. Edwards' argument against a self-determining cause, if sound, would disprove a first cause, and of course all causality whatever, as I have shown in my review of his argument above referred to. Now then, since self-determination in this sense must be conceded to the first cause of all, the great First Cause, the question turns upon this, whether there be any other cause that admits of self-determination?

1. No logical objection can be brought to bear against such a hypothesis. The logical objection of the infinite series of causative acts has been shown to be based upon a mere assumption, and to be destructive in its consequences of all causality.*

2. It cannot be shown that self-determination in this sense is not a possible property of finite and dependent cause. A finite and dependent cause, is one constituted and limited; but there is no absurdity in

* Vide Review of Edwards on the Will,—Ibid.

supposing that such a cause, in the given sphere of its action, and with respect to the possible objects of action, shall have the power of *contingent* self-determination, provided it have intelligence to perceive the various possible objects of its action ; for determination the one way or the other, in the exercise of choice, must presume perception and self-conscious ability.

3. A first *nisus* of power, or causality, must be assumed in every cause. Take again a series of causes in the linked interdependence of antecedents and sequents ; and there must be supposed in each particular cause acting in the series, a beginning of action, a first going forth, and the production of a first phenomenon, which has for its immediate antecedent only the cause itself. "Between an effect and its *immediate* cause, we know of nothing intervening."*

Now, how does this first *nisus*, this first going forth, take place? Is it not the immediate act of the cause itself? If you say it is produced in the cause, then either the cause contributes by some energy or property of its own to the production of the effect, or it does not contribute to this production. If the latter be true, then it really is no cause ; if the former, then as far as it does contribute, it must exert some energy of its own ; but in exerting this energy, it at once becomes a self-determiner. The very going into action to produce effects, is the characteristic of causality. The affirming of any thing that it is cause, is the affirmation of power to go into action to produce phenomena. The

* President Day on the Will, p. 33.

power of *beginning* to act, is the attribute of all causality; for this *beginning* to act is the very *nisus* of giving origin to phenomena.

Plainly, it is self-contradictory, to affirm causality of any thing, and then to deny it the power of *originating* immediate phenomena, and to assign this power to something out of itself. It is to affirm and deny the same property of the same subject. I am aware that to meet this reasoning, some such illustration as the following will be brought up, viz., place three or four balls in a row, give an impulse to the first, and it will be communicated to the second, and so on, and each ball will lose just the same amount of momentum which it communicates; and no one ball will move from its inertia until it receives momentum from the impulse of an antecedent. In relation to this, let us consider, that in the first instance we have, in the impulse, or projectile force, one cause; and as its effect, the change of place in the body acted upon: but in the second place we have, in the body acted upon, a resisting cause; and as its effect, the destruction of motion in the impinging body. Now, it cannot be said that the projectile force causes the resisting force. The projectile force only presents an object or occasion of action to the resisting force. The resisting force is there, and ready to act as soon as the occasion comes for its action. Take, again, one body impinging upon another which is highly elastic. The impinging body produces its effect upon the elastic body, by compressing its particles into a smaller sphere. The elastic body resumes its form, and throws back the impinging body. Now,

the force of the impinging body does not cause the elasticity of the elastic body. The elasticity is there ready to act, and the impinging body only presents the occasion in its own effect for the other cause to act and produce its appropriate effect. Any cause of given and fixed powers, of course, cannot exert those powers unless an object or occasion be presented which calls for the exertion of its powers; but then the exertion of these powers is its own exertion, an exertion which the cause itself begins. Let any number of distinct causes be arranged in a series, so that the action of one follows the action of another, and then we are not to conclude that the action of the one *causes* the proper action of the other, but only presents the occasion or object for the proper action of the other.* This constitutes the machinery and the harmony of the physical universe; a number of causes, having their own definite powers, yet so related as to present occasion for each other's action, and to restrain and limit each other; but the beginning of each one's action is in its own nature and capacity as cause; and in this sense every cause may be called self-determined.

Taking it then as settled, that all causes are self-determined in the sense that each one begins from its

* I say the *proper* action of the other, because where one body, for example, impinges upon another, or attracts another, there is an effect produced upon the second, which expresses truly the effect of a cause in the first: while the *proper* action of the second, from a cause inherent in it, is expressed by a resistance, or a counter-attraction, having its effect in the first. If A impinges upon or attracts B, there is some change in B which answers to the causal action of A as its effect; and the causal action of A forms the condition or occasion of the causal action of B, producing some change in A, answering to B as its effect.

own capacity as a cause, its peculiar action or causative *nisus*, the distinction still remains of contingency and necessity.

Necessitated causes are those which have no choice, and no power of forbearing to do what they have power to do when they come into the appropriate circumstances of their peculiar capacities.

Contingent causes are those which have choice, and have power of forbearing to do what they have power to do when they come into the appropriate circumstances of their peculiar capacities.

The first class *begin* their causative *nisus*, but begin it necessarily. But the necessity affirmed of them does not lie in an antecedent physical cause, but in the constituted nature of each individual cause. When it is assumed that this necessity does lie in the antecedent physical cause of the concatenated series, the result is inevitable. What is true of one is true of all; and running back from one antecedent to another, the retrogression brings us to the Great First Cause, as the sole and universal determiner of every act of causation. In this way physical causes cease really to be causes, and express only modes of Divine agency. It is not my purpose to contest this disposition of physical causes. All I contend for, is, that if we regard them really as causes, we must assign them the attribute, of beginning within their own bosoms the causative *nisus*, however the constitution of their nature and substances may be penetrated by necessary laws.

But with respect to that finite and dependent cause, which I call my will, or myself, there can remain no doubtfulness as to the disposition we are to make of

the point under discussion. I am cause, really, because the author of my own choices and volitions, and in this sense self-determined. I select contingently, and in this sense, also, I am self-determined; and finally, I begin both the pre-determination, or purpose of my mind, and the causative *nisus*, and in this sense, again, I am self-determined.

Against the self-determination of will, under either point of view, there rests no logical objection. But the positive determination of this question rests with the consciousness. It does not follow, because it is logically possible, that it is psychologically true.

After what has already been said, it is unnecessary to make any further appeal to consciousness, to show that will is really cause as giving origin in and of its own sufficiency, to volitions directly; and as connected with these in fixed sequence, to various phenomena:—our first idea of cause is gained in the exercise of our own causality. That contingent selection belongs to will, has also been made clear from the testimony of consciousness.

Is it equally clear from this testimony, that will is self-determined in the sense of beginning its own purposes and volitions; and if so, does the will begin its purposes and volitions by a necessity of its constituted nature, or in contingency and freedom?

This question also is in effect answered—answered in the appeal we have made to consciousness respecting contingent selection, or choice. If the selection of the will is contingent, then it follows that its purposes and volitions are really originated, or begun by itself; for if they were originated, or begun by any

other power, then they would not be contingent; on the contrary, they would be necessary relatively to the will, which in that case would have no power to produce, nor to prevent them. The very idea of contingent selection or choice, involves the beginning of every purpose, and the beginning of every causative *nisus*, by the will itself. And so also it follows, that this beginning cannot take place by any necessity of the constituted nature of the will; for a determination arising from the necessity of its constituted nature, would be a fixed and invariable determination, like that which appears in any physical cause, as for example the necessary and invariable determination of the magnetic phenomena; and of course, contingent selection or choice would be excluded.

We may also, besides the above reasoning, which however is conclusive, appeal simply and directly to consciousness in relation to the first movements of will. Let us suppose any set of objects and circumstances whatever, amid which, and in a reference to which a purpose may be formed, and a *nisus* of power exerted; let us take again the example of various kinds of fruits—the basket is standing before me on a side-board, and a servant is about to hand it to me—I cast my eye over the apples, peaches, pears, and oranges, and I know, by supposition, that no etiquette will be violated whether I take one or the other, or one of each kind. Here then, are first a variety of purposes open to me; I may purpose to take only an orange; or I may purpose to take an orange or a peach, and so on; or I may purpose to take one of each kind. There may be a great deal of canvassing in my mind

respecting the merits of the different choices; but whatever choice I finally make, seems clearly to my consciousness to be formed by myself in entire contingency and freedom. The very first movement seems my own contingent self-determination, for in the very act of making my choice, I feel that it is possible for me to alter it and choose the opposite of the actual nascent choice. Thus, for instance, in the very act of choosing a peach, I am clearly conscious that I can choose an orange. I have this judgment in my consciousness with perfect certainty. And if any one could doubt that I can thus choose the very opposite of what I am about choosing, I immediately proceed to give him the proof by staying my act of choosing the peach, and immediately choosing the orange. In all this I recognize myself as the first mover, and a self-determiner. There may be certain affections of my sensitivity, and certain judgments in my reason, urging to one choice rather than another; but these affections and judgments are plainly distinguishable from the causative *nisus* or volitions. If it could be made to appear that they always precede the causative *nisus*, still consciousness does not recognize them as the cause of the causative *nisus*. I am myself the cause, or rather the causative nisus is the first going forth to effect of myself as cause. These affections and judgments are before me—are connected with my will in the unity and completeness of my being; but they have their own sphere; they play their own part; they show the will what *ought* to be done, and what is *desirable* to be done; but causality resides in the will alone. Hence I find

that I can resist my affections and judgments; and when I obey them, I do it with the consciousness that I can disobey them. Turn the subject over and over, look on every side, analyze as minutely as we can, still we come to but one result; still the decision of consciousness remains that I am myself in my causality the first mover and a self determiner. It is a universal experience. No man in his spontaneous consciousness questions it. Every man is ready to affirm, I move myself, and I *begin* the movement of myself.

SECTION X.

Where and how do we first obtain the idea of self-determination?

Do we mean by self-determination, simply that every cause really gives being to its phenomena or sequents? Then we gain this idea from the consciousness of our own causality: for I have already shown that the very idea of cause is first gained in connection with our own causality. Do we mean by it the selection of one object rather than another, as an act accounted for in the causality itself? Then again we gain this idea from the consciousness of our own causality, for it is in ourselves that we really penetrate facts of selection, so as to form any such judgment, or even hypothesis. In external nature we see only a succession of phenomena in a fixed and uni-

form order, and we see nothing more; no idea of cause is given, and of course, no idea of cause determining its own selection, or, in other words, determining in entire contingency and freedom the order and succession of its own phenomena. In our own causality, in our own will, do we first gain this idea. Here we first recognize cause, and a cause which seems to determine its own selection, or the order and succession of its phenomena.

Do we mean by self-determination the beginning of motion, action, or causation? Then in this case also we gain the idea from the consciousness of our own causality. In nature we do not perceive any absolute beginning of motion, action, or causation. There is presented a chain of antecedents and sequents, the beginning of which is out of sight, and the continuation of which is in the process of formation; from the mere sense therefore we could not arrive at the idea of a cause beginning its own movement or *nisus*, without actuation or causative influence from an antecedent.

But that we have such an idea is plain; for we are discussing its origin and its application: and what is its origin? Undoubtedly it springs up in the experience or consciousness of our own causality. In ourselves we have the first exemplification of the idea of cause, and in ourselves we complete all the essential characteristics of that idea. As cause, I find myself a self-mover; the very first *nisus* appears my own, and determined in entire contingency.

From myself, as cause, I go in two directions to find causality other than my own.

First—I go to the infinite. I am but finite; my being, with its powers and laws, is constituted for me, and I find myself absolute and free only in the determination of my given causality, only in the production of volitions. My own being therefore demands a self-existent and infinite first cause.

Secondly—I go to necessitated causes. The first experience I have of these is in the sequents of my volitions. Edwards has placed liberty entirely in the relation of the volitions to their sequents; but so far is this from being true, that here our knowledge of necessitated causes begin. In the production of the volition itself, I recognize my contingent self-determination or freedom; but the moment I get beyond this, I perceive contingency and freedom no longer. The physical instrumentality *must* obey the volition, and whatever be the extent of the concatenation, the causes all along the chain, give the same characteristic of necessary determination. Now, in conceiving of these necessitated or physical causes, as far as I conceive of them as really causes, I must attribute to them the power of beginning within their own substance their peculiar causative *nisus*. They begin this *nisus*, but mark, they begin it of a necessity lying in the constitution of their nature. If these two ideas should be contradictory, then we must deny the existence of physical causes, and resolve all natural phenomena into the immediate movements of Divine causality, or into the fixed properties of substance.* If they do not appear contradictory, however,

* Vide Chapter on Motives.

and the doctrine of physical causes as real causes, in the particular spheres of action distinct from the Divine energy is received, then the difference between ourselves and physical causes will stand thus :—As causes, both physical causes and will have self-determination. To direct this self-determination law is given. Law is the birth of the reason. With respect to physical causes, God has so constituted their nature, that they necessarily determine themselves according to the physical laws which God has appointed. With respect to ourselves, we perceive the law which we know we *ought* to obey; but by no constitution of our nature is our obedience necessitated: we can obey or disobey: we are contingent causes, we are free.

It appears, then, that in the very earliest knowledge of actual cause, self-determination is given, in the sense of originating phenomena, in the sense of beginning to act: and being given in ourselves, and that too under the characteristic of contingency, contingent self-determination comes up to view as a primary and undeniable fact of consciousness.

SECTION XI.

Does actual existence presume necessary existence?

It may not be out of place here to notice an objection to the freedom of the will, which, although of little moment in itself and easily answered, is sometimes found to produce perplexity, especially in the

minds of those who are beginning to think on these subjects. It is of moment, indeed, to smooth the way of thought on a subject which is so generally regarded as a forbidding subject, on account of its inherent abstruseness, and of what is almost deemed its inexplicability. The objection is as follows:—When a volition does actually take place, then that volition must be considered as necessary, from the fact of its having taken place; it is now impossible that it should not be. This in substance is the old axiom that, "Whatever is, is;" or the axiom that, "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be." If these axioms can be thus applied to prove necessity, they enable us very easily to prove the necessity of every event; for when once the event has taken place, it is true that it has taken place, and it is impossible now, that it should not be.

In this reasoning, however, the whole point at issue is mistaken. The question is not, whether volition, or any other event which has actually come to pass, can be thought or believed not to have come to pass. Indeed, it would be utterly childish and absurd to raise any such question, "whatever is, is," precludes all such questions. The real point at issue is, whether any thing which has come to pass, or any thing which is expected to come to pass, has come to pass, or will come to pass, by necessity absolute or relative, or whether there be the contingency and freedom of choice and volition in its production. If it come to pass by necessity absolute, then it is not supposable that there is any power which can act in opposition to it or prevent it, not even the power of God. If it come

to pass by necessity relative, then it is not supposable that it could fail of coming to pass relatively to the power actually exerted for its production; but it is supposable that this power might not have been exerted; *e. g.*, the creation of the world was necessary relatively to the Divine will or fiat, "let there be light;" but we do not conceive that the Divine will or fiat was necessary; in his perfect freedom God might have withheld it.

It is a complete answer to the objection in question, that necessity and contingency do not relate to the mere fact of the existence of events, but to the causation of events.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE INTELLIGENCE AND THE WILL.

SECTION I.

The Will distinguished from the Intelligence.

I. THEY are distinguished in their functions.

This distinction is expressed in the phrases TO DO, and TO KNOW. What is TO DO? It is to will or to cause, to produce phenomena or changes. What is TO KNOW? It is to perceive phenomena or changes; to perceive what *is done;* and more than this, it is to perceive what *might* be done, and what *ought* to be done; and to perceive and to affirm truth particular and conditional, and truth universal and absolute. Is there any thing plainer than this distinction? Does not every man's consciousness at once, and without the least difficulty recognize it?

II. They are distinguished in their characteristics.

Take first the perception of external objects: let the intelligence by the organs of sense be directed towards these objects, and it is no matter of choice or self-determination whether we perceive them or not;

we cannot help perceiving them. It is, indeed, a matter of choice and self-determination, whether I employ the organs of sense on such or such objects, whether by an act of attention I employ the intelligence upon such or such objects. To direct the organs of sense, to attend, are phenomena of will, or of *doing ;* and *doing* is indeed conditional to *knowing ;* but when the organs of sense are once directed, and the intelligence appropriated by an act of attention, then the *knowing* necessarily follows; and in given circumstances, is determined in its extent and perfection, by its inherent capacity alone.

Again : it is a matter of choice and self-determination, whether I open this book and look upon its pages : but now that I have opened it, and am looking upon it, it is no longer a matter of choice whether I know its contents. When in the given case I have done all that is required to be done, in order to bring my intelligence into the proper relation to the object to be known, the act of knowing is necessary.

Now, I will suppose the book I have opened to be a treatise on geometry ; I read the axioms, I cannot help perceiving them to be true ; I read the definitions, I cannot deny their correctness ; I proceed with the demonstrations of the propositions, it does not depend upon my will or choice what the conclusion shall be : it depends upon my choice whether I fix my mind patiently upon the steps of the demonstration ; but having done this, I *necessarily* perceive the relations and progress of the thought, and *inevitably* arrive at the conclusion : I both *necessarily* perceive

the conclusion, and perceive the conclusion to be *necessary*.

In every example that can be adduced, we shall perceive the same characteristic always attending the intelligence :—*the simple act of knowing is always necessary*.

The will and the intelligence are thus clearly distinguishable in their functions, and differ remarkably in their peculiar characteristic. The will is contingent and free. The intelligence is necessitated by its inherent laws.

But although distinguishable, they are not separable : on the contrary, we conceive of the will and the intelligence as exerting a reciprocal influence in the unity of the mind. We may therefore take our stand in the will and investigate its action in the direction of the intelligence ; and then we may take our stand in the intelligence, and investigate its action in the direction of the will.

SECTION II.

The action of the Will in the direction of the Intelligence.

I. The most primitive action of will in this direction, is that appropriation of the intelligence to our first sensations, which gives birth to our earliest knowledges ; it is the first act of attention. The same action is renewed continually. We perceive and know only upon condition of attention ;

and attention is always and only a *nisus* of the will as cause, holding the intelligence as the faculty of cognition, in a particular direction or upon particular objects.

I have already made so minute an exhibition of this point, that nothing farther seems to be required in this place.*

It appears from this conclusively, that an exercise of will is conditional to the exercise of the intelligence universally. I must attend in order to know.

It is this patient, persevering, and indomitable determination of the will in holding the attention to the objects of knowledge, that makes the deep thinker and the man of science.

Hence, too, the propriety in affirming that *I know;* inasmuch as knowledge ensues only upon the exertion of my causality, of that which constitutes my personality. My causality does not create the knowledges; it creates only the condition of the development of the knowledges; it calls out from the depths of the Eternal Reason, by its oracle or manifestation established within, the truths which I want. I ask for law, and light, and guidance, and I am not left without an answer. I seek, and find; I knock, and it is opened unto me. It is *my* knowledge, not because I make it, but because I seek for it and find it.

II. The will is the power which abstracts.

It is the intelligence which perceives objects, their relations, and qualities; but it is the will which selects particular objects to the exclusion of others,

* Supra, pp. 40—49.

and particular qualities of objects to the exclusion of others. Abstraction is nothing more than the appropriation of the intelligence to particular objects and particular qualities. It is an act of particular attention amid a multitude.

III. The will acts also as a power of generalization.

There are certain classifications which we term natural, because directly recognized by the intelligence as classifications, without any intervention of the will to create the relations or arrange the particulars: *e. g.*, the commonly observed classifications of trees and of animals. But it is possible to bring together objects naturally diverse, by merely arbitrary selections and combinations: *e. g.*, I might bring together in my parlor the most incongruous and inappropriate articles, such as hoes, and ploughs, and laces, and rags, and cats, and monkies, and charcoal, and flowers, and call them my goods and chattels. Indeed, we can assign no limit to grotesque generalizations, which violate all rule and reason.

IV. The will appears also in acts of memory.

Memory is but a form of the intelligence. It is the knowledge of the past. We are so constituted that what we have seen we can recall after the object is removed. What we have learned in any way, we can recall when the sources of information are removed. The intelligence has the power of retaining and using the knowledge once gained. Now, in the effort of recollection, the will makes its appearance: take any object that we have once known, and which we wish to recall; if it has entirely passed from the mind, if it be entirely forgotten, then, of

course, we can make no effort to recollect it, and it will never return to us, unless we happen to meet with some objects which are related to it in the intelligence, or, which is the same thing, related to it by what is commonly termed the association of ideas. But by supposition, we have some notion of it, or at least some notion of some relation in which it stands. Now, in such cases, (and to every man's consciousness they are very numerous,) we are conscious of a *nisus* to recall the object, by keeping the attention fixed upon the dim and feeble notion until it expands into complete recollection; or by directing the attention to one known object, and to another, in order to hit upon some relation which in the intelligence may suggest or naturally connect with the object to be recollected.

V. The will appears in acts of imagination.

Imagination is not distinct from the intelligence, but a form of intelligence. This will appear from considering the offices of the imagination.

1st. *In memory.* In the knowledge of the past, when the object of knowledge is presented under the forms of time and space, as a tree, or a running stream, or a number of men, or a foot-race, or debates in a public assembly, it is plain that there can be no real knowledge of the past event, or the absent object, unless the intelligence have the power of representing to itself the original conception. It cannot be the knowledge of a tree, unless the knowledge embrace form, color, size, &c. It cannot be a knowledge of a foot-race, unless the knowledge embrace the individual forms, the eager countenances, and strained

muscles of the racers, the expectant multitude of spectators, the goal, the relative distances of the racers at the close, the triumphant shouts—all must be there, to make the knowledge complete; and if all these representations to the mind were left out, there would be no knowledge at all. Now, the intelligence has the power of knowing these and like objects, not only when the organs of sense are addressed by the impinging light and the vibrating air, but also when time and distance intervene, and the organs are no longer addressed. When we mean to express simply the fact that the intelligence in its completeness has the power of retaining and recalling its knowledges, we say it remembers and recollects. And when we mean to express, also, the fact that objects of time and space are thus remembered and recalled, we say the intelligence imagines them; just as we say, at the time the organs of sense are addressed, the intelligence perceives. Perception and memory only express the relations which the objects of the intelligence bear to it, with respect to distance of time and space; or we may say these words express the distinction of knowing objects of sense, primarily, by the use of the organs, or secondarily, without the use of the organs; while the imagination is the specific affirmation of that which is implied in the memory, viz., that the objects of sense, when known secondarily, without the use of the organs, are known truly and really under their proper forms, relations, and qualities.

2dly. *The will considered as acting in the direction of the imagination taken under its creative capacity or form.* The imagination under this form

is simply the intelligence itself, after it has furnished itself with materials by observation, and developed principles and laws by reflection, proceeding to form combinations beyond those which actually exist in nature.

God, as the infinite intelligence, must perceive all the possible forms of *creatures*, taking the word *creatures* as embracing every thing which begins to be. Now we do not conceive of him as having exhausted, in the actual creation, all these possible forms; indeed we can assign no limit to the exertion of his creative energy—his thought and his power reach onward without bound.

Intelligence, according to this definition, is not only the power of knowing *what is* or *what has been*, but also the power of knowing *what may be*. And imagination is but the intelligence under this latter form.

Man, because endowed with intelligence, must have imagination. He is not confined in his knowledge to what is or what has been, but knows also what may be; all, however, in a finite degree.

This knowledge, conception, or imagination of what may be, is not in itself creation, but precedes creation: but, inasmuch as it *always* precedes creation, and is *necessary* to creation, the conception or imagination itself, by a figure of speech, is called creation. The "creations of the imagination," are really only knowledges of what may be.

Knowledges or imaginations of what may be, are of two kinds,—

First. That which may be in the world, and under

the state of things here found. In this point of view all improvements and inventions are imaginations before they are actually developed and introduced.

God has made the world beautiful and useful, but man, under the ideas of beauty and utility, which as an intelligence he possesses in common with his Maker, proceeds to make combinations in this actual world, beyond what God has seen fit to make.

Man spans the rivers with bridges, opens canals and roads, digs ore out of the mines, cultivates the soil, builds houses and ships, invents machinery and implements. After possessing the world six thousand years, he has not yet reached the limit of his improvements. In all this he is but fulfilling the design of his Creator. God gave him the world with materials and forces, and endowed him with the capacity of improving the world in relation to his wants. In the fine arts we have another exhibition analogous to the former. Man makes the landscape more beautiful than he finds it; sound he arranges by the laws of his own mind into exquisite music; and in architecture, painting, and sculpture, he gives more nice and exact exhibitions of proportion, than nature has seen fit to unfold to him. God has not limited man's knowledge to that which is; but has enabled him to perceive that which may be, in this world, under its existing constitution and laws: and when he proceeds to modify God's work, he is not a trespasser and a violator, but a more noble instrumental power by which God gives his creation a higher finish, and a more perfect use.

Secondly. That which may be, but yet which can-

not be in this world, under its existing constitution and laws. This, again, may be divided into that which is in accordance with the laws of the reason, and that which is a violation of them. The *first* we have abundantly in poetry, and also in sculpture and painting. The Garden of Eden, as imagined by Milton, cannot be realized in the world as it is; but there is no violation of the principles of beauty in this fiction, and nothing but what God might create; it is, indeed, the *ideal* of landscape beauty. It would not be difficult to multiply illustrations, but this will suffice.

Under the *second*, will be embraced all the forms of the incongruous and grotesque. These are combinations which intentionally and sportively violate the rules of propriety and proportion.

Now, what is the action of the will in the direction of the intelligence under the form of the creative imagination?

The will does not create the laws of intelligence, according to which new combinations are made; and hence the combinations, as far as they lie in the thought, are independent of will. Invention in art, creation in the fine arts, and all improvements in the condition of society, as knowledges of what may be, take form and character from the intelligence alone. The association of ideas, and the evolution of the thought, are under necessary laws.

But the will, here, as in all other acts of intelligence, supplies the condition of attention, and in supplying this condition, controls the particular imaginations or knowledges of what may be. Thus,

amid any given number of subjects for the imagination, the will may select any one at pleasure ; and amid any given number of possible combinations, the will may select any one at pleasure. But when the particular object of the imagination is selected, then the laws of grandeur, beauty, harmony and proportion found in the intelligence itself, must govern the thought and bring out the conception of what may be. And when the particular combination of a number of particulars is determined upon, then the putting together, the nice adjustment, the fine embellishments, the exquisite finish, must all arise from the richness of the intelligence itself.

It appears thus that the will, in relation to that form of intelligence which we call imagination, acts precisely the same part which it does in every other form. It appropriates by an act of attention, selects the objects and direction under given circumstances, and binds down the intelligence to intense thought, which indeed is but an energetic attention to any subject of knowledge. Every thing depends upon this act of attention, this intensity of thought, this binding down of the intelligence to a given subject, and in a given direction. It makes the thinking man, the profound student, the erudite scholar, the exquisite composer in music and in verse, the sculptor, the painter, the architect and the mechanician. Newton attributed all his success to this, instead of claiming any superiority of natural genius. But, then, every thing depends upon it only as a condition ; the forms of thought, the grand results, the knowledges of what is, has been, or may be, directly and essentially depend

upon the faculty of knowledge, embracing in its oneness and completeness all that we mean by reason, understanding, memory and imagination.

In those imaginations in which the laws of proportion, harmony and beauty are intentionally violated for the production of the grotesque, the results seem more directly the work of the will. When the will sets out to arrive at the beautiful, it can only call upon the intelligence for its revelations—it merely consults the oracle: hence it is restricted and directed. But when it sets out to violate proportion, harmony, and beauty, by the very hypothesis, it is no longer restricted and directed by the intelligence. The beautiful and proportionate must indeed be perceived in order to be violated, but we cannot conceive of a law in the intelligence for the violation of its own essential laws. That which is the subversion of logic, of truth, of beauty, of reality, cannot have its rise in the faculty of logic, truth, reality, and beauty. Here the will reigns arbitrarily, and contradicts in an indefinite multiplicity of ways the laws of the intelligence. In the production of the beautiful, the will can merely choose amid variety of form; but in the production of the grotesque, it chooses what is opposed to all beauty, and in choosing actually creates. We have here another illustration of its contingency and freedom.

There is one circumstance which places the difference of the two cases in a striking light. In choosing amid the variety of the beautiful, there is generally a perceived limit, but in choosing amid the variety of the grotesque there is no perceived limit. A sculptor,

in forming a statue to represent the ideal of the beautiful in the human form, evidently has little choice of variety; he seems restricted by absolute law. Can we conceive of another variety of the Venus de Medicis, that shall be equal to it? But let any one attempt to distort it, and where is the limit of fanciful vagaries? By touching one feature, I destroy the beauty of the whole. In what an indefinite variety of ways then I may destroy its beauty.

By fancy, we merely express the arbitrary use which the will makes of the intelligence as the faculty of knowing or imagining what may be, and which stands contrasted with that use which is directed by the laws of the intelligence.

SECTION III.

The developments of the intellignece in the direction of the will.

The will has a twofold sphere of causality; a mental and a physical sphere. The first, is that in which the will is presented as the condition of all acts of knowing; as appropriating the intelligence under its several forms, and with its laws, to this or that object, in this or that direction, according to the view above given; and as governing the passions in a way about to be exhibited.

The second is that of the external and material world, in which the will produces phenomena or changes, after the analogy of other causes there at work.

Now, the developments of the intelligence in the direction of the will, may be briefly expressed as follows:—*The intelligence supplies the will with objects and laws.* Thus, in the first place, if we take the will in its mental sphere, in order that it may direct the attention or appropriate the intelligence, or select any objects, or any combination of particulars; various objects and particulars, and the laws according to which the appropriation, selection or combination may or ought to be made, must be perceived. If laws and objects be not given, the will must act blindly, and without choice or purpose. And in the second place, if we take the will in its physical sphere, in order that it may produce phenomena or changes, the substances, properties, and laws of the material world, must be known, as well as those primary ideas, which, as the idea of utility, of beauty, and of right and wrong, for example, express the aims and designs of action. The will, as a cause in the external world, likewise must act blindly and without purpose, unless it be supplied with knowledges, laws, and purposes, by the intelligence.

In its first sphere, if the will direct the intelligence to combine and compare, in order to elicit new conclusions, or to compass any purpose of thought whatever, there must be principles and knowledges to which to direct the attention. If it direct the memory to recall any former knowledge, there must be some present knowledge known to be related to the required knowledge, upon which the intelligence shall be fixed, in order that according to the laws of

the intelligence the required knowledge may make its appearance. If it direct the imagination to invent new forms of beauty, grandeur, and harmony; or new forms of the useful, whatever be the nature of the mental creation, there must be knowledges of the real with which to commence, and knowledges of principles and rules under which to purpose and to create.

In its second sphere, if the will direct the muscular organism to work any improvement upon the forms of nature, to construct machinery and implements, to mould new forms of proportion and beauty, whatever be the physical change to be wrought, the world must first be known as it actually exists, and some notion at least of the improvements and works to be wrought, if not an exact knowledge of scientific principles and rules must be developed.

And so also in respect of moral action, before the will can purpose or intend, and execute, the idea of right and wrong, and ethical rules must be given out and comprehended.

The reason is thus the light of the will.

It is evident also, that in order to the intentional violation of the laws of the reason, these laws must first be comprehended.

In the correlation in which we thus perceive the intelligence and will to stand to each other, they are mutually conditional of each other's exercise. The intelligence is determined, fixed, and appropriated, as to its direction and objects by the will; and the will is supplied with objects and laws of action by the intelligence.

But as the one by supposition could not have

reached its development without the other, how does the earliest development of each take place?

This will be explained by referring to sensation as the primary condition of both will and intelligence. Sensation is first given; to this the will adds itself by an act of attention, and perception follows. These are the three primary facts in their order; in point of time there is no appreciable difference, and they may, therefore, be taken as simultaneous: but still, according to this order, which really exists, intelligence in its first development, is immediately conditionated by will, and mediately by sensation: while will in its first development is conditionated by sensation alone. The intelligence going into action in this way, soon supplies knowledges, objects, and laws.

Now, although sensation be the *primary* condition of all knowing, and of all causality, it is by no means the *perpetual* condition. The mind having attained knowledges, objects, and laws, goes on to reason; to remember; to imagine, and to purpose, without a continual recurrence to sensation. And it is in this secondary state of mental development, that will and intelligence mutually and perpetually conditionate each other. The intelligence is subject to the selection, and determination of the will, as to its objects and directions; but the objects and directions amid which the will determines, have all been supplied by the intelligence: and the will can work legitimately and properly, only when it works according to the laws of the intelligence; while the intelligence when

directed and determined to a particular object, unless arbitrarily interrupted and violated, goes on to its results from its own inherent resources, according to its own necessary principles.

SECTION IV.

Objects and Laws.

I HAVE spoken of objects and laws, provided by the intelligence, as conditional of the action of the will: these are to be carefully distinguished.

By OBJECTS of the will, I mean, generally, that in respect of which the will acts. Take the will in its mental sphere: if it direct the attention, there must be something to attend to; if it direct the memory, there must be something to remember; if it direct the imagination, there must be something upon which the imagination shall be directed to act. Take it in its physical sphere; if the will make a *nisus* to effect movements of the muscular organism, this organism must be contemplated; if it aim to work any modifications of external nature, the materials to be effected, the modifications to be wrought, must be objectively before it. We cannot conceive of choice and causation taking place without objects; and hence it may be affirmed that the will cannot act without objects.

By LAWS, I mean whatever directs the *manner* in which the choice shall be made, or the causality exerted; whatever directs *why* one thing should be

chosen, or be done, rather than another, and which show *how* any required effect may be reached.

These laws appear, first, under the form of general primary conceptions or ideas. Thus we have the primary, scientific, or philosophic conception, or idea of accounting for, or explaining that which is, by absolute and necessary truths; the idea of the useful, embracing all the results of industry; the idea of the beautiful, embracing all the fine arts; the idea of right and wrong, embracing all responsible conduct.

In the second place, they appear under the form of scientific rules, of rules of art, and of ethical rules. Here we have laid down, specifically, what is to be done in the particular circumstances and relations. If the will would determine the mind to the pursuit of truth, here are the laws of logic and philosophic method, to which it must hold the attention. If the will would undertake any work of industry, here are the laws of mechanics, of chemistry, of political economy. If it would labor in the fine arts, here are the laws of *esthetics*. If it would originate conduct in relation to God or man, here are the laws of morality and religion.

Objects are the necessary conditions of the activity of the will, as place is the necessary condition of the existence of the body. Laws define and order how this activity should be exerted, amid the given objects or conditions.

After the necessary conditions of the will's activity have been supplied, and it has actually gone into action, as a power to produce phenomena, and after

the laws which should govern it are revealed, the question arises, Do these laws *necessarily* govern it?

I appeal, here, both to observation, or exterior consciousness, and to the interior consciousness. Is it a fact that men do always obey the laws which are given by their intelligence for the regulation of their causality in its different spheres, and under its several ideas? In the first place, it is plain that they do not generally apply themselves with sufficient energy to comprehend fully and clearly these laws; and in the next place, where they do comprehend them fully and clearly, they do not uniformly obey them. There is no necessary governance of the will by the laws of the intelligence; for if there were, error would be unknown, whether in science, or art, or in morals. These laws might not be fully developed, and the works of man might be defective in degree; but there could be no *violation* of these laws, since, as far as developed, they would be conformed to. By supposition, the activity of the will could appear only as ordered by the intelligence in its inherent and perfect laws; as far, therefore, as it should appear, it would necessarily go in the line of truth, utility, beauty, and rectitude.

I appeal to the interior consciousness, Are we necessitated to study carefully and fully the laws which should govern our activity; and when we study and comprehend them, are we necessitated to obey them? Do we find ourselves of necessity profound philosophers, men of science, mechanicians, poets, painters, sculptors—and honest, truth-serving, and religious? Does not every man know that he can trample philo-

sophy under foot, create the wildest theories, and frame the grossest sophisms; that he can attempt absurdities in the face of mechanical and chemical science, and political economy; that he can produce discord in music, false quantity in verse—the disproportionate, grotesque, and ludicrous, in painting, sculpture, and architecture; and that he can violate the laws of truth, honesty, and religion?

Does not every man know, too, that he can determine his will to obey these laws? He can apply himself to the study of philosophy by a legitimate method; he can search out scientific principles; he can become the mechanician, the chemist, the political economist; he can addict himself to the fine arts; he can become the honest, true, and pious man. All praise and blame, all statute law, all infliction of penalties, assume the entire freedom and contingency of the will with respect to the laws of the intelligence. We are placed within the light and under the authority of these laws; but we are free to obey or to disobey them.

When I appeal to general observation, and to every man's consciousness on this subject, I appeal to the highest evidence in relation to it, for I appeal to plain and universal facts.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE SENSITIVITY.

SECTION I.

What is included under Sensitivity.

Under the denomination of the sensitivity, I include sensation, emotion, and passion. It is a distinct faculty of the mind. It is not intelligence ; it is not will. In order to distinguish it, I must appeal to consciousness. Here every man recognizes the facts, and can make the required distinctions. In making primary definitions, all we can do is to lead the mind to notice its own experiences ; for there is nothing behind these by which they can be defined ; and they, in themselves, as recognized carefully by the consciousness, are sufficiently intelligible.

SECTION II.

Sensations defined and distinguished from the Intelligence and Will.

By sensation, we mean those experiences produced from without by means of the organs of sense. These

experiences are enumerated as sensations of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and feeling. By the last, we mean simply the sense of contact, which is common to the nerves in general. To these must be added sensations of tittilation, producing laughter; sensations of pain, which arise from excessive pressure, laceration, and disorganization; and sensations of heat and cold.

The sense of resistance is altogether peculiar, and is experienced only when the will acts upon the muscular organism, and meets with an antagonistic force. I do not think that this is properly a *sense* of resistance. There are sensations connected with it, as the sensations of contact, and of pressure more or less painful; but the resistance lies entirely in the muscular organism, as the instrumentality of the will.

The sensations are the first experiences of conscious being. Until we see, or hear, or smell, or taste, or feel, we know nothing of life, or thought, or action. In these we first begin to live, and think, and act. This is unquestioned and unquestionable. But now come the questions—Is sensation knowledge? Is sensation will? First, is sensation knowledge? The answer to this involves a definition of knowledge. We shall attain our object by comparing our sensations with a class of facts immediately consequent upon them, in order to see whether this class be distinct from them, or really a part of them, naturally evolved out of them; and if so, then by inquiry whether this class of facts be not what is universally and strictly meant by knowledge.

The sensations of the eye are merely sensations of

color; evidently there is nothing more: we indeed have painful sensations in the eye, arising from degrees of light, or the kind of color, but these are a different class of sensations, and do not form a part of the visual sensation. But there is to every man's consciousness another class of facts immediately consequent upon the sensations of color; there are the notions of space, time, distance, substance, cause and effect, measure, weight, heat and cold, solidity and fluidity, beauty and ugliness, right and wrong, and of various mental and physical qualities. I do not attend here to the distinction of the primary and the acquired perceptions of sight, because not required for the end I have in view. I call the attention merely to the fact that we do *now* have all these notions as consequent upon sensations of color. Now, does not consciousness at once decide that these notions are entirely distinct from the sensations? Do sensations of color bear any resemblance to the ideas of right and wrong, of beauty and ugliness, of space and time, of substance, of cause and effect, &c.? Can we conceive of the possibility of evolving space and substance, and right and wrong out of colors, as forms and modifications of colors?

Take the sensations of the ear as another example. These are sensations of sound. As consequent upon these sensations, we have many of the ideas abovementioned—as space, substance, time, and mental qualities as indicated by the human voice, of cause and effect, &c.; these plainly bear no resemblance to sounds. Nor is music, as a science of harmony, given as a part of the sounds, nor as a natural evolution of

them. Certain successions of sound, and certain combinations of sound, the mind pronounces a judgment upon as constituting melody and harmony; and other successions and combinations as without melody, and as discordant. Now, the sensations of the sounds are not one with the *relations* of the sounds, nor one with the judgments upon these relations. In a succession of sounds one ceases ere another begins, sensation gives only one sound after the other; but the mind beyond this notices the quality of each sound correlatively, and the interval of time between each. And, in a combination of sounds, how nice and curious are the judgments of harmony. From the knowledge of sounds and of principles already gained, the mind goes on to form successions and combinations never before heard, and develops music as a science, with all its wonderful variety, complexity, and richness.

Take muscular resistance. It is by this that we gain our knowledge of body, space, distance, and form. Now, granting in the first place that muscular resistance is a mere sensation, the knowledges consequent upon it, again, are quite distinct from the mere sense of resistance. The sense of resistance is a mere experience within me; but this internal experience bears no resemblance to body involving the idea of substance; of space involving the idea of infinity; nor of form involving ideas of proportion, and of geometrical relations. All I can affirm is, that an internal sensation is given, and that then upon this spring up various conceptions, to which the sensation forms a necessary condition, but which does not com-

prehend the conceptions as a part of itself, or as resembling itself.

The same may be remarked as to the idea of cause and effect, and other notions consequent upon muscular resistance in the developed experience of every one.

In the second place, if muscular resistance be taken as no sensation, but as directly connected with an act of will, or an effort to do, then of course the conclusion is inevitable that our knowledges of body and space, of distance and form, which confessedly are primarily given upon condition of muscular resistance alone, are knowledges distinct from sensation.

It would be easy to multiply illustrations, and run into immense detail on this subject; but I cannot deem it necessary. The distinction between sensation and the class of facts above described as consequent upon it is palpable. That in this consequent class of facts we have what we really mean by knowledge, consciousness attests with equal clearness.

Let us suppose that barely the sensations were given and nothing more; then we should have only that which we now are enabled to call experiences of color, sound, taste, &c.; but as there would be no comparison and abstraction, there would be no generalization and classification, and consequently no language; as there would be no knowledge of body and substance, and space, and time, and distance, and cause and effect, there would be for us no external world, and no science; and as there would be no reflection, there would be no self-knowledge; our whole being would be a mere state of sensation.

The sensations must depend upon the correlation

of the sensitivity, and the external objects or causes which act upon it through the organs of sense. The eye and the light are made for each other; the ear and the vibrating atmosphere are made for each other; and the mind in its sensitivity is constituted to receive impressions appropriate to each organ. We do not make these sensations, nor can we prevent them from taking place when the object and organ come together. Relatively to us, they appear in our consciousness of necessity.

The sensitivity must, in part, be regarded as the source of sensations, inasmuch as the sensations depend no less upon its constituted nature, than upon the objects addressed to it. Sensation is the effect of two causes, or the development of two substances, so interdependent, that one cannot act without the other, and so correlated that the effect, or development, partakes of the fulness of each.

Now, as the sensitivity is constituted to form certain sensations, from its correlation with objects, so likewise is the intelligence constituted to form certain cognitions, or knowledges, when brought into connection with the sensations.

Intelligence, however, is in a different, and in a far higher point of view, the origin of knowledges, than the sensitivity is the origin of sensations.

Sensations can have no existence without the prior existence of matter. They are effects or developments in our being, through a material organization in intimate and curious union with our spiritual part, which organization again, is in intimate and curious

correspondence with the external forms and properties of matter.

Intelligence, on the contrary, must be prior to matter, and therefore prior to sensation. The Eternal Reason contemplated every form and property of matter previous to the act of creation ; and when by this act, the universe of beings and things appeared, no addition was made to his knowledge.

Man, as intelligence, is in the image of his Creator. He must, therefore, have in *kind*, though not in *degree*, those faculties which of their own fulness, of their own native and inherent energy, form cognitions. As God knows before, beyond, and independently of sensation, so man must in some sort know in like manner.

But it will be said, you have already admitted that intelligence in man does not begin to act before sensation takes place. Very well ; this *is* admitted ; but now mark the relation of intelligence to sensation. Sensation is the waking up of life, the starting point of thought. Sensation presents the occasion on which the intelligence of man begins to act. Humanity is mind under conditions of material organization, and of sensation. Under these conditions the sensations must first be given, ere the mind begins to show itself, just as the light must first be given, ere the eye can show its wonderful power and capacity. An individual in a syncope ceases to know and think, because sensation is gone : but now, restore sensation, and the intelligence renews its movements, as the watch which had run down renews its movements the moment it is wound up again.

But because mind in humanity is placed under certain conditions of sensation, we cannot thence conclude that it loses its inherent fulness, energy, and faculties, as intelligence. The conditions being supplied, it now goes on to do its work as intelligence, and according to its inherent fulness, energy, and faculties ; it now shows its likeness to its Maker, in passing beyond the sense, and forming cognitions independently of sense. The faculties which God had, before he formed matter and gave birth to sensation, he has imparted in *kind*, though in a finite degree to man ; and these in man do constantly assert their independency of sense, and show their capacity to leap beyond its bounds. These are dependent upon sense for certain conditions, but they are in no such correlation with sensations, as to receive from them a portion of causative energy in order to form cognitions. These cognitions take their form from the intelligence alone.

Thus the experience of resistance being received, the intelligence goes on to form its cognition of substance, and in forming this cognition, forms likewise the cognition of space, and thence of the infinite.

The perception of a material point and of a material line being arrived at, the intelligence goes on to form the figures of geometry, where the point has neither length, breadth nor thickness, and the line is simple extension without breadth or depth ; and thence constructs a pure and absolute science. Now, the sensations with which the intelligence began this work, evidently neither as cause nor as a generic whole, contain the stupendous results. All we can

say, is, that with the experience of a resisting point, and the experience of a succession of resisting points, the intelligence began to think; and then it worked out these results, because it has faculties reaching to these results.

The Infinite and Eternal Mathematician made the world after his well-known principles; and in creating man after his own likeness, he capacitated him both to know the world in relation to these principles, and as far as it is capable of representing them; and to separate the pure and absolute science from all material representations, and to construct it in forms of perfection which sense cannot reveal nor even approach.

No error in philosophy has produced more baleful consequences, and is more monstrous, and yet none more shallow and puerile, than that which confounds the sensuous conditions of intelligence, with the measure and capacity of the intelligence itself.

Those who make sensation the origin and measure of all knowledge, are bound to show the evolution of pure, abstract, and absolute truth, and science from the sensations. They must explain to us how intelligence, which at first comprehends sensation and gives it birth, is able afterwards to find its birth, and to be comprehended in it; and how the infinite can be deduced from the finite, the spiritual from the material, the absolute from the conditional.

The Eternal ideas of Plato are but the primary, absolute, and all comprehending knowledges of the Infinite intelligence; and that which is innate to man, and sometimes, although improperly, called innate

ideas, are the essential faculties of intelligence, by which the creature, whom God has made like himself, develops in the proportion of his being those primary knowledges, when certain sensuous conditions are supplied, which conditions arise from the constituted connection of matter and spirit in humanity.

This distinction of the intelligence from the sensitivity, in this place, may seem like a digression. It appears to me, however, that on account of the intimate union and co-working of the different faculties of our being, it is desirable to take a brief and general view of the whole, in order to be prepared for the discussions which, in considering any particular faculty, necessarily involve views of the other faculties.

As to the distinction between the sensitivity and the will, I refer, in the first place, to the discussions in the preceding pages, in which I think I have satisfactorily established that the will is the contingent and free causality of the mind.

But sensation in relation to the individual has not contingency and freedom. Let any appropriate object be presented to the sensitivity, and we are conscious of no choice, whether the sensation shall exist or not; on the contrary, its existence is inevitable.

In addition to this, it is impossible for us to concentrate ourselves in sensation as a power to do. We are not conscious in our sensations, of directing our intelligence to any particular subjects of investigation and thought; nor of commanding our muscular organism to working any changes in the world around us. On the contrary, nothing seems to us

more distinct than sensation and doing. To walk amid beautiful trees and flowers is one thing, is an act of will. The sensations of color and fragrance I cannot possibly confound with walking. In the one, I am active; in the other, passive. In the one, I do; in the other, I feel. This distinction is so clear, that farther attempts at elucidation would be superfluous.

SECTION III.

The emotions and passions distinguished from sensation and intelligence.

It will be necessary to distinguish the sensations from the emotions and passions; but in doing this, we shall distinguish the emotions and passions from the intelligence likewise.

The emotions and passions we assign to the sensitivity. We distinguish them, therefore, from the sensations only as different affections of the same power. The distinction is briefly expressed in the following words:—sensation precedes the exercise of the intelligence; emotions and passions succeed it: sensation is the condition of intelligence; emotions and passions the consequent: sensation is produced by the action of external causes upon the organs of sense; emotions and passions are produced by cognitions of the intelligence: sensation is produced in the correlation of the sensitivity and secondary qualities of matter; emotions and passions are produced in the correlation of the sensitivity and the ideas of the

intelligence, either as pure ideas, or as embodied in external objects. I will illustrate this last point. The idea of infinite space awakens the emotions of sublimity: this is an emotion arising from a pure idea. The sight of the starry heavens awakens the same emotion; but then the sight of the starry heavens is associated with the idea of infinite space and infinite power.

The pure ideas of harmony, proportion, and beauty, awaken corresponding emotions. When these ideas are embodied in vocal or instrumental music, and in architecture or statuary, the same emotions spring up. But in this last case it is not the mere sound of which the music is composed, or the material of the column or statue which produces the emotions, but the ideas expressed in the sounds modulated and harmonized, and in the material fashioned and proportioned.

It is evident, that, in what is said above, the emotions and passions are distinguished from the intelligence, as belonging to a different faculty of the mind. This distinction, as well as that of the sensations and the emotions, it seems to me, every one's consciousness will readily recognize. The ideas of right and wrong, of justice and injustice, of beauty and ugliness—the perception of the proportion, grace and fitness of objects, together with their opposites, cannot well be confounded with the emotions and passions which these ideas and perceptions produce. Nor is it to be apprehended that any one can be so obtuse as to confound mere sensations of color, hardness, heat and cold, smell, taste, and sound, with the emotions of beauty and grandeur, or with the passions of love, hatred, or revenge.

SECTION IV.

Emotions and passions distinguished from the Will.

But now the important question comes up, whether the emotions and passions can be distinguished from the will or its volitions? "The will and the affections of the soul," says Edwards, "are not two faculties: the affections are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and inclination of the soul, but only in the liveliness and sensibleness of exercise."* Identifying the will and the affections, he assigns the mind but two faculties.

I. Assuming that I have proved, fully and satisfactorily, as I think I have, that the will is contingent and free, a distinction between will and the affections is made out in the opposition of cardinal characteristics.

The will chooses and determines its own acts under no law of necessity whatever. The affections are, without dispute, relatively necessary.

When the idea of beauty, or the cognition of a beautiful object is in the mind, the corresponding emotion necessarily springs up. Emotions of love, pity, anger, fear, &c., all necessarily appear when their causes are present. We cannot directly compel ourselves to love or hate any thing: on the contrary, when objects of intelligence are in a certain correlation with our sensitivity, the emotions and passions

* Review of Edwards on the Will, pp. 19 and 20.

belonging to this correlation take place with all the necessity which belongs to physical causes. This is familiar to the consciousness of every one. If therefore the preceding investigations into the nature and attributes of the will are satisfactory, the distinction between it and the affections is an inevitable consequence.

II. The will has been shown to be a primary condition of acts of intelligence. The emotions and passions have been shown to be a necessary consequence of acts of the intelligence; this marks the distinction between the two.

III. This distinction is implied in the moral consciousness. If the will and the affections are identified, then all acts of the will relatively to the man himself are absolutely necessary. It is in vain to plead for a physical freedom in the unimpeded use of the muscular organism, when the volitions which command this organism are necessary in relation to their causes; or for intellectual freedom in the unimpeded exercise of the intelligence, when the volitions which direct the intelligence and select its objects are necessary relatively to their causes. If volition be identified with the affections, then all the movements of the mind, and all our external actions become necessary with a necessity absolute, relatively to the man himself.

The sensations are admitted to be necessary; the law of the intelligence, the associations of ideas, are admitted to be necessary; the affections are admitted to be necessary; the connection between volition and the muscular organism is necessary,

relatively to the individual. And now, if the will and the sensitivity be one faculty, there remains no more place for freedom, and humanity as a whole, is bound with the chain of necessity. If the doctrine of an universal necessity be established, moral responsibility is destroyed, and self-government impossible. In my "Review of Edwards on the Will," I have fully discussed these points, and to that work, Part II., I beg leave to refer the reader.

That we are responsible for our actions, and that we can restrain our passions and govern ourselves, men, very generally, refer with confidence to consciousness to prove; indeed it is very commonly looked upon as the height of absurdity to pretend to deny these points.

SECTION V.

The distinction between the emotions, and passions, and the will, particularly illustrated.

Let us take again the example of a basket of fruit. When it is placed before me, there are first the sensations of sight and smell, and upon these I form cognitions of what is before me. I perceive a basket of various kinds of fruit; I distinguish them, and form a judgment of their respective qualities. Immediately following these acts of the intelligence are emotions and passions. I admire the beauty of the fruit, the fine graceful forms, and the variegated and rich colors; I feel an appetite for the fruit in general, and

this appetite is more earnestly excited for some particular kind, for example the peach: I desire to take the fruit; I then determine to take it; and finally make volitions which determine the hands to bring it to my mouth.

Now, according to Edwards, and all that school which identifies the will and the affections, all the phenomena of consciousness, after the acts of intelligence above pointed out, are of the same kind, they are all phenomena of the sensitivity; and that phenomenon which immediately precedes the muscular action is only a more lively desire than the preceding, and more lively than any co-existing affection.

Granting, for the present, that the muscular action takes place always in the direction of the strongest desire, (which, however, I shall hereafter show not to be the case,) is there no phenomenon between this strongest desire and the muscular action, or in other words, is that phenomenon which we call the volition identical with the strongest desire?

Now, plainly, there is no way of determining this question, save by referring to consciousness. And what other way should we require? This is the legitimate way, and entirely satisfactory. In this example of taking the peach from the basket, is the appetite for the fruit, or the desire to enjoy the fruit one and the same with the effort of the will to take the fruit? Are they the same in *kind*? Does consciousness give us only this, viz., a desire growing more and more intense in its excitement, and then just at the moment it overmasters every other desire produ-

cing a movement of the arm and hand? I can answer from my own consciousness, and since humanity is one, I must believe that what I learn here is a truth not of my particular mind alone, but of the human mind. Now, to me, the facts of consciousness appearing in connection with the above example, and all similar examples, that is, examples where there is desire or passion, in close contiguity with action, are not exhausted when I have enumerated the mere forms and degrees of passion: immediately after these strong excitements, there is to me the consciousness of an effort to do, either in carrying out the passion to its object, or in resisting and diverting the passion. This *nisus*, or volition, does not appear to me at all of the same *kind* with the passion, but entirely a new fact, and of a different power. I will endeavor to draw a clear comparison of the two.

1. The appetite or desire for the peach, arises upon the perception of the peach; it arises necessarily, and immediately, and without any deliberation, or choice on my part, whether it shall exist or not.

But this *nisus*, or effort, to take the peach, is to me a subject of deliberation. The passion for the peach already exists; but before I take the peach, although I am strongly impelled by the passion, I can pause and deliberate whether I shall indulge the passion by taking the peach, or refuse to indulge it by withholding the *nisus*. The passion does not seem to be immediately within my power; the *nisus* by which the act of taking the peach appears, does seem to be within my power.

2. I do not seem to exist, or act in the passion as a

person. The passion seems merely an affection which I experience under certain circumstances, and which I cannot but experience under these circumstances. On the contrary, in the *nisus*, or volition, I do seem to exist and act as a person. In the one case I feel myself subject to the influences of causes different from myself. In the other case, I seem to myself a cause producing effects both in and out of myself.

3. In some cases the passion is gratified and exhausted by a single act; in other cases there is a succession of acts before it is completely exhausted; in other cases, again, the passion is perpetual. Revenge generally exhausts itself in a single act. Anger may continue for a length of time, and require many acts to exhaust or fully satisfy it. Ambition and covetousness are perpetual. The appetites, in general, are soon satisfied. Now, with respect to a passion satisfied by a single act, *e. g.*, revenge, it evidently exists before any *nisus* is made leading to the act, by which the revenge is satisfied. The consciousness cannot confound the strong passion, with the volition which raises the arm and speeds the blow. The volition is the mere *nisus* of power which effects what the passion orders.

Where the passion is satisfied only by a succession of acts, I mean acts repeated at different times, and to make the case more palpable, at intervals of time, the distinction between the abiding passion and the *nisus* of will, by which, as the causality of the mind, the passion is repeatedly gratified, and finally satisfied, is perfectly clear. Take envy as an example: this pas-

sion may live on indefinitely; but in the end will become satisfied when its object is completely prostrated, and of course no longer in a condition to excite it. During the time of its existence, it may lead to many acts in relation to its object, acts gratifying the passion without extinguishing it. Every man will readily distinguish between the acts which go to effect the ends of envy, and the passion itself; and these acts embrace not merely the muscular movements, but the *nisus* also which produces these movements. The *nisus*, or volition, will be as clearly distinguishable as the external acts. But more than this, an individual may indulge envy, without having it in his power to reach the object of the passion, and in this case the passion exists without giving birth to any actions whatever. Under these circumstances it will experience gratification when its object is injured from any source whatever, and without any agency of the individual indulging the passion; and when at length its object, through a train of other agencies, is completely prostrated, it becomes fully satisfied, although contributing in no way to the catastrophe.

In a case of a perpetual passion, *e. g.*, ambition, the passion is said to govern the individual; but will any one contend that the ambition, which as a perpetual passion, gives direction and color to the life, is identical with the series of volitions which accomplish its aims? The *gratification* of the ruling passion is effected through the thinking and contrivances of the intelligence, and by the volitions of the will as the mental causality; but the consciousness finds no difficulty in distinguishing the passion from the will, as

well as from the intelligence. The passion exists even where no acts of intelligence, or of will, are engaged in accomplishing its behests. Napoleon, confined to the rock of St. Helena, did not cease to be himself—did not yield his master passion. There was no scope or opportunity for the designs and deeds of ambition, but the passion, we all believe, existed still, as an inseparable element of his nature. Chains, and dungeons, and exile, render every purpose and effort hopeless, but they do not necessarily extinguish the governing passion of the heart; be it ambition, or love, or any other passion, *it* can live on, and reign even in spite of hope.

In all the above cases, the separate existence of passion and volition is recognized by consciousness. The passion maintains the characteristic of a mere affection which I experience under certain circumstances, and in which I am subject to causes other than myself, while the acts which are demanded by the passion in order to its gratification, appear the effects of my own proper and personal causality.

SECTION VI.

Desire, or relative emotion, and passion.

An emotion is usually, and I think properly, distinguished from a passion by the absence of desire. An emotion is a simple affection of the sensitivity arising from the beauty, or from any other quality of objects, unaccompanied by desire. Passion is any

such emotion accompanied by desire. But what then is desire?

Every object brought before the mind is perceived to possess certain qualities, and these qualities affect the mind agreeably or disagreeably. We are filled with the admiration of what is beautiful, or are disgusted with ugliness. The first experience of the sensitivity after the perception of the qualities takes place, is that of emotion simply. In certain cases, however, immediately after the experience of the emotion, the mind perceives that the object which thus affects its sensitivity, may stand in some other relation to its faculties; and this other relation becoming an object of contemplation affects it likewise agreeably or disagreeably; and then the mind may choose that it shall stand in this other relation; *e. g.*, I perceive in a flower garden a variety of flowers, and immediately upon perceiving them, I experience the emotions corresponding to their grace and beauty. I now perceive again that these flowers can be formed into a tasteful bouquet, to be presented to a lady whom I admire. This new relation in which the flowers can be placed to me, awakens an agreeable emotion, and I choose at once that this disposition shall be made of them.* Now, this instance is widely different from that of emotions caused by contemplating the starry heavens, or the falls of Niagara. After the emotions here awakened, I do not perceive that these objects can hold any other relation to me, and

* I use the word choice here in the sense explained, Chapter III. Section V.

of course I have no consequent emotions upon contemplating a new relation, and I form no choice.

Objects, universally, may be divided into two classes, as represented by the two instances given above.

First. Those objects which after awakening appropriate emotions upon the perception of their qualities, are perceived again to admit of being placed in other and peculiar relations to us, which other relations give rise to new emotions and present occasions for choice. Secondly. Those objects which exhaust their effect upon us in their simple presentation, and do not appear to admit of being placed in relations beyond those which they first assume. The two emotions here described may be conveniently distinguished as the *simple* emotion and the *relative* emotion.

Now, PASSION is a complex term, and is designed to express both the *simple* and the *relative* emotion, as taking place, the one in immediate succession to the other, and with respect to the same object;—*e. g.*, I perceive a house of fine proportions and embellishments, and surrounded with beautiful lawns, and gardens, filled with trees, shrubbery and flowers. The first emotions are those of the beautiful in various degrees. These are the *simple* emotions. I next conceive of it as being in my possession, and this relation of possession appears to me highly agreeable, and affects me with the most pleasant emotions. These are the *relative* emotions; and these relative emotions constitute DESIRE.

In calling them *relative* emotions, I refer not merely to the fact that they form the enjoyment of the

individual, for this is true of simple emotions likewise; but I refer also to the fact, that the new relation which is contemplated, and which gives birth to the relative emotions, is one which requires my personal choice and volition in order to be realized. In the example above, the possession of the house appears *desirable*, or, in other words, I *desire* the possession of the house; but it may not be possible for me, in my present circumstances to gain possession of it, although the possession of it may be hypothesized, and in other circumstances would be attended with no difficulty. In this case I make no choice, and put forth no *nisus* of causality in relation to it. I cannot reach or gratify my desire. But if I have the means of purchasing the house, and the owner is willing to sell it, then I am in a condition to make choice and exercise volition in reference to the new relation of possession.

A beautiful princess became captive to Cyrus the Great, in the course of his conquests. He did not trust himself with the charge of her, for he knew the weakness of human nature too well to risk his principles. A young officer of spotless chastity, but of overweening confidence in his own firmness, undertook the dangerous charge. He of course received the natural and unavoidable impression of her extreme beauty; this was to be expected—this *he* probably expected; but, contrary to his expectation, his imagination soon conceived of a more intimate relation, and this relation so excited his emotions of delight, appeared so *desirable*, that he tore himself away from a temptation before which he found his virtue giving

way. In this instance we have, 1st, the simple emotion of beauty; 2dly, the relative emotion, or emotion awakened by a new relation perceived, which relation, however, cannot be realized without choice and volition. The second emotion is *desire;* and the two emotions so related that the second immediately follows the first, and is conditioned by it, constitute PASSION.

From this analysis, it appears clearly that the desire is only a form of emotion arising, like every other emotion, under the characteristic of necessity: that while the desire arises from a cause from without, in correlation with the sensitivity, and without any deliberation and pre-determination, or any *nisus* of a power "to do or not to do;" in the effort which is to realize the new relation, or relation awakening the relative emotion or desire, we recognize deliberation and choice, and a power "to do or not to do:" and that the desire, or relative emotion, as well as the simple emotion, exists before choice and volition, and often without any corresponding choice and volition taking place. The passion is often excited in the highest degree, and yet there is no opportunity for its gratification, or the strong mastery which the man exercises over himself repels the temptation.

SECTION VII.

Whether a given passion can be resisted only by an opposite passion.

THE only way in which the force of the last conclusion is attempted to be evaded, is by affirming that

some other emotion and desire of a more lively character intervene, and that in this the volition or causative *nisus* makes its appearance. For instance, in the case of the young officer of Cyrus, it will be said that the preservation of his virtue awakened a livelier emotion than the gratification of appetite, and that this livelier emotion constituted the causative *nisus*.

In the first place, I remark that this evasion touches but half of the argument. What shall be done with those causes in which the desire exists without any opportunity or even any hope of gratification, and that, too, when the desire, beyond dispute, respects an immediate object, and is the strongest desire with which the mind is now affected? In the example given on a preceding page, I may desire the immediate possession of the house and ornamented grounds, and it may be stronger than any other desire at the moment, but this desire of possession does not identify itself with any *nisus* or volition, in order to gain the possession, if I am destitute of the means of purchasing.

The young officer of Cyrus, after the beautiful princess is removed from his keeping, and secured against the attempts suggested by his passions, may become the very slave of these passions, and pine away with desire.

A prisoner standing in utter hopelessness at his grated window, desires his freedom and his home more than any thing beside; but the all-absorbing yearning and passion takes no form of volition to reach its object.

The highest form of misery of which we can con-

ceive, is that constituted by the passions excited in the highest possible degree, and yet unaccompanied by any volition or *nisus* to reach their objects. This is the state of despairing love, hatred, or revenge.

Let us now turn to the point which the evasion in question touches upon, viz., that when passion is successfully resisted and is overcome, it is resisted and overcome by another and a stronger passion.

Before combatting this position, I wish to make a few preliminary observations as to its moral bearing. I do this not for the purpose of enlisting in my favor any prejudices however sacred, but rather to secure myself against the prejudices which have represented the system which I oppose as impregnable in its moral and theological interests. To proceed then, I remark, that if passion can be opposed only by passion, there can be neither moral obligation nor self-government. *There cannot be moral obligation:* because, inasmuch as the passions arise necessarily in the presence of their objects, and inasmuch as the strength of each particular passion both intrinsically and relatively depends likewise necessarily upon its cause, the determination as to which passion shall prevail, that is, which passion shall take the form of volition or causative *nisus*, rests in a pre-arrangement, and that too beyond the sphere of the individual. The strongest passion which is to subdue a given passion cannot be called up by the individual for this purpose; for to call it up would be to exercise an antecedent strongest passion, and this again would require another antecedent strongest passion, and so on *ad infinitum*. The strongest passion therefore

which is to subdue the given passion, and which can alone subdue it, must make its appearance wholly irrespectively of the individual's agency. It follows then that every passion of the individual being relatively to him absolutely necessary, and every strongest passion absolutely necessary, no place for responsibility remains.

There can be no self-government. Self-government implies a power of resisting one's passions; but, according to this system, there can be no resisting power but that of another and a stronger passion; but the individual cannot wield this power, since to suppose this would involve the absurdity of an infinite series of antecedent strongest passions.*

If therefore we aim to sustain important moral and theological interests, we must effect a distinction between the passions and the power which resists them—a power which, from within itself, can resist and overcome the passions. Let us see whether this important distinction will hold, notwithstanding the attempted evasion in question.

The young officer of Cyrus dismisses the princess from his charge, according to the evasion, because the love of virtue, proving stronger than the impure passion, the love of virtue forms at the moment the volition or causative *nisus*. In reference to this, I remark, that at the beginning of this trial of virtue, the relative state of the opposing passions must have preponderated more strongly on the side of virtue than at the close. At the beginning, sensual desire

* Vide Review of Edwards, pp. 106—109.

was comparatively weak, and the love of virtue fresh, strong, and confident. Presently the individual is surprised by the growth of sensual desire; but his virtue resists firmly. By degrees, however, the first is constantly advancing, and the resistance on the part of the love of virtue grows proportionally weak, until at length he finds it impossible to preserve any longer the emotions of virtue, except by removing from the presence of the temptation. The love of virtue triumphed at the beginning over sensual desire; in the end sensual desire triumphs over the love of virtue. If the love of virtue increased proportionally to the growth of sensual desire, then, of course, the resistance would remain precisely the same throughout; and however great the assaulting passion might become, the resisting passion would be there to meet it, and to preserve the steadiness of the mind. The very fact, therefore, of fleeing away from the temptation, was the acknowledgment of weakness—the acknowledgement that virtue could no longer bear up against the assaults of its antagonist. What, then, is the cause of the retreat? It cannot be the predominating sensual desire, for this urges the individual to remain. It cannot be the virtuous passion, for this is not of sufficient strength to form the volition, or causative *nisus*, which is to defeat the sensual desire. The sensual desire says remain; the virtuous passion says retire: but as the first is stronger than the last, if the decision of the matter is to be left to the passions, the individual will remain and become the victim of sensuality. In this emergency the strong and resolute will, as a distinct faculty—as

of itself the power to do or not to do—determines to avoid the occasion of the overmastering desires, and to retreat from the opportunities of crime. The retreat is made; but as respects the affections, it is made in weakness and disgrace.

But instead of speaking of a third person, let us refer directly to ourselves. When we perform an act which gratifies any evil passion of which we are conscious, and which we perform *in order* to gratify that passion, do we not feel that we are guilty for that act? All who acknowledge the existence of conscience, and the distinction between right and wrong, will answer in the affirmative. But in this consciousness of guilt, do we not believe that we might have forborne to commit the act, that we might have resisted the demand of the passion? And suppose we could persuade ourselves that it was impossible for us to have forborne to commit the act, that we could not have resisted the demands of passion, would not all our conviction and sense of guilt die away?

But if passion can be opposed only by passion, if the opposing power cannot be distinguished in kind from the passion to be resisted, then the voice of the consciousness, as given above, must be delusive. For how can I be guilty on account of an act, when the passion which it gratifies is the *causative nisus* of the act, this causative nisus being, relatively to the individual, absolutely necessary?

Again. We acknowledge the duty of self-denial, and we think that we often perform this duty when we resist the inclinations of the appetites and passions. It seems to us, in these cases, that we bring into view princi-

ples of duty, and put forth the energies of a self-governing power distinct from these appetites and passions.

But here, again, the decisions of consciousness must be fallacious, if passion can only be opposed by passion; and self-denial becomes an absurdity which can never exist; for the acts in all cases which actually take place, are the immediate effects of the strongest passion: as, therefore, it is impossible for any act to make its appearance except as an act of the strongest passion, and gratifying that passion, and as the strength of the passion consists in the quality of agreeableness, no place for self-denial remains. All human action necessarily becomes self-gratification.

It must follow, also, that all our sentiments of praise and blame, and the deep reverence we feel for the name of justice, and the profound submission we render to its authority in the infliction of penalties, are an error, a folly, or a superstition.

Why should we praise the agent for one deed rather than another, or blame him for any deed whatever; and by what authority can any power inflict penalties, when the cause of every deed is the passion which is immediately antecedent to it, and which passion is proved to be the strongest by the very fact that it is the antecedent of the deed; and is also, relatively to the agent, necessarily the causative antecedent? For we have seen that, according to the hypothesis which I am combatting, no opposition can be made to a given passion, except by another passion: so that on the one hand, the play of the passions being absolutely necessary relatively to the agent, the passion which predominates, predominates necessarily; and on the

other hand, if the agent be supposed to attempt an opposition to a given passion, the *nisus* of opposition can only lie in another passion; and this can be called up only by an antecedent strongest passion, and this again by another, and so on *ad infinitum*.

It appears to me unnecessary to multiply any further appeals to the consciousness, or to add illustrations. Consciousness, in the ordinary, and as well as in the most sacred and awful relations, decides against the hypothesis, that when a passion is subdued, it is subdued only by the force of an antagonistic passion, more powerful but equally necessary. It is a mere hypothesis.

SECTION VIII.

Preceding distinctions summed up.

LET us now review summarily the distinctions and relations of the will and the sensitivity, as given in the preceding investigation.

1. Upon the perception of objects and their qualities, the *simple* emotions arise—that is, emotions produced by the objects and qualities considered in themselves, and not relatively to the uses and gratifications to which the man by his personal agency may appropriate them. Some objects awaken only simple emotions, because they do not admit of any appropriation by our personal agency.

2. In the case of many objects, the simple emotions are foliowed by the perception that the objects may

come into other relations more intimate and gratifying by the personal agency of the man, and the emotions awakened by this perception are the *relative* emotions, and constitute *desire.* Simple emotions and desire awakened by, and united in, the same object, constitute that complex state of feeling which we call *passion.*

3. When passion is called into being, an occasion exists for action. It now becomes a subject of thought and deliberation to the intelligence, whether the passion shall be gratified or not, or whether attempts shall be made to gratify it. Upon this thought and deliberation, CHOICE takes place.

4. Choice is the pre-determination, or intention of the will, to act in a certain way; either in obedience to the passion, or in resistance of the passion, whenever the moment for action shall arrive.

5. When the moment for action arrives, the moment for gratifying or denying the passion, then the will puts forth its volition or causative *nisus.*

6. The play of the emotions and passions in the presence of their objects, or causes, is necessary.

But every act of will of which we are conscious, and for which we hold ourselves responsible, hath this remarkable characteristic, that it may be done or not done—that is, it is *contingent;* and every agent has in himself at the moment of performing such act, the irresistible belief that he is a power to do or not to do—a power not necessitated, but free.

CHAPTER VI.

OF PERSONALITY.

THE personal pronouns belong to all languages, and represent the idea of personality, which is common to all men.

Personality is affirmed only of God, angels, and men—only of beings of intelligence and freedom.

Personality is not individuality, because individuality is of universal application, and expresses merely the last logical division, as is denoted, indeed, by the etymology of the word. A person, however, is an individual; and person in this connection, expresses *differentia*.

What does personality represent? If it represent the whole individual mind or spirit, then of course it is merely a synonyme of mind or spirit: but the term personality will not apply to every faculty of mind or spirit.

I. It will be granted that the I is applied to the will as the free causality of the mind; when it is affirmed *I do*, the will is the I.

II. Personality cannot be conceived of without

freedom. When it is affirmed *I do*, the I is truly and properly the cause of the *doing ;* but if this I, be regarded as necessitated in its doing, if its *nisus* be not regarded as really its own determination, but the determination of another, then it is no more I that *do*—it is no more I that make the *nisus*, it must be referred to some other cause.

This appears still farther in the use of the personal possessive pronouns. We will take for example the pronoun *mine*. This implies two objects, and the idea of possession. It implies the I, and something which is not me, and the fact that this something belongs to me. But to what do we apply the pronoun *mine*, and on what is possession based? We apply this pronoun to every object which we can appropriate by our personal agency to any purpose, wish, or enjoyment; we apply it to every thing over which we exercise our causality; and possession is really based upon the idea of our causality. As far as this causality reaches, possession reaches, and no farther. What I cannot govern, regulate, direct, compel, resist, modify or appropriate by will, cannot be mine, but must be *his* or *theirs* who do stand to it in this relation. Lands, houses, and chattels are *mine*, because I have appropriated them by my will, or because I regulate and control them by my will.

My friends are *mine*, because I can influence them, and bind them to my interests. My enemies are *mine*, either because I have made them such, or because I am engaged in acts of resistance and endeavors to make them yield to my purposes.

My physical members are mine, because they are moved and governed by my volitions.

My thoughts are *mine*, not because I create the laws of the reason and the understanding, and the association of ideas; but because I direct the reason and the understanding to particular objects and fix them upon these by an act of attention.

My emotions and passions are *mine*, not because I am the author of my susceptibilities, or because I directly create the emotions and passions; but because I can call up this or that emotion or passion by the presentation of the correlative object; and because I can dismiss an emotion or passion by fixing the attention upon some other object, and an object correlative to an opposite emotion or passion.

My volitions are *mine*, because I directly create them.

My volitions are *mine* in the most perfect sense, because they are and can be participated in by no one else; they are absolutely and exclusively my own.

Whatever else is *mine*, is called so only in reference to my will taken as the causality, and the I.

But now only admit the idea, that I as a cause, am necessarily determined by something antecedent to myself, or out of myself, and so far from being able to use the pronoun *mine* of any thing which I act upon, I immediately become one of those things of which it is to be used; and that antecedent and foreign power which controls all my volitions and movements, must apply it to me.

The possessive pronoun is applied to a child and to a slave, because the father and the master exercise

a paramount control over their actions; with how much greater intensity the term would be applied, if the father and the master absolutely caused every volition in the child and the slave!

When we use the phrases, *I think* and *I feel*, that is when we apply the representative of our personality to acts of the reason and the sensitivity, we do it under the impression that thought and feeling are free. Only suppose that when thought goes on within me there is no element of freedom connected with it, and when the emotions and passions are awakened there is no element of freedom connected with them, and they no longer appear our *personal* acts. It is no longer I that think if I have no power to produce thought, and to control and direct thought. It is no longer I that feel, if I have no power to produce feeling, and to control and direct feeling.

But it may be said, that thoughts and feelings are often started in our minds without any intention of our own, or any effort on our part to produce them by selecting and bringing before the mind subjects of thought, and objects correlative to our feelings. To this I reply, that the element of freedom here again appears in the choice and volition to attend to the train of thought, or the feelings started in our minds; or to banish them by immediately calling up other subjects of thought, and objects correlative to other feelings. It is the free act of attention which makes the thought and feeling *mine*, and it cannot become mine without this; and in connection with this, the consciousness that I can dispose of the thought or feeling as I please.

It thus appears, that in every application of the personal pronouns, those words which represent our personality, the will is referred to and freedom is implied. Personality, therefore, cannot be conceived of without the causality or will, and freedom. The fact, however, that it cannot be conceived of without causality or will, does not prove that the will alone constitutes personality; but that it cannot be conceived of without freedom, does go to prove this. Reason in itself is not free; all its laws are necessary and immutable. The sensitivity in itself is not free; it has no power of changing it own suseptibilities; and every emotion which appears in it, is, relatively to itself, absolutely necessary: and all the freedom which appears in thinking and feeling is the freedom of the will or causality, adding itself to these two necessary, cöordinates, in acts of attention and governance. The whole personality is free; will, alone, is free; therefore the will constitutes the personality.

III. It will be seen, upon reflection, that *personal* refers to that which is exclusively and entirely my own, and not that of another. But in no part of my being do I find that which, in an absolute sense, is exclusively and entirely my own, and which can in no sense be participated in by another, save in the actings of my will.

Reason in all men, and in all beings having reason, is the same: it has its absolute and fixed laws. There is not one kind of logic for one man, and another kind for another man: logic is one and the same for all beings that reflect and reason.

The sensitivity, in its general and constituent prin-

ciples, is the same in all men. The same emotions and passions, with a given state of the sensitivity, generally appear under the same causes. Where the sensitivity is perfectly pure, there remains no place for diversity in different individuals, and the emotions are as absolute as the laws of perception which govern them; and where it is corrupt, with given characteristics and circumstances, the phenomena must be the same.

The phenomena, both of the reason and the sensitivity, depend upon uniform, necessary, and general laws, as far as their particular constitution is considered.

To the will it is all different. Here is a power which, while the whole field of its possible determination is contemplated, retains its absolute contingency and freedom. There are for it no uniform and general laws necessarily governing its determinations, for it governs itself and can violate all law. From the reason it is easy to decide how the will *ought* to act; and for the sensitivity how it would be *most pleasing* to act, but it is under no compulsion from one or the other; whatever it does, it does from its own inherent force, in entire freedom. Every volition is its own immediate creation. It does not create the perceptions and conclusions of the reason; it does not create the emotions of the sensitivity; but it does absolutely create its own *nisus* or volitions. Let there be a given subject of ratiocination, *e. g.*, a theorum in geometry, and I know what the process of the ratiocination must be in every mind; it does not belong to any one mind, but is common to all.

Let there be a given object for the sensitivity ; *e. g.*, a painting, a statue, a column, or a landscape, and I know what the emotions must be in every mind ; they are emotions which do not belong to any one mind, but are common to all. But let there be a given occasion for the action of the will, and I do not know what the determination of every will must be ; there is here no determination common to all, for they do not come under one common and necessary law : on the contrary, there is here the power and the possibility of indefinite diversity ; and what each will determines will be peculiarly its own, and not another's. The different wills may indeed agree in their particular determinations ; but the agreement will arise from no antecedent all comprehending and necessitating principle, but from each will meeting every other will by a free determination. Now if the *absolutely personal* is that which belongs exclusively to the will, then again the will is the *person*—or *personality.*

IV. We have seen that when the pronouns *I* and *mine* are applied to the reason and the sensitivity, they are applied only because the will adding itself to these coördinates appropriates and directs them with their constituted and necessary laws : I think and feel only when I attend to the thoughts and emotions, and when I determine their direction and select their objects. With respect to the will itself, we also use the possessive pronoun—thus it is common to say *my will. My will* is sometimes equivalent to *my choice, or my volition*, and in this sense is proper according to the usage represented in the preceding pages. But

in addition to this it is used to express the appropriation or direction of the will itself, and in this use it is very remarkable. The will is that which is entitled to say *my* and *mine ;* when, therefore, it says *my will,* it affirms self-determination. It is its own will, because a cause *per se,* and self-moved and self-directed. It affirms itself of itself.

The will may thus be regarded as the centre of our being, all the other parts being related to it as the governing faculty. Hence it is called the *person,* that is the *per se una*—the one alone, and distinct from all beside; and by, and of itself, acting and doing.

A first determiner is demanded logically; but a first determiner must also be a self determiner. If there were but one first and self-determiner, there would be but one *per se una, vel persona.*

But God made one class of beings after his own likeness, and of his own kind; and these in the possession of will are persons likewise, or first and self-determining causes of their primary *nisus,* or volitions.

It is an interesting and striking fact, that the human mind has, in language, given testimony spontaneously and universally, to the freedom and supremacy of the will, by assigning as its representative, a class of words which perpetually imply freedom and supremacy.

The sentiment of Cousin that the will is only "the eminent characteristic" of personality,* deprives this

* Cours de Phil., Tom. II., page 234.

feature of language of its peculiar force; for if that sentiment be just, the personal pronouns represent all the faculties of the mind equally. Besides, the word personality becomes a mere synonyme of mind or spirit. But when we represent the personality as itself a characteristic of mind or spirit, and a characteristic which appears in a peculiar representative assigned it in the structure of all languages; which representative constantly implies freedom and supremacy, then we gain a new point of view in philosophy, and a new and singular confirmation of the doctrine of the will we have been unfolding.

The will, as the centre of being, is then always peculiarly represented and distinguished, whenever I affirm that I do, or I know, or I feel; or whenever I affirm proprietorship by the pronoun *mine*.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SENSITIVITY AND THE WILL.

I HAVE distinguished the will from the sensitivity. It now remains that we consider their reciprocal influence; and here I will pursue the same method as in the case of the will and the reason considered in their reciprocal influence:—I will first take my stand in the will, and investigate its action in the direction of the sensitivity; and then take my stand in the sensitivity, and investigate its action in the direction of the will.

SECTION I.

The action of the will in the direction of the sensitivity.

I. THE will can *mediately* and *remotely* cause emotions and passions in the sensitivity.

The production of emotions and passions, depends *immediately* upon objects correlated to the state of the sensitivity. When the correlated objects are perceived, the appropriate effect in the sensitivity necessarily follows. Now, the action of the

will, in reference to the production of emotions and passions, obviously lies in bringing before the intelligence the objects correlated to the sensitivity. Let the state of the sensitivity be known, and let the correlated objects be known, and then the will can design and accomplish any possible modifications of the sensitivity: thus we excite the passions of other men, we persuade other men, by arraying before them such objects, or producing in them such cognitions as we know to be correlated to the sensitivity, with respect to the passions we wish to excite. The intimate knowledge of the state of the sensitivity in general, and of the sensitivity in particular classes of men; the intimate and extensive knowledge of correlated objects in reference to every variety of passion; and the power of strongly and vividly arraying before the mind those objects by language, expression and gesture, go far to constitute the orator. The will of the orator controls the feelings of his audience, by appropriating his own faculties to the work of designing and effecting correlations of objects with their sensitivity.

This also enters into moral government. Moral government, in the largest sense, is a government lying in addresses to the reason and sensitivity of men. All influence therefore exerted through the sensitivity by voluntary endeavor, is of the nature of moral government.*

* Moral government is the only government which does not destroy freedom, inasmuch as the subject is not compelled to yield to reason or persuasion. Physical government is the compulsion of external action by physical force. This destroys physical freedom. Moral freedom, or the freedom of will, cannot be destroyed. Vide, p. 94, supra.

What is true of other individuals is true of myself likewise. I can produce any given emotions or passions in myself, by calling before my mind, by an act of will, the objects correlated to my sensitivity with respect to these emotions and passions. It is in this way that I can play the orator, with respect to myself, as well as with respect to others ; and it is in this way that I can exercise moral government over myself.

The only limit to the action of the will in the production of emotions and passions, are:—First, the state of sensitivity: if it be not correlated to any objects which I can present, the required emotion or passion is impossible to me, for I have no direct power over the sensitivity. Secondly, the objects to be correlated: if these objects are beyond my reach, that is, if my causality cannot be exerted over them, so as to bring them before the mind, then, again, the required emotion or passion is impossible to me. Thirdly, the extent of my knowledge: if I am unacquainted with the state of the sensitivity, or with the objects necessary to affect it, then, also, the required emotion or passion is impossible to my personal agency.

II. The will can indirectly banish from the sensitivity existing emotions and passions.

Existing emotions and passions must arise from objects correlated with the sensitivity. Now, the will can banish the emotions and passions by removing these correlated objects, or, in other words, withdrawing the attention from them and fixing it upon objects correlated with the sensitivity in respect of other passions.

There are two ways in which this can be done.

First. By bringing up any new object calculated to divert the sensitivity, on account of the superior interest which it possesses.

Secondly. By reasoning upon and representing the odiousness of the existing emotions and passions; that is, bringing into view other qualities of the object affecting the sensitivity than those it first perceived, and qualities calculated to excite the disgust and abhorrence of the sensitivity; at the same time, also, holding up the commands of the reason in a way to excite fear, admiration, veneration, and love. A man strongly inclined to intemperate drinking, is considering only the pleasures of the cup. Now, his passion may be subdued for the time, by presenting to his mind some other objects, more engrossing and delightful, if any such there be; or, by reasoning with him upon the degrading and destructive character of intemperance, both as respects himself and his family, and upon his responsibilities, as a moral and immortal being, thus awakening abhorrence of the vice, and rekindling the kind, and social, and moral, and religious sympathies of his nature. All this, again, is plainly involved in the practice of oratory, and in the exercise of moral government, either with respect to others or with respect to ourself. It is not only the kind and pure-minded philanthropist who possesses the power of presenting to the intemperate man, or the vicious man of any description, other objects calculated to divert the depraved sensitivity, and the power to reason with him on the hatefulness of vice and the obligations and loveliness of virtue; the vicious man himself possesses this power. The free

will, the personality, can command the objects of attention and thought in the bosom of every man. All men, upon the evidence of consciousness, believe this; and all law and government, human and divine, proceeds upon this belief. Admit the principle that the vicious man has no power of diverting his affections by the presentation of new objects—no power to reason with himself—in fine, no power to resist evil passions, and to cultivate good passions, and the sense of guilt, and praise, and blame—and the awards of justice no more have place.

In the above representation, I have proceeded upon the assumption that new objects might be found, possessing a higher interest to the sensitivity than the objects of the existing emotions and passions, and that the reasonings respecting the odious qualities of these objects, and the supreme worthiness and obligatoriness of virtue will likewise command a higher interest than the objects of the existing emotions and passions.

But, now, let us suppose either that the objects of the existing emotions and passions possess a higher interest to the sensitivity than the new objects, and the representations, commands, and rebukes of the reason; or, the still stronger case, that every representation of the loveliness and worth of virtue finds no genial response in the sensitivity, but, on the contrary, only positive dislike; and then we inquire whether, in these cases, the will can banish the existing emotions and passions? I shall consider the two cases supposed in the order in which they are announced.

1st. *Where the objects called up before the sensitivity, and all the representations, commands, and rebukes of the reason, are less interesting than what they are designed to supplant.* Can an object less interesting to the sensitivity be made, by an effort of will, to take the place of one more interesting? Can the less delightful emotions take the place of the more delightful? This is the point of inquiry.

In order to this we must assign the will the power of fixing the attention upon objects irrespective of the interest they excite in the sensitivity: for if the will possess this power, it can hold the attention to the object of less interest, in spite of the emotions awakened by the other object; and the latter being thus removed from the attention, the corresponding emotions must die away, and the emotions of the less interesting object alone exist. Does the will possess this power? This point has really been already determined in the affirmative, while considering the characteristics of the will. The will would not possess that freedom, and that power of self-determination which has already been demonstrated of it, if it could not determine in opposition to the sensitivity; for the preponderance of the sensitivity would be the subjugation of the will. The direction of the intelligence to this or that object, belongs to the will. If the action of the will were governed by the degree of interest awakened by the object in the sensitivity, then not the will, but the sensitivity would be the governing faculty—would be the personality. But as my object is to make a full development of the testimony of consciousness, respecting the will, so this object

will be best attained by appealing to consciousness on every occasion presented in the course of the inquiry.

Let us, then, inquire of our consciousness whether we be not able to divert the sensitivity from strong, agitating and most agreeable passion, by fixing the intelligence resolutely upon some object of trifling interest?

I have just heard a certain piece of good news, and am so excited with delight, that upon retiring at night, I find myself wakeful. The ten thousand thoughts associated with joy and hope, which are bounding through my mind, are delicious; but I reflect that if I yield to the excitement, I shall be unfit for the duties of the morrow. Under these circumstances I adopt the well-known expedient of counting one, two, three, four, &c., until at length I fall asleep. Now, the counting over one or two hundred units possesses no manner of interest; and it is on this very account that I resort to it; the mind being thus diverted from the exciting subjects of thought.

When I first make the attempt thus to divert the mind, I find it attended with difficulty, and it is not until I make repeated efforts that I succeed. In all this we are conscious of sternly exerting the will to fix the attention upon the uninteresting employment, to the exclusion of objects interesting in the highest degree. When the latter are excluded, the corresponding emotions, of course, cease, and the mind sinks into repose.

I am eagerly perusing some book of intense interest; an acquaintance breaks in upon me with the narrative of some trifling incident which he has just

witnessed. Nothing can be more vexatious and impertinent, than the interruption; and my inclination would lead me to turn him off and continue the perusal. But am I not conscious that I can lay aside the book, withdraw my attention from its contents, and patiently listen to the intruder?

Again. I will suppose that I have made an appointment with some friends, to take an excursion upon the water. The day comes, and is one of unrivalled beauty and serenity. Every circumstance makes the proposed excursion perfectly delightful. On the other hand, I have no pressing duty, and no other and more agreeable employment to detain me at home. Now, under these circumstances, am I not conscious that I can deny myself the pleasure of the excursion, and condemn myself to remain, and spend a solitary and irksome day at home?

I will suppose one case more. A man of dissolute habits on his way to a place of conviviality and pleasure, is met by a friend, who endeavors to dissuade him from going, and urges him to accompany him in a quiet walk in the fields adjacent to the suburbs. The man replies, your company and the walk certainly are not disagreeable to me in themselves, but on the present occasion my strongest feelings lead me in another direction. Now, who does not believe that notwithstanding his preponderating desires, he can accompany his friend, and by holding his attention to his conversation and to the objects he may chance to meet, succeed in diverting his sensitivity and awakening less interesting emotions.

Illustrations of a similar character may be adduced to an indefinite extent, and in all, the testimony of consciousness will be found to be uniform.

It is of no force in reference to these cases to say, that when the action takes place in a direction opposite to what at first appears to be the preponderating desire, there is really a change in the desire. This is plainly reasoning in a circle. It is assuming—first, that the action must be as the preponderating desire—and then again inferring that a certain desire must be the preponderating desire, because the action accords with it.* Besides in all these instances the testimony of consciousness, as every man may know by hypothesising himself in the instances, is decisive, that the action is in opposition to the strongest desires.

It is not inapposite to repeat here a remark which I have, in substance, before made, that self-denial is a word without meaning, if objects less interesting to the sensitivity cannot become the objects of attention in the place of those which cause the preponderating desires. If self-denial be any thing, it must consist in yielding to reason in opposition to our desires. But if whenever we yield to reason, reason itself becomes the object of preponderating desire, then we can never yield to reason in opposition to desire, and the triumph of reason is always a reconciliation with desire. But does not the man who is striving to attain purity know, and does he not always acknowledge, that trial and discipline, and self-mortification, are all embraced in doing right for the sake of the right, while

* Vide Article V. of this Section.

the strong passions of his nature are persuading and enticing him to do the wrong, because the wrong is most pleasing? I do not say that he does not love and reverence the right, but he does not wait for the gushes of congenial emotion to carry him along easily in the way of duty. He is the most sublimely good when he follows duty in self-denial, and up hills of difficulty, and when he experiences the gush of congenial emotion not as the impulse which precedes and necessarily determines, but as the sweet and gracious reward, which follows his conquest over self.

2dly. *The case where every representation of the loveliness and worth of virtue only awakens positive dislike.* I take here the case of virtue, because a strong case, and entirely apposite to the end I have in view, but I might with equal propriety take any other case in the sensitivity, for example, a case of esthetical interests and belonging to the fine arts.

The opposition of the sensitivity here supposed, must either be a mere prejudice arising from wrong judgments in the understanding, or it must be inherent and radical.

If it be a mere prejudice, then plainly it is open to correction from enlightened reasonings and representations, accompanied with examples calculated to work benignly upon the sensitivity.

As my investigations relate to the sensitivity in general, I will draw an illustration from music. An individual, whose taste has been corrupted by false education and fashion, finds himself displeased by a composition whose purity and excellence rest upon such undoubted authority, that he must conclude the

fault to be in himself alone. Now, for the correction of his false taste, he may attend to a scientific criticism upon musical compositions, together with fine musical performances addressed to his sensitivity through the ear; under this discipline the true nature will regain its authority.

If the dislike of any virtue be a similar prejudice, *e. g.*, if the virtue of meekness, through a prejudice of false education, be regarded as meanness and imbecility, then we may expect that the dislike will be removed by an exposition of the true ethical judgment, and the presentation of examples from biography and actual life.

Now that the will may institute this discipline for the sensitivity, and thus supplant one class of affections by another class of an opposite character, appears from the exhibition I have made of the freedom and self-determination of the will, and of its action in the direction of the intelligence. For the discipline consists in determining the mind to the thoughtful examination of principles, and in bringing up and contemplating appropriate examples. It would be easy to bring up particular instances as under the preceding head, for the purpose of directly questioning consciousness in this relation; but I cannot deem it necessary, for this point is eminently clear.

I proceed to the stronger part of the case, where the dislike is inherent and radical.

Here, by the very supposition we cannot by any effort of will supplant the existing emotions in relation to the object disliked; for the will has no direct power over the sensitivity, and the dislike, instead of

being the consequence of a prejudice, arises from the natural and fixed uncongeniality of the sensitivity with the object.

The only way, therefore, in which the emotions can be banished, is to dismiss the object entirely from the attention ; and this the will has been abundantly shown to have power to do, by fixing the attention upon other objects.

But the point of great interest which I design to consider in this connection is, whether the will, under the presence of the object, and the pressure of the dislike, can act in accordance with the object, and in opposition to the dislike. This, however, does not belong to the last title, viz., the power of the will to banish existing emotions and passions. I shall therefore introduce it under the following.

III. The will can act in direct opposition to the sensitivity.

1st. The will can act in direct opposition to the appetites. I can take medicine which I utterly loathe; I can eat food which is disagreeable to me ; I can eat when I have no appetite ; I can refrain from eating when I have a raging appetite. The same statements may be made with respect to the appetites in general.

I can do what the appetite rejects. I can refrain from doing what the appetite craves.

2dly. The will can act in direct opposition to the emotions and passions. I can turn away from the exquisite music which delights me, and attend to, or make discords which shock and distress me. The will can arbitrarily and indefinitely violate the esthetical laws, as I have shown when considering its

relations to the intelligence. In like manner it can violate the esthetical emotions, or act in direct opposition to them. Indeed, both are attested by facts familiar to all.

What is true of the esthetical emotions is true likewise of the moral. Transgression on the part of a being hitherto pure, would not be possible if the laws of the reason, and the corresponding emotions necessarily governed his will. But the fact of transgression proves that both the laws of the reason, and a pure sensitivity, must have been opposed by the will in at least the first instance of transgression. But beside the argument which may be thus formed, the power to do in opposition to appetite—in opposition to emotions esthetical and moral, is attested directly by the consciousness. Examples, under the head of the appetites, and the esthetical emotions, have been referred to. With respect to the moral emotions, I appeal to every man's consciousness whether we do not conceive of the possibility, and the actual power, to do acts which shock and disgust our moral feelings; and do we not conceive of this at the very moment we feel this disgust, and in the very face of it? An infant is lying before me asleep, in beauty and innocence: the law of conscience is active within me; the moral emotions in relation to this infant are in harmony with this law, and are as intense as they well can be; in addition to this, there are all the strong actings of natural affection, for the infant is my own offspring: I have, indeed, determined never to injure it, but to cherish, and guide, and bless it, to the utmost of my ability;

but still I am conscious of power to cast it off, and to expose it a foundling at the door of a stranger. My personality or will is clearly distinguishable from the reason and the sensitivity. I know myself as a cause, self-determining and free. My personality, or will, is distinguishable from the reason and the sensitivity, but not separable from them: hence the act of casting off my infant child would fill me with remorse, and wring my heart with the acutest suffering; but in the consciousness of a free and self-determined will I have the consciousness of power to bring upon myself this remorse and suffering. Analagous to this is the power of subjecting myself to physical suffering.

But I will now present the subject under another aspect. Let the sensitivity be taken as totally opposed to some duty enjoined by morality or religion, so that the duty when contemplated awakens only strong dislike; then, again, in this case, and in the very face of the dislike, the free will or personality can perform the duty. I may remark here, that in public opinion, in courts of justice established on earth, and in the great court of justice established above, as depicted by conscience, the non-performance of a duty is not excused on account of the dislike of the individual. We have here the testimony of the universal moral consciousness. But that same consciousness testifies, that if the dislike necessitates the non-performance, then blame is not possible; for the sensitivity has no power to change itself.

The drunkard, the adulterer, the thief, and the murderer, cannot excuse their deeds on account of their preponderating desires. So, also, the man who re-

fuses to relieve the sufferings of another, when he has the means, is not permitted to plead in excuse the want of compassion, and benevolent feeling. The profane man is not permitted to plead his dispositions in extenuation of his impiety, nor as an apology for not worshipping his Maker. Every similar case receives the same decision from the moral consciousness. And what is the basis of this decision? The consciousness testifies that, notwithstanding the desires to the contrary, the man in his personality or will—that in which the power of doing resides—can fulfil the duty. The miser has the power to give and to relieve; the profane man, the power to pray and render obedience to truth and righteousness; the drunkard, the power to cherish his wife and children; the thief, the power to do honestly towards all men; the cruel and hard-hearted, to do deeds of mercy. "Talk not of your dispositions, of your strong and habitual passions;" is the common judgment found in the human consciousness, "you are not compelled to obey these dispositions and passions; you have power to resist their influence, and to do the right."

Where would be social order and moral government, were the sentiment promulgated and adopted, that the obligation and ability to do right depend upon the ever-changing passions of men; that an evil deed is sanctified by the desire which necessitates it, and that the neglect of well doing is no longer culpable when the disposition to do well, no longer exists?

Happily for mankind there are few who can so

stultify and benumb the consciousness by specious sophistries, as to yield any respect to such a sentiment. My consciousness tells me plainly, and I believe, as humanity is one, the consciousness of men at large in its spontaneity tells them plainly also, that in our personality, in our free will, we have the central and self-directing power, which, notwithstanding the fire of opposing passions within, or the flood of malignant oppositions threatening from without, can do the right simply because it is right. Let virtue have no fascination to the corrupted sensitivity, still we can perceive the marks of eternal truth and majesty upon her brow, and do her homage.

IV. I anticipate here the following objection, viz., that when appetite and passion are apparently opposed in the action of the will, that is, when an individual seems to do an action utterly disagreeable to him, the non-performance of the action is connected with something still more disagreeable to him, and that therefore his sensitivity, after all, preponderates in favor of the least disagreeable action, or which is the same thing, the most agreeable of the two. Thus the miser may do a benevolent action, because he may be so situated that his refusal to do it will involve many unpleasant and injurious consequences to himself. And the thief may do honestly when he is liable to detection and punishment if he does otherwise. In these, and the like cases, the actions which to others, who judge from the general characters of the individuals in question, appear to be actions which must be utterly disagreeable to these individuals, are nevertheless to them the most agreeable in the pe-

culiar circumstances, in which they alone perhaps know themselves to be placed. They obey the laws of justice, truth, and benevolence, not because they reverence and love these laws, but because the actions which ostensibly form this obedience happen to stand likewise in relation to their habitual principles of action. So that in all these cases, the sensitivity is not opposed, but really obeyed.

In meeting this objection, I, in the first place, grant that men may do actions which in themselves are in accordance with rectitude, from covert motives of the worst character, and that in all such cases the corrupt sensitivity is not opposed. I shall not therefore dispute the reality of examples like those above given.

I remark in the next place, that the above objection assumes that, in all cases where the sensitivity appears to be opposed by the action of the will, the same explanation is to be given. It assumes too that the will has power to obey the reason, when the sensitivity is apparently opposed to the reason, only upon condition that the acts of obedience can have a covert relation with the corrupt sensitivity itself. That is, it assumes the impossibility of opposing the will to the sensitivity. If the objection is a mere assumption, then it is of no force.

Although, however, as an assumption it has no intrinsic force, still it may serve to cast suspicion and doubt over the doctrine which it opposes, by offering a ready way of explaining the facts, adduced as instances of the will opposing itself directly to the sensitivity. The objector may say, as every fact is brought up, "Ah! but you have not penetrated into

all the relations of this fact; if you could do so you would find that, after all, the will is not opposed to the sensitivity." I remark therefore again, that the moral consciousness, by which I mean the consciousness in relation to questions of duty, to which I have appealed, when it affirms that the individual can do right, although his sensitivity be opposed to right doing, makes no condition of a covert relation to the sensitivity, by means of which the external act may show fair, while the intention reaches to something beyond, which gratifies the sensitivity. If this were so, then the ability to do right would still be limited by appetite and passion. Nay, there would be no ability to do right, but what lay in appetite and passion confessedly opposed to the right, by an ingenious device succeeding in reconciling the acts of duty with their own gratification. If this were so, then moral obligation would be binding upon the man of corrupt passions, only when circumstances should permit him to reconcile the specific acts enjoined, with the laws of his passions. If this were so, then the law of conscience, when it commands the sinner to cease to do evil, and to do righteousness, would aim only to make him a specious hypocrite. And the last consequence would be, that not only the ability to do right, but the very law of righteousness itself would be submerged in the sensitivity.

I appeal to my own consciousness, and I find that in the worst temptations to which I have been subject, when the gratification of passion appeared altogether delightful, and duty appeared indeed obligatory, but at the same time the "stern daughter of the voice of

God"—obligatory, but forbidding and irksome—I have had the conviction that in my personality I had the power to resist the temptation, and to refuse to do the deed to which my passions charmed me.

This decision of my consciousness is sustained by the common consciousness of men, whether found expressed in books of ethics and law, in the decisions of the courts of justice, or in public opinion.

V. When the law that "the strongest motive always determines the will" is brought forward, it is not difficult to set it aside in the bare logical point of view under which it is generally presented, by turning it into a *petitio principii*.* I have heard an ingenious reasoner, however, evade the force of the *petitio principii*, by leaving the *logical* and returning to the *psychological* inquiry. He affirmed, 1. That the consciousness directly determines the comparative strength of desires. 2. That he consciousness gives its testimony that every act, of volition is immediately preceded by a desire known at the time to be the strongest desire in the sensitivity. And this, it was contended, could be affirmed, without pretending that the connection between the strongest desire and the will is a *necessary* connection; but that this is a *certain* connection, since, according to the hypothesis, it is a fact that the volition is always preceded by such a desire. According to this view, it becomes a simple matter of consciousness, that "the will is always as the strongest desire, or the most agreeable."

In reply to this, I remark, 1. I grant that conscious-

* Vide Chapter on Motives, Sec. II.

ness can, as above stated, determine the comparative strength of desires; that is, in our consciousness of the affections of the sensitivity, we know their intrinsic character and comparative energy; just as in our consciousness of truths affirmed by the intelligence, we know their intrinsic character and comparative importance. This is, indeed, the true mode of comparing motives.

2. The second affirmation, that consciousness gives its testimony that every volition is immediately preceded by a desire, known to be at the time the strongest desire, I am bound to deny; for my consciousness gives no such testimony. I know, indeed, that my life presents very numerous instances of this kind, and very numerous instances have come under my observation, in the lives of others; but there are clearly defined to me, instances in which I have willed against the desire which my consciousness recognized as the strongest desire at the time; and besides my own experience, I can appeal to facts in biography and history, which bear so decidedly the aspect of the will obeying the reason against the preponderating passion, that I know not how to give them a different interpretation. Take the instance of Sir Philip Sidney, who, when another spit in his face, calmly took out his handkerchief and wiped his face, saying, "I would that you could as easily wipe the deed from your conscience." Can any man doubt what were his feelings! Can any man doubt, that, by a masterly self-control lying in the exertion of his will, under the light of correct principles, he was enabled to set so sublime an example! "He that ruleth his spirit, is greater than he that taketh a city."

3. If the theory of the strongest desire always preceding the volition, as above stated, were true, it would also be true, notwithstanding, that it professes to put aside a necessary determination, that no self-denial is ever exercised, that the mind never directly obeys reason, and that the sensitivity is really the governing faculty of the mind. If a man always wills according to his strongest desires, then he always wills to gratify his desires, and self-denial is out of the question. There are no stronger or more explicit terms in which to describe an epicurean life, than what this theory employs to express the uniform and universal law of volition. And where the will acts according to the laws of the reason and the conscience, the obedience cannot be said to take place on account of the intrinsic worth and obligatoriness of these laws, but simply, because they at the time call forth the strongest desires, and obedience to them will prove the highest gratification. Here, also, it holds true that the individual can neither propose nor make efforts to change the actual state of his strongest desires, since any plan or effort to do so, would be to act in opposition to them, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

If the sensitivity is thus taken in fact always to govern the will, on what ground is it affirmed that this governance is not necessary, but merely certain? If we characterize this governance merely from our observation of the succession of desires and volitions, and this succession is one of invariable uniformity, it would be natural and legitimate to characterize it as a necessary governance, according to the analogy of

physical phenomena in succession. If then we have any ground for believing that this governance is not necessary, it can only be that of the direct testimony of our consciousness in reference to the succession of desires and volitions: at the very moment a given volition follows a given strongest desire, there must be in the consciousness this judgment, viz., it is not necessary that this volition should follow this desire—it might not follow it, it might oppose it, and follow some other desire which is not the strongest. But what would this judgment imply? Would it not imply that there is a power in the mind to resist the strongest desires, and of course that in the constitution of the mind the sensitivity is not the sole governing faculty? What then is this other governing faculty which it is conceivable might resist the sensitivity—is it the reason? Then, since the power exists, why is it not sometimes exercised? Why does not the reason sometimes govern the will? Is it the will itself as a self-determining power? Then why does not the will sometimes oppose itself resolutely to the sensitivity? It is indeed strange, that we should be conscious of a power to resist the strongest desire, and yet no man in no one instance ever accomplish it! The language of law and justice, of religion and ethics, of praise and blame, is a mere empty display of words, if there is no actual willing against the strongest desires. Does not law enjoin duty in the face of opposing passion? Does not justice pronounce her severe penalties because duty was sacrificed to the gratification of passion? Do not religion and ethics make it their great end to impose a self-discipline, which consists in a

constant opposition to propelling desires? Do we not praise or blame—does not conscience in every man's bosom praise or blame, according as the man obeys the law of rectitude in opposition to passion, or fulfils the end of the passion, by trampling upon the law? Now, the theory in question must affirm either that the language of law and justice, of religion and ethics, of praise and blame, respect only the character of the desires, of desires which have a necessary existence, and of actions only as uniformly embraced in these desires, and that therefore the language is glaringly inappropriate; or it must affirm that the language is applied only in reference to what might be, but yet that which never is; a sounding array of phraseology only in reference to hypothesised cases.

But law and justice, religion and ethics, and the conscience of each individual man, have nothing to do with mere hypotheses; their bearing is practical, they deal with human nature in its actual constitution, capabilities, condition, and manifestations. Hence, every man feels the authority of law, yields to the sovereignty of justice, and acknowledges the reality of moral and religious discipline. The duty and possibility of opposing the sensitivity under its strongest excitements is assumed in the law, the penalty, and the discipline, and is responded to fully in the consciousness of the moral agent.

To those who have made the discipline of truth and uprightness their aim, I can appeal with confidence, if they be unbiassed by any favorite speculations, and are ready to understand their own experiences. Do not such individuals recollect moments

when a firm resistance of temptation—the resolute turning away from an alluring opportunity, or the breaking off from an old and dear habit, painful as the "cutting off of a right hand," or the "plucking out of a right eye," determined the ascendancy of principle, or the renovation of character and hope?

The man who has approached the fearful "edge of battle," or the edge of any awful trial and conflict whatever, has ever felt himself suspended between the shrinking and dread of his sensitive nature, and the self-collecting energies of his will, turning the mind away from the causes of weakness and dread, to the great aims and hopes of patriotism, heroism, or conscience. In such an emergency he receives no aid directly from his sensitivity; on the contrary, it is the very place of weakness. There is something to be done, and he must do it in spite of agitation and despondency: or if the sensitivity itself must be revived, strengthened, and wakened up to glorious enthusiasm and fearlessness, *he himself* must collect around it in the consciousness, the reasonings, the objects, the inspiriting purposes, which are to produce the transformation. In such circumstances he does not feel himself to be a mere sea of passion, tossed in this direction or that direction, by random, and unsought and irresistible winds; elevated and depressed by influences above and beneath, out of sight and beyond control—he is here the monarch of his own troubled waters,

et alto
Prospiciens, summa placidum caput extulit unda.

If, for a moment, we were to grant that in the hour of trial or conflict, where the whole sensitive being is at war with the required action, the state of the passions must first be changed before the action can transpire, still the question must arise, how shall the change be effected? And, unless the individual be taken as a mere "passive thing," he must himself set about producing this change, and of course must oppose himself to the sensitivity, instead of being governed by it. That volition which is to subdue the present strongest desires, by calling up the requisite influences, cannot itself be immediately preceded by one of these desires.

SECTION II.

Moral and Natural Ability and Inability.

THOSE who identify the will and the sensitivity; or who represent the first as necessarily determined by the last, thus merging all our causality in the last, this last being itself governed by necessity, give the following representation of ABILITY and INABILITY.

Ability is the power of doing any specific action. Inability is the want of this power. The seat of moral ability or inability is in the sensitivity. When there is moral ability, the sensitivity is in correlation with the thing to be done. When there is moral inability this correlation does not exist. Natural ability exists where there is an established connection be-

tween a given volition and a sequent; natural inability is the want of this connexion. I have natural ability to raise my arm, because there is an established connexion between a volition to this effect, and the motion of the arm. I have a natural inability to stop, by a volition, the circulation of my blood, because there is no established connexion between a volition to this effect and the stopping of the circulation. Liberty exists when this established connexion is not interfered with, as when my arm is not bound. A deprivation of liberty takes place where natural ability is interfered with, as where the arm is bound.

I have moral ability to raise my arm when the act is in correlation with my sensitivity, that is when it is most agreeable to me. I am morally unable to move my arm, when the act is not in correlation with my sensitivity, that is when the act is not the most agreeable, or is positively disagreeable.*

I have shown in my review of Edwards, the utter futility of this distinction, as a means of escaping the doctrine of necessity. The volition evidently depends upon the moral ability, and this moral ability being necessary, the volition must be necessary likewise.† After this, it is impossible to realize the idea of freedom in an unimpeded connection of the volition with a given sequent.

The view of moral ability above given, is a legitimate consequence of identifying the will and the sensitivity, or of governing the first by the last.

But this moral ability and inability, is a mere chi-

* Vide Review of Edwards, pp. 46—58, and 79, 80.

† Ibid. pp. 95—100.

mera, if the will be taken as a central and self-determining power; for in this case the activity neit herlies in the sensitivity, nor is governed by it. Hence if there be a correlation between the sensitivity and the action contemplated, the will can determine in opposition to this correlation, and produce a different action. And if there be no correlation, still the will can determine it. The will, as the causality, can produce any volition, or, in other words, make any causative *nisus* whatever, within the scope of known objects. There is no limit to volition but the limit of knowledge.

The ability and freedom of man lie in his ability and freedom to produce volitions. It may be called a *natural* ability in reference to his fixed and given constitution of being. It may be called a *moral* ability in reference to his accountability under the laws of conscience. The ability and freedom lying in the connection between his volitions and sequents is conditional, variable, and destructible, while the other is absolute and fixed, and indestructible as the soul itself.*

Edwards, in his work, gives several instances of moral inability.† Let us examine these instances, and see whether they really contain the inability he speaks of.

1. "A woman of great honor and chastity, may have a moral inability to prostitute herself to her slave." His meaning is, that her sensitivity being in no correlation with such an act, the act is utterly impossible. Now, I appeal to every one, do we not be-

* Vide supra, p. 94.

† Review of Edwards, p. 56.

lieve that this woman, with all her pure and honorable feelings, has still the ability in her personality or will, to determine to do it. Conceive of yourself as in the same situation, and with the same feelings, and still while you feel certain* that neither the woman nor yourself in her situation, would do the deed, you feel certain, likewise, that your ability to make the volition is complete. The certainty is not the result of a barrier of necessity, but of your own determination.

2. "A child of great love and duty to his parents, may be thus unable to kill his father." The circumstances of this case involve the same principles with the former.

3. "A very lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and temptations. and in the absence of such and such restraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying his lust." On this principle, every gratification of lust is absolutely necessary. If the whole activity is in the sensitivity, then, when this activity is highly excited to lasciviousness, there can be no opposing power conceived of in the man, and the lascivious deed inevitably follows. But do we not believe, in all such cases, that the man has within his personality a power to resist the allurements of his sensitivity? In all our own exposures to temptation, have we not been conscious of such a power, and have we not always felt guilty if we did not exercise it? Take the case of Joseph and Potiphar's wife; do we believe that it was impossible for her to resist her propensities? If we could believe this, would we not

* Review of Edwards, pp. 254, 280—Certainty and Necessity distinguished.

pity instead of condemning her? It is not certain that Joseph himself did not feel greatly tempted, but *he* resisted and overcame. Had that resistance been necessarily determined in him by a counter breeze of passion, would we regard him in the light of that high and magnanimous virtue in which we now place him? It is the strong and resolute will obeying duty, in opposition to the fascinations of the sense, and the intoxications of desire, which makes heroic virtue. An ancient Christian was chained naked upon a bed of roses, and a naked and beautiful courtezan sent to dally with him. He bit off his tongue, in order, by self-torture, to divert his mind from the soft approaches of pleasure. Was not this the commanding and conquering will piercing the sensitivity with agony, to prevent those desires which were otherwise inevitable? What other resistance can be conceived of in this case, but that of the man—of the personality itself?

4. "A drunkard, under such and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear taking strong drink." In all cases, the man, according to Edwards, does what is most agreeable to him; and when he does what is most agreeable to him, he is morally unable to do the contrary, "through the want of an inclination." Hence the drunkard is always necessitated to the drunkenness in which he indulges. But this, again, contradicts consciousness. We believe the drunkard can resist his appetite, and we blame and rebuke him for not doing so; and still more he blames and upbraids himself for not doing so.

5. "A very malicious man may be unable to exert

benevolent acts to an enemy." This inability is "the want of an inclination," and this "want of inclination" exists, according to Edwards, antecedently to the volition, and is therefore absolutely necessary relatively to the individual. Hence these benevolent acts are utterly impossible, and the opposite acts—the acts of malice, cruelty and revenge—are absolutely necessary. But does any one believe that a malicious man cannot restrain his passions, and do deeds of benevolence? Were this belief to obtain, all sense of guilt, all abhorrence of crime, all penalties of justice, would disappear. But the consciousness is decisive here, no less than in the preceding examples.

It is possible that some one may remark here, that, after all, before a man of a perverse temper can do a good deed, he must, in some way, effect a change of temper for himself; and that, therefore, the ability to do an act opposed to the present state of his sensitivity must lie in that sensitivity, when it has undergone the change required for bringing it into correlation with the new act.

But according to the theory which I am opposing, it is not possible for the man to set about a change in his sensitivity; for this change, if effected by him, must be effected by a volition directly changing the state of the sensitivity, or by a volition calling upon or adjusting other agencies and influences to do it. But the sensitivity cannot change itself by an act of volition; for, all the volitions are the result of its actual state, and therefore no volition can exist which is opposed to its actual state, any more than an effect can exist without a cause. Nor can the sensitivity

call upon or adjust other agencies and influences, in order to bring about this change; for this aim, or effort, or volition of the sensitivity, would be hostile to itself. It would be as impossible to effect this change mediately, as to effect it immediately :* *e. g.*, how could the act of the ancient Christian, above related, find its origin in the sensitivity? On the theory of a moral inability, all self-command, all self-discipline, all efforts to subdue passion, all acts of duty opposed to passion, are impossible. The man absorbed in his sensitivity is just what that sensitivity chances to be, and cannot possibly be any thing else, unless influences altogether exterior to himself produce the change. This theory, I dare affirm, is condemned by the human consciousness. It is a monster, created out of an assumed and false psychology.

When we take the will as distinct from the sensitivity, and capable of acting in direct opposition to it, we assign man a positive ability of willing whatever lies within the sphere of his knowledge, and of actually accomplishing whatever, by the laws of his intellectual, sensitive, and physical being, stands connected with his volitions in the relation of effect to cause. Hence it is not necessary, that in order to perform any act in obedience to duty, the sensitivity should be first changed. Again, the will as distinct from the sensitivity and itself the central power or personality, can make efforts for the change of the sensitivity itself.

First. If the sensitivity could be changed by a

* Review of Edwards, pp. 106—109.

volition directly, that is, if such a change were in the constitution of our being the immediate sequent of volitions, then the will as the absolute cause of volitions could produce any change in the sensitivity required. As to the fact, I grant that changes in the sensitivity are not thus connected with volitions. I cannot love or hate, nor have any other emotion by merely willing to love or hate, or to have such emotion.

Secondly. If the sensitivity is to be changed by bringing other agencies and influences to bear upon it, then in the will we have a power which can seek for and appropriate these agencies and influences. The man may comprehend by his intelligence the corruption of his sensitivity, and ascertain the means of its regeneration; and then in the will he is conscious of the ability to make use of these means. When all activity is represented as in the sensitivity, and all corruption as there likewise, there is no possibility of making any attempts at self-regeneration direct or indirect. But when the corruption lies in the sensitivity, and the activity lies in another part of our being capable of resisting the former, there is opened a possibility of making attempts at self-regeneration.

Thirdly. The will resolutely bearing up against the solicitations of the sensitivity, and acting in direct opposition to it, presents us the noble and heroic virtue of self-denial. It is the determination to do right, and the determination to use all requisite means for self-purification. This I regard as the great and decisive act of self-regeneration. Whether in the con-

stitution of our being there be a ground of connexion between this act and the purification of the sensitivity, is a point worthy of consideration. That there is a connexion between it and the communication of supernatural regenerating influences will in the proper place be shown to be a truth of revealed religion.

SECTION III.

The action of the sensitivity in the direction of the will.

I. The gratification of the sensitivity by presenting objects calculated to awaken pleasant emotions, or to satisfy desire, constitutes a ground of action. It is inconceivable, for it implies a contradiction, that the will should act without an aim, and an object of action. In order to do, there must be *something* for it to do, and *something* in respect of which to do. The reason in its laws supplies one class of aims and objects of action. The reason supplies us with *something* to do when it commands us to practice benevolence and justice. So likewise the sensitivity supplies the will with aims of action—supplies it with *something* to do, in the emotions and desires, which are to be awakened and gratified. The passions are thus active principles of our being. I mean by this that the pleasurable excitements of passion form motives in view of which the will determines itself. Thus the love of knowledge, the passion for fame, the love of kindred, the animal appetites, &c., are

active principles because they contain motives of delight, in view of which the will determines itself.

II. An act commanded by the reason may be likewise agreeable to the sensitivity. In this case the motive is twofold; and the act is more readily and easily performed, because there is no opposition between the two faculties supplying the motives: there is no deliberation or choice between the reasonable and the agreeable, since they are both united in the same object. Where this exists we have moral certainty as to the character of the volitions.*

III. The sensitivity does not necessitate the action of the will.

Those who contend for the necessary determination of the will, present the question under two phases.

1. The will and sensitivity are identified; and as the sensitivity is generally admitted to be governed by a necessity lying in its peculiar constitution; volition or the strongest sense of the agreeable arising from the correlation of the sensitivity and its objects, must of course be under a necessary determination. This is the phase of the school of Edwards.

2. The will is preserved distinct from the sensitivity, but the sensitivity contains the causes of the voluntary actions. Hence, again, as the sensitivity is necessarily determined in its affections, the will is necessarily determined in its volitions. This is the phase of Locke, and those who exactly follow him.

Now, the dogma of a necessary determination, has been really and truly met under both those phases.

* Review of Edwards, p. 285.

For I have shown the will to be both distinct from the sensitivity, and as the personality or free causality of the mind to have power to regulate the sensitivity, and to resist its strongest temptations. It appears to me that the above dogma is effectually set aside.

What I say farther under this head, I mean rather as an elucidation than as an augmentation of proof.

IV. The passions may be divided into deliberative and instinctive. The first, are those which arise upon a thoughtful and deliberate contemplation of the object. The last, are those which spring up suddenly, without a thoughtful and deliberate contemplation of the object.

Now, with respect to the instinctive passions, the bodily actions seem to follow them necessarily, at least we are not conscious of any power to prevent their effects; *e. g.*, fear upon the sudden and unlooked for presentation of danger, causes us to start back and to elude the danger. In this case thought and deliberation would come too slowly to answer the end. But the sudden impulse of fear leads to an effort of self-preservation at the very instant it is required. This is a wise provision in the constitution of all animals; it is common to man and brute. If will in this, and the like cases, be necessarily determined by the sensitivity, it is of course an exception to the general law. But it becomes an exception because consciousness does not mark any intervention of self-determination, and consequently those cases in which consciousness does mark such an intervention, remain impregnable.

It may fairly be questioned, however, whether the muscular emotions appearing as sequents of instinctive passions, are connected at all with the will. The passions produce various effects upon the physical system, such as increasing the circulation of the blood, and determining it to the head, agitation of the nerves, and tremblings and convulsive starts in the muscles. Now, the sudden eluding of danger by a change of position, or the resistance of an impending mass, may be another instance of the same kind. The instinctive effort would be of only momentary duration, as thought and self-determination immediately come in and direct to farther efforts, wisely and judiciously laid, and to which the instinctive impulse is inadequate. When the mere instinctive impulse does continue, as sometimes happens in persons of weak and nervous constitutions, and thought and self-determination do not make their appearance, the result is disastrous.

It is in deliberate passions that we are conscious of the strength of will to resist, to regulate, to overcome. The passion strongly urges to the action in which its gratification lies. But the man reasons, and determines in perfect freedom. He feels that he has power to obey the passion, power to deny it, and power to regulate the measure of its gratification.

I have examined my consciousness earnestly and candidly on this subject, and I cannot find that my volitions are necessitated by my passions. I feel that I am morally obligated to resist them, however strong they may be; that I am morally obligated to obey my conscience, however painful, and difficult, and

self-denying, it may be ; and in my will, my free causality, I find the ability to do both : nothing can be clearer, or more decisive to me than this consciousness. I repeat again, that as I believe humanity to be one, so I believe that every one who thoughtfully and candidly seeks to know himself will attain to the same result.

V. It is probable that those who advocate a different doctrine, will start here the objection, that when under the law of conscience, we resist a passion, obedience to this law strikes the sensitivity more agreeably than the gratification of the passion. The objection is a fair one, and I do not wish to evade it.

Let it be remarked that I have already in considering the action of the will in the direction of the sensitivity, taken up the case of a sensitivity, totally opposed to duty ; and have shown the possibility, as well as obligation of its performance, notwithstanding this opposition. In all such cases the reason or consciousness is not obeyed, because the most agreeable ; but simply because I am convinced that I ought to obey.

The whole force of the objection lies in affirming that the will cannot obey a simple conviction of conscience, without its appearing the most agreeable. But, on the other hand, it is not denied that the will can obey the sensitivity without any regard to the conscience, or in direct opposition to its laws known and understood. Now, how is it that I can obey the sensitivity in opposition to reason or conscience, but cannot obey the reason or conscience in opposition to the sensitivity ? If the will can act from the motions

of the sensitivity without the reason, why may it not act likewise from the command of the reason without the sensitivity? If it be said that every object of the reason is necessarily related to the sensitivity as agreeable or disagreeable; I reply that there is equal force in the affirmation that every object of the sensitivity is likewise related to the reason as approved or disapproved by its laws.

The power here claimed for the will, is that of taking an object which is granted to be related to both reason and sensitivity, in one of these relations irrespective of the other, or in the consciousness of directly opposing the other; the power of performing an action solely to gratify a passion, without any regard to the law of conscience commanding or forbidding the action; the power of performing an action solely out of respect to the laws of the conscience, without any regard to its agreeableness or its disagreeableness. *A priori* one would appear as easy and natural as the other, to say the least, unless we can show that the will is absolutely governed by the one and not by the other. And this indeed is the point which those I am opposing contend for. They affirm that the will *is* absolutely governed by the sensitivity, and not by the reason; and that when the laws of the reason are obeyed, they are obeyed only through the intervention of the sensitivity; that is, the *reasonable* is obeyed not as the reasonable, but only under its aspect of agreeableness.

Now, that this intervention or coming between of the sensitivity, whenever the law of the reason is obeyed, is false, I show by appealing to conscious-

ness. My own consciousness tells me that I can obey, and have obeyed the sensitivity without respect to reason; and that I can obey, and have obeyed reason without respect to the sensitivity; and I appeal confidently to the consciousness of other men for a confirmation of this decision.

Let me also remind the reader of the consequences of subjecting obedience of the laws of the reason, to the conditions of the sensitivity.

1. If the laws of the reason are obeyed only as they are agreeable to the sensitivity, then obedience whenever it takes place must be necessary; and disobedience when it takes place must be necessary also. Hence the merit and demerit of actions are destroyed.

2. The brutes have the same power to obey the laws of the reason that men have, and if the idea of merit and demerit be admitted, they have also the same merit and demerit of action. A brute acts according to the impulses of passion and acts thus necessarily. Now in obeying these impulses, he may chance to do such acts as are commanded by the reason or conscience. He indeed does not know or perform them as such—he performs them because they are agreeable to him. But the man according to this theory, can act in obedience to reason or conscience only so far as it is agreeable to him, and solely because it is agreeable to him. The man has the judgment that such an act is right and proper, but the mere judgment by the hypothesis does not influence the act as cause or motive—the agreeable properties contain the influence as cause or motive. The brute and the man are thus governed in the same

way; and act from similar impulses, and with the same necessity.

VI. Is any thing gained in point of clearness in our psychology by representing the will as governed by the sensitivity? Certainly no more than there would be in representing the will as governed by the reason. We may as well affirm in order to elucidate our psychology, that we obey the agreeable only as it is most reasonable to do so, as to say that we obey the reasonable only as it is most agreeable to do so.

But do we gain any thing in point of clearness by making either affirmation? I cannot perceive that we do. When we make the will to be governed out of itself—or, in other words, assign the effects which appear in it, or which appear as the immediate sequents of its volitions, to other causes beside itself, we encounter in reference to these other causes all the difficulties which are imagined to pertain to the will considered as the cause.

Let the reason be taken as the sole cause of volitions, then all volitions are reasonable and right. But the reason as the cause of volitions must be either a cause self-determined and free, or a cause necessitated.

Let the sensitivity be taken as the sole cause of volition, then all volitions are agreeable and pleasant. But the sensitivity, as the cause of volition, must be either a cause self-determined and free, or a cause necessitated.

Now, at the least, it is as easy to conceive of a self-determining and free will, as it is to conceive of a self-determining and free reason or sensitivity. But do we not all admit, that the processes of the reason,

and the motions of the sensitivity, are necessitated, while it is respecting the will alone that we raise the question of freedom? If the will be governed either by the reason or the sensitivity, under a relation of necessary dependence, then we are thrown upon the doctrine of universal necessity.

When, however, we look at the actual phenomena of volition, they seem to be characterized sometimes by the reason, and sometimes by the sensitivity. They sometimes appear in the direction of propriety and duty, and sometimes in the direction of the passions. Hence it becomes impossible to assign them exclusively either to the reason or the sensitivity, unless when assigned to the one, there be a subsumption under its own characteristics, of the characteristics of the other. For example, if the phenomena of volition be assigned exclusively to the reason, then those objects which obviously bear the characteristics of the sensitivity, must be subsumed under the characteristics of the reason, and *vice versa*. Thus, by the first subsumption, the agreeable must be taken as the reasonable. By the second, the reasonable must be taken as the agreeable. By the first, I obey the agreeable only because it appears to me reasonable. By the second, I obey the reasonable only because it appears to me agreeable.

Now these subsumptions might take place if the reasonable were always agreeable, and the agreeable were always reasonable. But it is a palpable fact, that they are not unfrequently opposed. Hence, if the reason exclusively governed the will, no volitions could take

place, however agreeable they might appear, if they were opposed to the reason: and, on the other hand, if the sensitivity exclusively governed the will, no volitions could take place, however reasonable they might appear, if opposed to the sensitivity. If the reason govern, I do every thing which is reasonable; and if I do any thing which appears agreeable, I do it not on this account, but because I perceive that it is reasonable likewise. If the sensitivity govern me, I do every thing which is agreeable to me; and if I do any thing which is reasonable, I do it not on this account, but because I perceive that it is agreeable likewise. So that actually no subsumption of the characteristics of one takes place under the characteristics of the other; but when the object of volition chances to be both reasonable and agreeable, it can, in respect of the appropriate characteristic, go under the rule either of the reason or of the sensitivity.

Now, if phenomena of volition appear which are opposed to reason, the incontestible evidence exists that reason does not exclusively govern the will. And again, if phenomena of volition appear which are opposed to the sensitivity, the incontestible proof exists that the sensitivity does not exclusively govern the will.

That phenomena of both kinds do appear, I think no one will be bold to deny. It seems to me that every man, speaking in candor his spontaneous sentiments, must say, that he sometimes does things which are agreeable to him, or pleasing to his passions, although he knows them to be opposed to reason and conscience. And again, that he does things

which are disagreeable to him, or displeasing to his passions, [or that he is conscious of power to do these things,] simply because they are right or proper. It is not admissible here, for an opponent to reply, that when a man does things which are opposed to his passions, or thinks he has power to do such things, it is a mere illusion; for that the thing which he concludes to do, must, after all, in some way, be the most agreeable to him. I say this is inadmissible, for it is plainly an assumption made against consciousness. It is assuming the necessary predominance of the sensitivity over the reason, in the determination of the will, thus sweeping us at once into a universal necessity. I claim paramount authority for the consciousness, in deciding that the phenomena of volition do actually appear under characteristics both of the reason and the sensitivity, distinctly marked, and not unfrequently opposed; presenting the man at one time, under forms of beastliness and degradation; and at another time, under the noble aspect of self-denial; wallowing in pleasure under the rebuke of his conscience; or struggling for virtue, against passion within, meeting strong temptation from without.

Now, in order to give clearness to our psychology, we want a third and distinct faculty in intimate union with the other two, but not necessarily governed by either one or the other; a faculty which can go in the direction of the reason out of respect to the reason, and in the direction of the sensitivity out of respect to the sensitivity. By the introduction of this

faculty, all the varying actions of men can be accounted for.

Let it now be asked, when phenomena of volition appear in the direction of the reason—the direction of law and duty, why do these phenomena appear? The answer is ready, that the personality or free-will having power to go in this direction, has *chosen* to go in this direction. Let it now be asked again, when phenomena of volition appear in the direction of the sensitivity, the direction of passion and enjoyment, why do these phenomenas appear? The answer is ready again, that the personality, or free-will, having power to go in this direction, has *chosen* to go in this direction. This very attribute of *choice*, implies power to go in either direction, and the actually going in the one direction rather than the other, without constraint, and with the consciousness of power at the very moment of determination, to go in the opposite direction.

VII. But if any one should reply here that he is not yet satisfied, and that he wishes to know in respect of the specific act, what *reason*, or *motive*, or *inducement*, or *ground*, or *aim*, the man has in view in taking the one direction rather than the other. I think I can explain to him that his wish is irrelevant. It will be granted by all parties that the motive of an action refers to the ultimate aim of a man's choice, or what a man would do by putting forth his causative *nisus*.* There may be in my motive a series of

* Whatever is before the mind when it puts forth its causative *nisus*, and connected with that nisus, as condition, or reason, or inducement, may be called the *object* of the mind taken as the *subject*; and according to ordinary usage may also be called the *motive* of the mind. In Chapter

particulars linked together; but the doing of each one, in the particular relation, has reference to the ultimate end. Thus, in raising my arm, or moving my foot, my motive or design is what I choose to accomplish. The end I have in view may be reached immediately by the first action, or this action may be connected with another in a lengthened series leading to it. Now, the end thus contemplated and chosen is an end which stands in one or other of the following relations. 1. It may be related to both the reason and the sensitivity, but may be contemplated in relation to the first. 2. It may be related to both, but may be contemplated in relation to the last. 3. It may be related to both, and be contemplated equally, in relation to both. 4. It may stand in particular relation to neither; that is, it may be an object indifferent.

Now, it is obviously true that a man cannot act without a motive, or ultimate aim of action. The doing of *something* is implied in the act of doing. To say that a man can act without a motive in this

IV. Sect. IV., I have distinguished the objects from the laws of the intelligence; and in like manner we may distinguish the objects from the inducements of the sensitivity—taking laws and inducements in their relation to the will. Following out this distinction closely we should not call the objects in themselves motives, but regard them merely as that which is perceived by the intelligence, and standing in certain correlations with the sensitivity. While that would more strictly be motive, which in relation to effects to be produced as modifications of the objects, should authoritatively from the reason appear as the law of causality—or persuasively arise in the sensitivity, as an inducement to action. In the representation above given the two are really united; the motive being an object taken in relation to the reason—or in relation to the sensitivity—or in relation to both—or in relation to neither; that is, as an object indifferent.

sense, would be to affirm at the same time that a man can do and yet cannot do. An aim of action is the necessary condition, of the fact of action. But as to the particular aim of action, it must stand in one or the other of the relations above mentioned; for there are no other relations to our being, conceivable. The aim of action must be either the pleasing, or the rational, or both together; or it must relate neither to the reason nor to the sensitivity.

Consciousness attests that all this variety of motive is before the activity of the mind, and that the mind in its freedom can choose any one. When the mind chooses simply in relation to the reason, should we ask, why it chooses thus? The only legitimate answer is, that it thus chooses. When the mind chooses simply in relation to the sensitivity, should we ask, why it chooses thus? The only legitimate answer is, that it thus chooses. In other words, the choice is a primary fact, and has no other fact going before it, by which it is to be explained. For suppose that when an object in its simple relation to the reason is chosen, we should attempt to explain it by affirming that the object in this relation is the most agreeable; then it becomes a choice of the most agreeable, and identifies itself with the other case where the mind chooses an object in its simple relation to the sensitivity. But then, again, we may attempt to explain the choice in its simple relation to the sensitivity, by saying that the most agreeable is chosen because it is the most reasonable; and thus it becomes merely a choice of the most reasonable, and the second case identifies itself

with the first. The attempt to explain choice in one relation, drives us into the other relation, and that again drives us back into the first. It is only by making choice a primary fact, belonging to a third power determining itself amid these relations in perfect freedom, that we can attain any resting place for thought and inquiry.

The third relation, gives rise to no question, as the reason and sensitivity there appear in harmony.

The fourth, is the negation of all relation. The aim here is to obey no law of reason, and no desire of the sensitivity, but to do something perfectly indifferent to both. Now, this is possible only upon condition that such an object of action can be found. If we know of any thing, the doing of which shall be neither rational nor agreeable, the will as a free causality can choose this as well as any thing else. If the will were absolutely governed by the reason, or the sensitivity, then it could choose only in these relations, but if it be not so governed, it can choose out of these relations, it can choose that which is indifferent to both. When the will chooses the indifferent we cannot go out of it, to explain its choice, for obviously there is nothing out of itself, by which it can be explained.

A motive, we have said, is the final aim of action, it is that which I would do. Whether this final aim lie in the direction of the reason, or in the direction of the sensitivity, it is still a *final* aim. If I do a thing which is reasonable; but yet not in view of its reasonableness, and only because it is agreeable, my motive plainly lies in the direction of the sensitivity. If

I do a thing which is agreeable, but yet not in view of its agreeableness, and only because it is reasonable, my motive plainly lies in the direction of the reason.

If I do a thing which is both reasonable and agreeable, in view of both qualities; then my motive lies in the direction of both, because both lie in the same direction in relation to me.

Now, when the will acts in the direction of the reason, it is characterized from the reason, and the action is pronounced right and proper.

When the will acts in the direction of the sensitivity, the act is immediately characterized from the sensitivity as an act of pleasure or enjoyment; but as the act is likewise to be judged of by the reason, it must be characterized likewise as right or wrong—as proper or improper.

When the will acts out of either direction, granting the possibility of this, the act is characterized as indifferent.

I think it must be now apparent how irrelevant it is, when the will acts in a particular direction, to inquire, why it acts in this direction? The question is really prevented by the fact, that the will in going in the particular direction has selected its motive or ultimate aim of action. It acts in the direction of the reasonable, because it is reasonable; in the direction of the agreeable, because it is agreeable.

VIII. The difficulty with which inquirers perplex themselves, respects the *modus*, rather than the fact of choice. It is a fact that the will at one time goes in

one direction, and at another time in another direction. And when we inquire *why* the will goes in any particular direction, we fully explain it by pointing out the motive, or object of action which lies in that direction. But the inquirer asks *how* can the will thus vary its movement, sometimes taking its motive in the reason, and sometimes in the sensitivity? My reply is, that the will, as a free and self-determining cause, must have, and cannot be supposed not to have, this power. Choice is a simple and original fact, known in the consciousness, but definable by nothing out of itself, and is the characteristic of a singular and peculiar subject. It is the first truth of personality, freedom, and responsibility. I cannot penetrate the *modus* of any cause whatever. I cannot penetrate the *modus* of will. I will suppose that you have succeeded in assigning the causes of volition to the sensitivity, and that you account for the varying determinations of the will, by bringing up to view the *varying states* of the sensitivity; then these varying states claim to be accounted for.* But a no less difficulty will arise in respect of these varying states, than in respect of the varying self-determinations. You must either take the varying states as an ultimate fact incapable of being accounted for, beyond the constitution of the sensitivity itself; or as lying in the influence of something antecedent to it. If you take the latter part of the alternative, the same inquiry presses upon you in relation to the antecedent influence. If you take the former part, you assign to

* Review of Edwards on the Will, p. 230—239.

the sensitivity what I assign to the will—with this difference, you bring the facts under a law of necessity, I bring them under a law of freedom.

You affirm that you always do what is agreeable to you, and that what is agreeable to you is necessarily so; and under all this you are bound to explain, if you can, all the varying facts of volitions, good, wise, wicked, foolish, and indifferent. The most ready way, and perhaps also the most philosophical, under this theory, is, to affirm that the sensitivity is so constituted as to exhibit all these various phenomena; and is necessarily determined to each one, in all the multiform instances—the *modus* of this determination being left unresolved.

I affirm that the will has power to make these various volitions, in its capacity as cause; and that under its characteristics of choice and freedom, we have contained the power to make these volitions at any moment, under any of their changes.

The difficulty in the one theory respects the *modus* of a *necessitated* variety of determinations. In the other theory, the *modus* of a *free and chosen* variety of determinations.

The first theory, to say the least, holds no superiority in point of clearness as a psychology. But the great merit of the other theory is this, that it accords with the facts of consciousness throughout, and is therefore a sustained and legitimate psychology.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF A WILL NECESSITATED BY THE SENSITIVITY, OR IDENTIFIED WITH IT.

THE distinction of the will from the sensitivity, and the freedom of the former, are spontaneous and universal judgments of men. In all the ordinary transactions, or the mere *pratique* of life, as well as in law and government, these judgments appear. It is only in philosophy and theology that the contrary dogmas are broached.

I shall here attempt to explain the origin of these dogmas.

SECTION I.

Philosophizing by physical analogies.

MEN, when they begin to philosophize respecting the mind, are prone to draw their conclusions from the analogy of external objects. Hence they reason respecting mental causality from their observa-

tions upon physical causes. But all our observations upon these causes lead very clearly to the conclusion that they are necessitated causes. This method of determination must, therefore, give the will the characteristic of necessity.

Indeed, men who philosophize in this way, contend that the very notion of cause has its origin in external observations: but, inasmuch as the external phenomena are related in uniform and necessary antecedence and sequence; so, in this way, the very notion of cause involves the idea of necessity. The mental phenomena, also, no less than the external, appear in suc cessions, which undoubedly have, to a great extent, the characteristic of uniformity; and this uniformity, habitually associated with necessary cause in the physical world, becomes, at last, by a very easy error, the indication of necessity itself. I have shown, I think, satisfactorily, that the idea of cause is gained, not from external, but from internal phenomena, and particularly from phenomena of the will itself.* Uniformity, too, is clearly not a characteristic of cause, as such, but a characteristic of the laws according to which causes are designed to act.†

The method of philosophizing by material analogies cannot be received as a legitimate method, and contradicts that direct questioning of consciousness pointed out in the beginning of this treatise.

* Chapter II., Section VI. † Review of Edwards, pp. 294—297.

SECTION II.

In the condition of corrupted humanity "the will is as the most agreeable."

THE folly and corruption of man are all expressed in one sentence: he obeys his passions to the violation of the laws of reason and conscience. If passion in its character were never opposed to reason and conscience; and in its degree never exceeded the measure they prescribe, the pursuit of enjoyment would never involve transgression. But it is a fact which none may dispute, for every man finds it within himself, and sees it on all sides acted out, that passion does oppose reason and conscience, and exceed the measure they prescribe: the human sensitivity is a corrupted sensitivity.

The obedience of the will to the passions is so general in the individual man, and so universal in the race of men, that we are impressed with its uniformity. The law of this obedience is correctly stated in the system of Edwards: "The will is as the most agreeable." It is true also that he who calculates human conduct in any given circumstances according to this rule, will generally reach an accurate result.

Now if we base our conclusions respecting the will upon mere external observations under general points of view, without exactly noticing differences, and glide over the facts of the interior consciousness, it is not difficult to frame a theory of the necessary determination of the will, by the sensitivity.

This, however, is an abuse of the Baconian system. It leaves out facts of the highest moment: I mean those judgments which we pass, at the very moment of volition in any particular direction, of our ability to will in the opposite direction—as well as those instances in which the sensitivity actually does not govern the will: and thus, under a show of extensive and elaborate induction it draws a universal conclusion, where only a particular is authorized. The mere general history of human nature shows man a weak, sinful being, the poor slave of his passions; but if there were but one instance of passion resisted and overcome—but one instance of free volition, it would show the real potentiality of the will and destroy the necessity and universality of the law that, "The willis as the agreeable;" just as one undoubted instance of a stone remaining suspended in the air when thrown up, would destroy the law of gravitation. The potentiality of the stone to be suspended would be established, and the other instances of its falling to the earth would have to be accounted for by the introduction of a new force, acting very generally and uniformly, but not universally.

If the will obeyed the reason as generally and uniformly as it now obeys the sensitivity, the same crude observations might give birth to the law, "the will is as the most reasonable."

SECTION III.

The actual predominance of the sensitivity accounted for.

A question here arises which I deem a perfectly fair one; I will not therefore set it aside, but endeavor to meet it; it is as follows. If the reason be uncorrupted, why does not the will obey it as uniformly as it obeys the sensitivity? Here are two faculties supplying motives of determination, and the determining power is independent of both; how are we to explain the fact that it, to so great an extent, uniformly determines in the direction of the sensitivity; and why do we not find as many men obeying the one as there are men obeying the other?

As preliminary to a direct answer, I remark, that this fact of the predominance of uniform determination in the direction of the sensitivity, does not annul or even weaken the results of the preceding investigations. It still remains true that men do sometimes determine in the direction of the reason in opposition to the sensitivity; that we are always conscious of power and freedom to do so; that all self-denial, and the strength, and discipline, and triumph of virtue consist in doing so; and that moral obligation, the constitution of government, the enactments of law, and the procedures of justice, are based upon the assumption that we can do so.

In taking up the direct answer, it must first be observed, that the objects of the sensitivity embrace the visible world in its relation to the appetites, and to

those passions which aim at distinctions of rank, power, and riches. "The lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life," all belong to this faculty; while the objects of the reason embrace ideas, principles, duties, and immortal conditions, which are "not seen," and which require thought and reflection. Now the sensitivity is developed earlier than the reason; the first is active in infancy, childhood, and youth; while the second comes to its development slowly, and ripens with riper years. The first also acts readily, promptly, and with instinctive force; while the second must compare and deliberate with time and care.

The purely instinctive passions we have seen, are designed as principles of action, where the deliberations of reason would be too slow for the emergency to be met. So likewise the passions generally in their pleasurable excitements are more ready principles of action than the decisions of the reason. Hence we may conceive, that in a pure state of being, where the passions answer to the laws of the reason and conscience, and where the consciousness and confidence prevail, that all the action within, is harmonious and right, the will may and does securely resign itself to the impulses and excitements of the sensitivity, without consulting every moment the awful oracle of reason.

> "There are who ask not if thine eye
> Be on them; who, in love and truth,
> Where no misgiving is, rely
> Upon the genial sense of youth:
> Glad Hearts! without reproach or blot;
> Who do thy work and know it not."
>
> *Wordsworth's Ode to Duty.*

Now, when the sensitivity becomes corrupted and answers no more to reason and conscience, but inclines to, or desires objects unlawful; then it must follow, that in the earlier period of our being, before reason and conscience are fully developed, and in any condition where education is neglected or not attained, and thought and reflection are not induced, the sensitivity must, in the strength of its action, and by the establishment of habits, gain an advantage over the reason. Add to this that all the instinctive and ready impulses of the sensitivity which serve as the ordinary principles of action, and which in a pure state act so faithfully for reason and conscience, now are treacherous, rebellious, and conflicting; and it seems to me to become very plain how the uniformity of determination comes to be in the direction of the sensitivity.

In the second place, it must be observed, that our sense of happiness or enjoyment lies in that part of our being which is depraved. The passion for happiness or enjoyment is instinctive, and is found in all creatures, and in all higher natures, whether pure or impure. Where the sensitivity is uncorrupted, this instinct cannot lead away from any law of reason and conscience, unless it be in the mere fact of becoming absorbed in enjoyment to the neglect of exercising the rational and higher powers of our being. In this case the enjoyments themselves would not transgress the law of reason in *kind;* but they might become so excessive in *degree* as to destroy the balance of the mind, by giving an undue preponderance to the sensitivity over the reason. This ten-

dency may exist in pure natures, and require of them the exercise of watchfulness and self-discipline.

The law of Paradise in relation to the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, may have been designed to impose this discipline upon a highly sensitive nature, surrounded with the means of enjoyment; and to lead him to know and to value aright, relatively, the reason and the sensitivity. Now, where the sensitivity is depraved, this strong instinct of enjoyment in addition to its natural tendency to excess, and which is found even in pure natures, must take the direction of the depraved faculty to which it belongs. And this again accounts for the uniformity of determination in the direction of the sensitivity.

In the third place, it is a fact attending the corruption of the sensitivity, that the reason is in most men but feebly developed in proportion to the sensitivity, is obscured and impeded by prejudices, ignorance of facts and principles, and cunning and fanciful sophistries, and therefore is not in a condition to supply the will with motives of action, to the same extent with the sensitivity. This feeble development, or even as it may be called eclipse of the reason, is induced by the circumstances already mentioned, viz., the earlier movements of the sensitivity, its more direct and ready inducements to action, and the strong tendency of the instinct of enjoyment in the current of depraved passions, supplied as these are on all sides with their correlative objects.

The reason, like the sun, cannot lose its innate brightness, but some meaner planet coming between, or even the exhalations from some stagnant and of-

fensive pool may obscure and even entirely shut out its rays.

In the fourth place, the will itself is by some regarded as directly participating in the depravity of the sensitivity. If this be the fact, then of course we at once account for the uniformity of determination in the direction of the sensitivity; while the positive instances of opposite determinations, and the consciousness of power to resist the impulses of the passions which always attends our submission to them, prove to us the ability of man to attain to righteousness of conduct, and his consequent responsibility.

If, however, we deny that the will naturally partakes of depravity, still it is not difficult to account for the predominance of uniform determinations in the direction of the sensitivity. The *earliest* motives of action are supplied by the sensitivity. The *instinctive* principles of action lie in the same faculty. The *ready and ordinary* motives of action are supplied by the sensitivity. The instinct of *enjoyment* belongs to this faculty. And as this faculty in its corruption preponderates, we have seen how the development of the reason is in consequence retarded, and rendered disproportionate, and its light obscured. The will therefore in its relative position between the two faculties supplying motives, finds a more abundant and prompt supply from the one than from the other. Now as the mind with all its faculties is still one mind, the cöoperation of its faculties in its unity would naturally give the expectation and probability in favor of the sensitivity, without destroying the ability and freedom of the will, and without implying even

its native depravity—any more than an undeveloped and obscured reason implies a reason so corrupted as necessarily to know only error and to ratiocinate only falsely.

Notwithstanding the general ignorance of men—notwithstanding the prevalence of prejudice and sophistry, there are sound logicians, and profound philosophers, and men of accurate and undoubted science. And notwithstanding all the error and vice in the world, there are among all nations and in all times, men of truth and integrity. The reason breaks out from the clouds beautiful and glorious ; and the will rejoices, as a strong man, to run its race under the pure and unerring light.

Although the will, as well as the reason, may be supposed to possess native integrity, still from habitually subjecting itself to depraved passions, it must be confessed that its power of resolute, vigorous and decided determination becomes enfeebled. As a cause, it does not lose the power of making its *nisus* in obedience to truth and duty ; but by repeated and continued disobedience, a habit and facility of disobedience is engendered, and the power of making the *nisus* of obedience seems to a corresponding degree deprived of its vigor and strength.

In this state the man becomes *brutalized.* In brutes there appears neither reason, considered as the faculty of the absolute and the necessary, and of distinguishing right and wrong, nor will or free causality. The actions of the brute are regulated by his passions, and, in him the law holds, that *he acts according to the most agreeable.* For him this is a

safe and adequate law, because he is so constituted that he never exceeds the proper measure of indulgence; he is never the victim of intemperance in respect of any of his passions, because in his instinct he is absolutely governed by the supreme reason.

When the man submits himself habitually to passion and takes into his will the most agreeable as the law of its determination, he descends to the level of the brute, but he does not descend with safety. There is in him no necessitating instinct, regulating the measure of enjoyment; he was constituted to govern himself by reason and conscience, and to reduce his passions by his free will to the measures which they have taught him and enjoined upon him; and when he fails to do so, his passions seem to have an indefinite capacity of excitation, and to become measureless, boundless, and insatiable: until his physical part, which was never constituted for such wild havoc, is scattered like "chaff before the whirlwind." In the worst forms of this dominion of passion, induced by the will itself, the will seems almost to lose its personality, freedom and power of resistance. Like a mad conjuror, it has dared to call up a spirit, whose tremendous energies it had not dreamed of, and before whose appearance it shrinks away "a guilty thing surprised."

These considerations seem to me fully to answer the question respecting the predominance of the volitions in the direction of the sensitivity. The sensitivity first predominates over the reason, and then the personality lying between the two, most readily re-

ceives its motives from the first; and is finally weakened, and in some sort imbued with a corrupt nature, from its habitual and guilty self-subjection.

SECTION IV.

Of the calculation of future events.

I PROCEED now to another particular in accounting for the theory of a necessitated will.

The basis of all calculations, and of certain knowledge of future physical events, philosophers very generally take to be, that, "Nature is uniform in her operations." The meaning of this is, that natural causes act according to uniform and fixed laws. These laws specifically, are arrived at by observation and induction. They have regulated the past, they regulate the present, we conclude they will regulate the future. The calculation of eclipses is a striking instance of this reliance upon the uniform action of natural causes.

These causes are believed to be necessitated causes, that is necessarily determined by the laws to which they are subject.

We believe, indeed, that the Almighty who ordained them with their laws, has power to alter them: they are not necessary relatively to him; but they have no power to change their own laws, to diversify their own movement; nor have we any power to do this. Man governs and appropriates natural causes only by obeying their laws.

Our calculations respecting the future effects of natural causes, or our knowledge of these effects, is sometimes certain and sometimes probable, according to the knowledge we have of their laws. The knowledge we have attained respecting future eclipses is certain knowledge. Meteorological calculations are only probable. Our calculations respecting the appearance of the comets are passing from mere probability into certainty.*

Now, philosophers when they come to consider the will or the causality of the human mind in relation to future events, are very naturally desirous to bring it likewise under uniform laws.

But, under what laws shall it be brought? There can be only two. The law of the reason, or intelligence, embracing the conscience, and the law of the sensitivity. These laws may harmonize, or they may be opposed to each other. If the will come under the first, we state it thus: "The will is as the reasonable;" if under the second, thus: "The will is as the agreeable." If under both, in their harmony, we state it just as the one or the other, if any particular act is contemplated.

But what is the relation between the will and its laws? Is it a necessary relation? If it is, then the future events of the will can be calculated in the same way with the events of physical causes. But suppose the relation not to be a necessary relation, how can the future events of the will then be known?

* Respecting these terms, *necessity*, *probability*, and *certainty*, I refer the reader to my Review of Edwards, pp. 280—297. Indeed, I would have him read the whole article, beginning at p. 250.

Now, here is the point where error begins. Those who contend that the will is necessarily determined, affirm that there is really no basis on which to calculate the future events of will, unless its relation to its laws be a necessary relation; and that even Divine fore-knowledge is possible only on this basis. Contingency, in their view, is incompatible with certainty, or even probability.

These reasoners err, in the first place, in confounding law and cause. Natural causes and natural laws, in their view, are one; and so the laws of reason and sensitivity, in regulating the will, or supplying it with motives, are taken as really causing its volitions. Hence also the uniformity which necessarily belongs to law, they assign to cause itself.

Both cause* and law† have been already discussed. Their distinction is palpable: the one is "simple efficiency;" the other is "the thought or design of the reason."‡

Uniformity belongs to law, universally; and becomes the attribute of cause only specially, when the cause is necessitated in the direction of the law; or when, by an act of free self-determination, it goes in this direction.

They err, in the second place, in confounding certainty and necessity. But necessity expresses a mode

* Chapter II.

† Chapter IV., Section IV. Also, Review of Edwards, pp. 294—297.

‡ When as above I speak of the *laws* of the sensitivity, I call them such merely because they are rules or aims of action which the intelligence draws from the sensitivity. They are not laws, in an absolute sense, like those which are drawn from the reason, and which are eternal and obligatory.

of causation, or *how* any thing comes to be as it is; while certainty expresses merely the state of our knowledge. Necessity is a ground of certainty, but not certainty itself.*

They err, again, in their conception of contingency. They regard it as the negation of cause, or at least the negation of law; but it is only a negation of necessity.†

And, in the last place, they err in assigning necessity as the cardinal, if not the sole ground of certainty. The future events of physical causes, in their view, can be known with certainty, because these causes are necessarily governed by uniform laws. But they forget, here, that this necessity of governance is not absolute, but relative, unless they choose to reduce the will of the Deity under necessity, and thus establish a universal fate; for the causes and laws of the natural world are ordained by the Deity, and can be altered by him at pleasure, unless his will be governed by an antecedent necessity. If we reject the dogma of fatalism, our confidence in the laws of nature is not based upon necessity, but upon the wisdom and benignity of the Almighty; confirmed as it is by the history of past ages. The calculations of eclipses, which we make for a thousand years to come, we believe will be verified, only because we believe that God will not change the state of the world. But our confidence in God, if we allow him to be a perfectly free Being, arises from the known state of his intelligence and affections; for wisdom and benignity are words which

* Review of Edwards, pp. 254 and 280.
† Ibid, pp. 203—213.

express this state. God in the sovereignty and freedom of his will, can modify, reverse, or destroy the present order of things; but we feel perfectly sure, that, with all his vast power, He, the infinitely good, will do no evil.

When we proceed to make calculations respecting the future events of human wills, or causalities, we are upon precisely the same ground. If these human wills be necessitated, then, still, our confidence as to their future decisions does not rest ultimately upon their necessity, unless, again, we adopt the dogma of fatalism; for these human wills, or causalities, if necessitated without coming under a system of universal fatalism, are only relatively necessitated; that is, they are necessitated by the Divine will, and cannot be altered by the creature; but the Divine will can modify them at pleasure. On the theory of a necessitated will, therefore, my certain calculations, or knowledge of the future conduct of men, rests ultimately upon my confidence in the Divine Being, as governing men, by fixed, and uniform, and to them necessary laws, just as he governs the whole system of nature.

But, now, let us suppose that by our appeal to consciousness we have overthrown this theory, and established the contingency and freedom of the will; then it must be evident that there are no greater difficulties in *kind* to be met with in calculating upon the future events of the human will, taken as free, than when taken as necessitated; unless the theory of necessity openly assume the ground of necessity universal and absolute—and then it is met by diffi-

culties of its own, portentous and insurmountable. The future events of a human free will are calculated and known, just in the same way that future events resting upon the Divine Will or efficiency, are calculated and known—the state of the intelligence and the affections, as supplying the will with aims or motives, forming the basis of our calculations.*

The *proton pseudos* of the reasoners whom I am opposing, is simply this, they *assume* that *certain* knowledge of future events can exist only when these events are brought about by *necessary* causes.

That this is a *pseudos*—an error, appears first, *logically*, from its consequences. If their assumption be true, then, either there is no certain knowledge of future events, not even in God himself; or a system of absolute and universal fatalism prevails. Secondly, *psychologically*, from the testimony of consciousness. According to this testimony we can, and do calculate upon future events, which are brought about by free and contingent causes.

SECTION V.

Theories of a Moral Government.

THE theory of a necessitated will is accounted for again in the manner in which many philosophers and theologists conceive of, and expound a moral government.

* Review of Edwards, pp. 284 and 294.

I. A government is that which regulates and controls. It implies both law to direct, and power to enforce.

Physical government is the regulation and control of the material universe with its forces. In God this government is absolute. In man it is conditional; he regulates and controls only as he obeys in his appropriations, contrivances, and adjustments, the fixed laws which his investigations and observations have enabled him to discover.

Moral government is the regulation and control of the conduct of responsible beings. The most general conception of this government, embraces the enactment and promulgation of laws, accompanied with promised rewards and threatened punishments.

This, likewise, may be viewed as it is exercised by the Almighty and Eternal Lawgiver; and as it is exercised by one created intelligence and moral agent over another.

II. Viewed, as it is exercised by the Almighty and Eternal Lawgiver, the philosophers and theologists alluded to, represent, that there are certain great measures and ends conceived of by infinite wisdom and goodness, which, this government must be so ordered as to prosecute and bring about, without any danger or even possibility of frustration. But how is this to be done? They reply that God, perfectly understanding the disposition and mind of every man, presents in his providence such motives as are suited in every case to produce the requisite course of conduct. There are many who hold in connexion with this, that the Almighty exerts a direct influence over

the heart, not appreciable by consciousness, but made known in revelation, which influence moulds the heart to the motives presented. In one way or both, a correlation between the motive and the heart is secured so as to render the result absolutely certain.

Now, it is affirmed, that unless the will be necessarily determined by this correlation, the result cannot be absolutely certain, and the purposes of the Almighty are liable to frustration. On this I remark :

1. According to this representation the purposes of the Almighty absolutely necessitate the events which they contemplate : whatever human conduct, therefore, is purposed by the Almighty, is likewise necessitated by him, and really produced by him. But this cannot accord with praise and blame, reward and punishment ; and goes to destroy moral government, and to universalize physical government.*

2. It is also assuming that necessity is the only ground of certain knowledge, the consequences of which assumption I have already exposed.†

The Divine purposes, according to this representation, must contemplate and necessitate all human conduct, or a part. But it would be inconsistent with the representation that only a part should be contemplated and necessitated, since that which is left contingent and undetermined, might possibly go to frustrate the Divine purposes. The completeness and certainty of the system require that *all* human conduct should be contemplated and necessitated. But it follows from this, that whatever men do is really

*Review of Edwards, pp. 111—120. † Sec. IV.

most pleasing to the Almighty, since purposed and brought to pass by him. No act of any man can be displeasing to God in relation to the man, because the man cannot but do it, and does it really in consequence of the Divine will. It was what God desired in relation to the man, above all other acts. Nor can it really be displeasing to God in any point of view, since it is the very act which in that very time and place, and by means of that very agent, he fixed immutably as the best possible to be done.

The moral government of God is indeed a government of laws accompanied with promised rewards, and threatened punishments, but it is a government exercised over free beings, and in a way not to be destructive of their freedom. If it be not a government exercised over such beings and in such a way, then in what respect is it a *moral* government? If all human conduct is necessitated by the divine purpose, it stands in the same relation to the Divine Being with purely physical events, and the distinction of physical and moral does not obtain. But when the element of freedom is brought in, and the man is made the author and determiner of his own volitions, then a government altogether peculiar appears. It is quite a different thing to govern a being having the power of choice, by laws addressed to his understanding, and persuasions offered to his sensitive nature, which he may obey and yield to, or disobey and resist; and to govern a being, or a material mass, by a law penetrating its substance, and absolutely necessitating its motion.

The advocates of the necessary determination of

will, while by this dogma they appear to preserve the harmony of a moral government, and to secure the certain fulfilment of all the purposes of Infinite Wisdom and Goodness, do really destroy the very idea of moral government, and the distinction between moral good and evil.

If, however, the question be urged, how upon any other system the purposes of the Almighty can be secured against frustration?

It may be replied, in the first place, that human freedom and responsibility, and immutable moral distinctions, are to, us truths plain and certain, and of the very last importance. They are truths with which we especially have to do.

The divine purposes we cannot be presumed to penetrate, either in their reach and scope, or in their modes of fulfilment. The words of the Holy Scriptures are here in point: "The secret things belong unto the Lord our God: but those things which are revealed, belong unto us, and to our children for ever, that we may do all the words of this law."—Deut. xxix. v. 29.

These necessitarian philosophers choose to form a theory of the Divine purposes, viz. that these purposes comprehend every event which is to be, whether physical or moral, with an absolute and irresistible causative force. And as a necessary consequence of this theory, they introduce a necessary determination of the will, or rather this point is really announced in the theory itself. Now in the matter of forming theories, one has as good a right as another. A sound philosophy, however, aims to form a theory in view of facts, so as best to account for them. But the above

theory does violence to some of the plainest and most important facts of the consciousness.

III. Let us as an experiment put together another theory not doing violence to, but based upon these facts.

A moral agent is a free and intelligent agent. A free and intelligent agent is a moral agent. Like a mathematical definition the converse is strictly true, although it is a universal affirmative conversive of a universal affirmative. The definition is equivalent to saying, let an agent free and intelligent be called a moral agent. The word moral from the Latin *moralis*, a derivative of *mos*, is applied to characterize a free and intelligent agent, by way of distinction; because in such an agent the *manners* or *conduct* becomes a subject of high and momentous interest.

In creating such agents God communicated extraordinary gifts—reason, and personality or free causality: he made them after his own likeness.

Such agents cannot be conceived to exist without the power of transgressing the laws of reason, comprehending under reason, conscience, which is but the reason in relation to *moral* or free conduct.

When God created these agents, he, as omniscient, must have known all the possible forms, and conditions, under which they might be created and constituted; and as he is all-wise and almighty, he must have selected, in his actual creations, the best possible forms and conditions of such beings.

In making and constituting free agents under the best possible forms and conditions, he, as omniscient, must have foreseen all the actions, which in the ex-

ercise of their free agency they would *certainly* perform ; and among these actions he must have foreseen, likewise, their sinful actions.

Sinful actions being those which violate and transgress the laws of rectitude which God approves and loves with all the energy of his nature, cannot in themselves, or in any point of view, be pleasing to Him. They are incidental to a system of creation which he approves, but then they are incidental *evils*.

If God conceived of a system of free agency, in which he foresaw that these incidental evils would not take place, still this system must have been known to him on some other accounts not to be the best system ; for, if in all respects, a system of free agency without these incidental evils, had been conceived of as the best system, an infinitely good and wise Being must have projected it.

For aught we know, God may have foreseen that every system of free agency would involve sin, and he chose that system in which he saw it would be least fearful, and under conditions best admitting of the ultimate triumph and perpetuation of virtue.

These evils, incidental to a system of free agency, God could not, by the very hypothesis, prevent. They are *incidental* to it. To say that God could have prevented them, and yet have constituted the system as it is, is a plain absurdity.

When we speak of God's omnipotence, we mean that he can do every thing which does not, in the nature of the case, and in the very terms, imply a contradiction. Thus God cannot make $2 + 2 = 5$; nor a part, greater than the whole. So in the case of free

agency; when God made free agents he gave the power of doing both good and evil. If he had taken away the power of doing evil, he must have destroyed by that very act the free agency which he had just constituted. God could prevent evil by physical constraint, but he could not prevent evil in consistency with moral agency.

God having chosen the best possible system of free agency, constitutes it in the certain knowledge of all the evils incidental upon it. Connected with this must have been the knowledge of all measures and means, of all influences direct and instrumental, which he could bring to bear for the correction of these evils.

Now, when we speak of the purposes of God in reference to human conduct, we mean, that foreseeing all the actions which would take place under the system he had constituted, with all the good and evil attendant, He, in infinite wisdom, goodness, and grace, projected his plan of measures and means, of influences, direct and instrumental, which he could and would bring to bear in the system, for perfecting the good, for correcting and subduing the evil.

This plan, as designed to operate in a system of free agency, is such as not to destroy or interfere with that free agency. Every moral agent is to retain his free power of creating his own volitions.

Having ordained his plan, God foresees how it will effect every individual, under every variety of circumstance. Every man has the power to cöoperate with, and to avail himself of, the means and influences re-

vealed to him, whether by natural reason and conscience, or by oral and written communications.

Now, moral agents take character as worthy, or unworthy, as deserving of reward or punishment, accordingly as they act, both under the primitive and pure constitution of things, and under the operation of the plan of divine interposition, after evil has made its appearance.

The Divine interposition can be conceived of, both as indirect or by instrumentalities, and direct or by immediate divine influence.

The indirect embraces the promulgation of moral precepts, of persuasions, promises, and threatenings, and the exhibition of examples.

The influence thus exerted, is the influence of motives. The individual is urged to do right, by motives addressed to his intelligence and sensitivity. As a perfectly free being, he can yield to the motives, or he can resist them. God foresees who will yield, and who will resist.

The direct influence is, that wherewith God as the infinite and all comprehending being, the one in all, may penetrate any faculty of the soul, so as to control and direct its movements. It may be exerted in the reason, so as to clear from prejudice and error, so as to enlarge and invigorate, and so as to determine the very subjects of thought and ratiocination. It may be exerted in the sensitivity, so as to purify all its emotions, passions, and desires; that is, to bring them into perfect correlation with the objects and laws of reason and conscience, of truth and duty. It may be exerted in the will, either in respect of

restoring and increasing its energy as a cause, or of giving it positive determination to particular objects.

Whether these influences be appreciable or not by the consciousness, is a question of simple fact, to be decided by consciousness.

If such influences be not recognized by conciousness, they can be known to exist only from Divine revelation.

All these influences may be conceived of as existing, without impairing, or interfering with free agency, except the last particular mentioned in relation to the will.

The Divine Being, whatever influence he may exert in the reason and sensitivity, does not in this way necessitate the determinations or volitions of the will. And even the restoring any degree of energy, which the will as cause had lost, from its habitual self-subjection to a corrupt sensitivity, or any increase of its energy beyond what it had ever possessed before, would not necessitate any particular determination or volition.

But if the Divine influence give the will positive determination to particular objects, then in those determinations free agency ceases. It is no more the agent who performs the act, but God, by the use of a passive instrument. Although God has the power of doing this, we cannot conceive of it as a part of the Divine interposition. Why should God cease to treat men according to their constituted being, and influence them as mere physical masses? If any good reason can be assigned, then of course we admit the

idea, but at present it seems so foreign to his moral government that we cannot entertain it.

As to the particular manifestation and extent of these interpositions, this is not the place to offer any remark. I draw my conclusion only in the demonstration that God can certainly secure his purposes without necessitating the determination of the will: for, in the first place, his purposes are laid in a perfect fore-knowledge of all the actions and circumstances, and all the tendencies and relations; and are adjusted to a system of free agency which he himself has chosen and constituted. The system itself, as chosen and constituted by Him, came into being and action necessarily, relatively to Him; it could not but be as he chose and constituted it. But now, when gone into operation as a system of free agency, his pre-determined interpositions are relative to its constitution, tendencies, and foreseen results. God, therefore, cannot be conceived to purpose any thing but what he knows will be practicable in the system which he has established, and practicable according to the laws of that system.

And, in the second place, as he can exert an immediate influence over the reason and the sensitivity without impairing free agency; in harmonising these, *moral certainty* is secured as to the determinations of the will.*

IV. I have thus far under this head, considered the theory of a necessitated will in relation to moral government as exercised by the Almighty and Eternal Lawgiver. I now proceed to consider it in relation

* Review of Edwards, pp. 284—290.

to moral government as exercised by one created intelligence over another.

In the first place, it will be granted that moral government, in the lower sphere in which we are now viewing it, does not consist in any immediate influence over the faculties of the soul. At least, it does not consist in this among men relatively to each other, and this is as far as the argument is designed to reach. Moral government, as exercised by men over each other, is government by motives addressed to the reason and sensitivity. Now it is urged, by necessitarian philosophers, that if motives do not necessarily determine the will, all our efforts to influence each other for good or evil, are made without any certainty of attaining the object: but that so far from our exerting this mutual influence in uncertainty, we do really calculate upon the effect of moral causes, after the analogy of physical causes, and in many instances with equal certainty.

A recent anonymous writer,* of great cleverness, remarks, "it is surprising indeed, that this connexion between motives and actions should have ever been theoretically questioned, when every human being, every day of his existence, is practically depending upon its truth: when men are perpetually staking pleasure, and fortune, and reputation, and even life itself, upon the very principle that they speculatively reject. It is in truth intermingled in all our schemes, projects, and achievements. In the address of the orator, in the treatise of the author, in the enactments

* The author of Essays on Opinion, Truth, Knowledge, Evidence, &c.

of the legislator, in the manœuvres of the warrior, in the edicts of the monarch, it is equally implied. Examine any one of these. Take, for example, the operations of a campaign. A general in the exercise of his authority over the army which he commands, cannot move a step without taking for granted that the minds of his soldiers will be determined by the motives presented to them. When he directs his aid-de-camp to bear a message to an officer in another part of the field, he *calculates* upon his *obedience* with as little mistrust as he reckons upon the *stability of the ground* on which he stands, or on the *magnifying power of the telescope* in his hand. *When he orders his soldiers to wheel, to deploy, to form a square, to fire a battery, is he less confident of the result than he is when he performs some physical operation, when he pulls a trigger or seals a despatch?* It is obvious, that throughout all his operations, in marches, and encampments, and sieges, and battles, *he calculates as fully on the volitions of his men, as on the strength of his fortifications or the power of his batteries.**

"The fact of our assuming the uniformity of causation in mental as well as in physical events, appears to settle the question respecting human actions. The regular sequence of causes and effects, seems to be all that is implied in the word necessary."†

"Amongst the primary truths which are necessarily assumed, or taken for granted, in this manner, one of the most important is the uniformity of causation."‡

* Essays on Truth, &c., p. 189, Am. ed., 1831.
† P. 217, ibid. ‡ P. 155, ibid.

The propositions here introduced, may be summed up as follows :—

1. The uniformity of causation, or "that every cause will continue to produce the effect by which we have hitherto found it attended," is a primary truth, *necessarily* assumed.

2. By the term *necessary*, is meant only this uniformity of causation.

3. Physical and mental causes come equally and alike under this idea of uniformity or necessity.

I consider this ingenious writer as having fairly stated the necessitarian theory of human moral government. I will, therefore, take his remarks as giving the leading points of the thought to be examined.

The uniformity which really and necessarily belongs to *law*, is taken by him as a necessary attribute of *cause*. But law is of the reason. Cause, ultimately, rests in will. Truth and law are necessary. Cause, or efficiency, is contingent and free. It is only of *physical* cause that we affirm necessity, and that only relatively: relatively to us they are *necessary*, when they overcome our causality: relatively to God they are *necessitated*, because they are, and act, only as he ordained and fixed them. But they are not necessary as truth and law are necessary.

It is not conceivable, under any circumstances, that these last *might not be*. That $2 + 2 = 4$, cannot be annihilated, even in thought. It is not conceivable, that with given premises, any but the legitimate deduction could exist. But it is conceivable, that all the physical laws of the universe might cease to be.

The Creative will might change, modify, and reduce to chaos, without any implied absurdity.

2. It is true that physical and mental causes are both connected with law; but the great question respects the *nature* of the connection. Physical causes are *necessarily* connected with particular laws. Mental causes, or wills, are connected with particular laws only by *choice* and *self-determination.*

Necessity and freedom are two primary ideas opposed to each other. The last is the attribute of will alone.

3. Our expectation of future events is often sure and certain, in relation to both mental and physical causes. This certainty is of the same nature, in so far as the physical causes are contemplated as necessarily connected with the Divine will, which is itself a mental cause the same in kind with our own.

The ground of our belief, that physical causes will continue to act in the future as they have done in the past, is not that they, in their very nature, are uniform and necessary. They have been under uniform laws in the past, and this we receive as an implied promise on the part of God, that they will continue under these laws in the future, especially as these laws accord with his benignity. But, at the same time, we believe that he has power to stop every wheel of this great machinery; and there is no absurdity or contradiction implied in the supposition that a "universal pause" may take place at some future period.

The ground of our belief that mental causes or human wills will act under uniform laws in the future as, in any given cause, they have done in the

past, is based upon the knowledge that we have by consciousness, of the unity of our causality with the reason and sensitivity; and that according to the relative state of these, we do generally act. What we thus gain from the introspection of ourselves is confirmed by the observation we make upon others.

4. It is not true, however, that mental and physical causes come equally under the idea of uniformity and necessity.

A physical cause is altogether a necessitated cause, and would remain such, even if the uniformity of its action were disturbed.*

A mental cause is never a necessitated cause, unless it be in the primitive and simultaneous development of the mind, and in the governance of instinctive passions; and is uniform only as it chooses to obey continuously a uniform law.

In relation to physical causes, uniformity and necessity are united; but in relation to mental causes, they are not united.

5. It is not true as a fact, that the same *kind* and *degree* of certainty prevail in mental causes, or in the production of volitions, as in physical causes, or the production of material phenomena.

There are most important particulars, in which every will differs from every physical cause. The physical cause is attended by no deliberation whether to do or not to do, makes no choice or pre-determination what to do before the moment of action arrives, and at the moment of action is conscious of no power

* Vide supra, pp. 27—29.

alternate, to do, or not to do. But all these plainly belong to the will.

When the general raises the telescope, he knows that he is using an instrument which exercises no choice whether to be thus used or not; and an instrument which must perform its office unless a Divine interposition change the properties of light and the powers of the lens.

When he commands his aid-de-camp, he addresses one who, he knows, has in himself the power to refuse obedience, and to vary the orders given. When the match is applied to the gunpowder, the general knows that his batteries must discharge with a certainty based upon the uniform laws ordained by the Almighty, as the laws of the universe; and which He has hitherto observed, and which none but He can alter.

But is it true, that when under all the given circumstances, the general issues his commands to his troops, their volitions must take place in accordance with his commands with a certainty, based upon uniform laws, ordained necessarily to govern the human will; and that disobedience is impossible, unless by the interposition of the Almighty changing these laws? Is there not this plain difference, that the wills of the soldiers have within themselves, under all the given circumstances, a power to disobey the commands, while the gunpowder has no power within itself to resist explosion, when under all the given circumstances the match is applied? Is the certainty of the volitions then the same in *kind*, as the certainty of the explosions of gunpowder?

Again, as to the *degree* of certainty, there is a wide difference. The certainty of natural phenomena by well known causes, rests upon our experience of the uniformity of the divine will, revealed, and operating in, the movements of nature. The certainty of human volitions rest upon our experience of the stability of men. An aid-de-camp has been known to disappoint the expectations of his general; and even veteran troops have failed in the hour of trial. There is no instance in which the properties of light, the power of a lens, the explosive capacity of gunpowder, have suddenly ceased or been changed.

I know very well what the reply will be here. It will be said of course, (for there is nothing so convenient to resort to, and indeed nothing that *can* be resorted to but the old sophism of the strongest motive,) that in the case of both aid-de-camp and soldiers, there must come in some other influences more powerful than those which the general had calculated upon. This *must* be said where we begin by identifying will and physical causes, because with respect to physical causes it is true, that when in the adjustment of a train of instrumentalities, we reach results which we had not calculated upon, some cause must have mingled with these instrumentalities unknown to us. But if we begin with a free will, distinguished in the consciousness from all physical causes, this *need* not be said. We can explain the unlooked for result in the new determination of the will itself, as caused by itself, all the circumstances remaining unaltered. But it may be said, that although the *external* circumstances remain unaltered, there is some

change effected in the internal views and feelings by the suggestion of new trains of thought. But then we have to explain the *origin* or *beginning* of these new trains of thought; and this will involve the same difficulties as those which are supposed to lie in the way of assigning the new volitions directly to the will itself. But beyond all this, how does the general naturally regard the conduct of his aid-de-camp and troops? If he can discover motives for their treachery, or cowardice, or insubordination, lying in a change of circumstances, or in new trains of thought, does he *excuse* their conduct on this account? Does he not believe that his aid-de-camp and troops had the power to resist the influence of the new motives, and to adhere steadily to duty: had the power to resist the terrors of battle, or the bribes of the enemy, and to defend unto the last their standard?

The motives which they obey are not known to be to them the strongest motives, until they have obeyed them. The very plea of the strongest motive is built upon the assumption that the will and physical causes are one; the relative strength of causes being determined in both by the relative effects; an assumption which is utterly exploded by the widely different characteristics of the will as revealed by the consciousness: or it is built upon the *petitio principii*, that the will is determined by the strongest motive because that, that which determines it must be the strongest.

Indeed, the affirmation that uniformity belongs to human will, with the same strictness of application as to physical causes, cannot be sustained.

Lead, thrown into the water, always sinks. The combination of particles by chemical affinities, and in definite proportions, never fails to appear upon a fair and properly conducted experiment. But the efforts of the orator, the moralist, the legislator, and the warrior, to influence and control masses of men, are not uniformly successful. There is, it is true, a great appearance of uniformity, where appeals are made to the corrupt passions of men. When man is brutalized, treat him as a brute, and you will govern him as one, and in so doing give remarkable confirmations to the doctrine of uniform *mental* causality. But treat man as a rational and responsible being, although corrupt; bring before him those motives which his passions may not answer to, but which his reason and conscience pronounce the *strongest and most weighty* of all motives; and in the conflict which you will thus occasion between his higher and his depraved faculties, you will find a great variety of results; you will find any thing but uniformity. But our philosophers of the necessitarian school, still continue to make out the analogy to physical causes. They affirm that whatever be the result, still but one law is followed: "The will is always as the most agreeable." Nothing surely can be more opposite than volitions obeying the laws of conscience, and volitions obeying the suggestions of corrupt desires, and yet the same will is found obeying sometimes the one and sometimes the other. The opposition of good and evil, of the law of righteousness and the impulse of criminal passion, is as great as any opposition of physical phenomena, can be well conceived to be; a perpetual variation of the chemical affinities, and of

the proportions of the combinations ; the congelation of water, and the melting of ice, by the same simple cause ; gravitation, now towards the centre of the earth, and now in the line of a tangent to the earth's surface ; the magnet, at one time pointing to the pole, at another to the centre of the earth, and again pointing upwards to the zenith. The earth varying from its present orbit, to wander for a term of years in the path of a comet, and then returning again to its original revolutions, would not present us more strange oppositions of causality, more contradictory motions, than are found in the same human being, in the same human will. While all the motions of the physical world can be traced to uniform laws, in the human character there seem strange and perplexing contradictions. But the necessitarian escapes from all by the simple principle, "The will is always as the most agreeable."

But how will you explain this, viz., That things so palpably opposite, can all take at one time the character of the "most agreeable," and at another the character of "the disagreeable?" If the chemical affinities and their proportions were to change perpetually as above supposed; if water were at one time formed by eighty-five parts of oxygen to fifteen of hydrogen, and at another time by fifteen of oxygen and eighty-five of hydrogen ; or, if an alkali were at one time to combine with an acid, and at another time to resist combination, you might, indeed, affirm, that the oxygen and hydrogen always obey the law of affinity in general, and enter into each other by proportions mutually agreeable ; and that the alkali when it com-

bines with an acid finds it agreeable, or in accordance with its nature to do so, and when it resists combination, finds it equally agreeable, or in accordance with its nature at that time to do so; all this you might affirm, but the inquiry would still press upon you, how are these changes of the proportion of combination, and these varying fits of combination, to be accounted for? And besides, what now becomes of the uniformity of nature?

The uniformity and harmony which do actually characterize the physical world, are found there because the Omnipotent will, in union with Infinite wisdom and goodness, is ever consistent, beautiful, and benign, in all its projections. The disorder and conflicts which do actually characterize the moral world of our sphere, are found there, because the human will, in union with the depraved sensitivity and a reason undeveloped, or eclipsed by prejudice and error and the fancies of passion, is sensual, sinful, distorted, imperfect and unequal in all its projections.

In the physical world law reigns. In the moral world law is violated. We calculate with just as much more certainty upon physical events than upon moral, as we can exercise more confidence in God than in man.

This expression, "exercise confidence," implies the very distinction I am aiming at; for it implies that the being confided in has power to disappoint our expectations, but that we believe from what we know of his character and past conduct, he will not do so.

Thus we expect the "early and the latter rain," "the seed time and the harvest," and confide in God for their return, because he is very kind and pitiful,

and hath uniformly in the past remembered to bless us. Thus we confide in parental tenderness and in tried friendship. If God and our parents and friends were determined to uniform deeds of kindness by necessity, "to confide," would be an expression without meaning, or admitting of no application. "They have power not to do, but such is their excellent character, and so decided and frequent have been their manifestations of kindness, that I feel assured they *will not* leave nor forsake me," is the language of confidence.

This introduces us at once both to the *kind* and *degree* of certainty with which we calculate upon human volitions in our efforts to exercise moral government over others.

As to the *kind* of certainty, it is not a certainty based upon necessity, for it relates to free will. It is not a certainty built upon any analogy between physical and mental causes, for they are so remote in their nature considered in themselves, and under forms of determination so opposite, that no striking analogy can be made out. But it is a certainty built upon the relative state of the reason and sensitivity as supplying the occasions and grounds of action to a free will. It is a certainty altogether peculiar, because relating to a cause altogether peculiar. It is simply a *moral certainty*, or certainty of knowledge arising from the contemplation of the powers, character and occasions of a free being, that particular actions will be performed by this being.

As to *degree*, this certainty widely varies. That there is a great deal of *uncertainty* attending our ef-

forts to influence the determinations of our fellow-men, all must admit. It awaits alike the legislator, the orator, the teacher, the moralist, the divine, and the philanthropist.

In attempting in any of these characters to guide and govern men, we soon find that we are engaged with beings who have an indefinite power of resisting our commands, instructions, and persuasions, and who in reality govern themselves.

But notwithstanding the uncertainty to which we are liable, we can calculate results with different degrees of *probability* and *certainty*, upon grounds which are perfectly legitimate.

It has already been shown that if necessity be the only ground of certain knowledge of the future effects of causes now known to exist, it follows, either that all cause is necessitated cause, or that there is no certain knowledge of future effects. If we were reduced to the alternative of either giving up freedom or all certain knowledge of the future, and to the alternative of denying God either freedom or prescience, the excellence of mind and the great interests of being would be best unfolded and subserved by taking the first part of the alternative. But we are not reduced to such an alternative.

On the one hand, the freedom of the will I hold to be not only one of the most momentous, but also one of the most incontrovertible of truths. On the other hand, it is a fact that we do calculate in very many instances upon the volitions of men without disappointment. Both are established; each upon its own independent basis. Each has its evidence,

each has its value. What if I could not perceive the *nexus* of the metaphysical doctrine and the palpable fact, am I thence to infer an opposition? But we are not left even in this position, although it would not be one wholly unsatisfactory, and irreconcilable with wisdom and duty. The immense difficulties which have seemed to encompass this subject, are removed when we consider the relations of the will with the reason and sensitivity in the unity of the mind. The unity of mind and the distinction of faculties with their relations to one another, is a position with which all set out in mental philosophy.

The will is simply the causality. The reason and sensitivity reveal the objects, and laws,* and rules of action.

In the first place, the reason and sensitivity are conditional of the action of the will in the developed state of the mind. As a cause it must have a sphere and objects of causation. There must be a place in which to act—there must be substances upon which and in reference to which to act. But the sphere and objects of causation can be arrived at only through the reason and the sensitivity.

In the second place, the reason and sensitivity supply the will with ideas of utility, beauty, enjoyment, and duty—show *how* the causality may be exerted, and what is most pleasing, most useful, most beautiful, or most delightful to be done.

In fine, by the reason and sensitivity the will is

* Chapter IV., Section IV.

placed in a position to exercise choice or pre-determination, and to make its positive volitions or *nisus*.

Now the definition of its freedom is this, that while it cannot act without the reason, or the sensitivity, it is necessarily determined by no interest found in either, in preference to any other interest therein found; that all the objects, and laws, and rules known, are equally open to its causality in the simple exercise of volition or the most original *nisus;* and that when it acts upon any particular object in preference to the other known objects, and in obedience to any particular laws of the reason in preference to other known laws, or in compliance with any particular desire of the sensitivity in preference to any other conscious desires, or in preference to a law of the reason over a desire of the sensitivity, or in preference to the latter over the former, the act of choice and the volitions are caused solely and simply by itself as a self mover and a first mover. There is no antecedent cause producing the choice and volition in it, these are its own birth—its own creation.

As to the grounds upon which we calculate volitions they have already been discussed.* They are found in the relative state of the reason and the sensitivity, and are the only grounds upon which we ultimately calculate any future events whatever. I deem it important, however, to renew the statement here with such additions as naturally spring up in this connexion.

Necessity is the only ground of *absolute* certainty,

* Vide supra, Sec. IV.; also Review of Edwards, pp. 266—269, and pp. 279—297.

meaning by absolute certainty, that that which we certainly know, cannot be conceived of as different from what it is, *e. g.*, any mathematical theorem—the existence of time and space—that a whole is greater than a part.

All other certainty rests upon the relative state of the reason and sensitivity, either as appearing in God, or in inferior intelligences; and is generally called *moral* certainty, meaning by moral certainty, that, that which we certainly know of future events, can be conceived of as different from our actual and certain knowledge, and admits of being brought about differently from this knowledge; but yet that, from the harmony existing between the faculties of the mind, which is to produce the events, we have a full expectation and confident belief, that what *can* be done, *will* not be done.

Physical certainty is resolved into moral certainty, when we consider physical events in relation to the Divine causality. Physical certainty is distinguished from moral certainty, only when we consider physical events particularly in relation to physical or secondary causes. In this relation they are necessary with a relative necessity—that is, granting the cause to remain unaltered by any other power, it is inconceivable that the effect should not follow, since the cause is defined as having no choice, or power of self-modification. In this point of view we may call our certain knowledge of a future physical event, a *physical certainty*. But the event taken on its ultimate ground of existence—taken as the effect of Divine causality, possesses a moral certainty.

It follows from the above, that necessity, real and absolute, does not belong to cause. All cause will be found to resolve itself into will, and will is free. Necessity, real and absolute, belongs only to the laws and rules of the reason and sensitivity.

In the constitution of the mind there is an element of freedom united with elements of necessity. By these elements, in their unity, we account for all that was, and is, and is to be. But these elements, in their unity, admit of no explication beyond themselves. They are the mystery in which thought begins and ends.

Confusion and error are the consequences of either separating them, as if they were capable of existing disunited; or of failing to distinguish them, as if they possessed no peculiar characteristics.

All existence, actual or possible, must be either mind thus constituted, or the developments and effects of mind.

In respect of mind, we reckon first, the eternal and infinite Mind; and, secondly, created and finite mind; and all else is presented as the developments and effects of mind, under its infinite, or its finite form. The infinite hath created and constituted all. The finite creates and modifies according to its given capacity. Nature shows us the "handy work" of God. Art is the measure of human power.

Now the developments and effects of mind must relate either to the element of freedom, or the element of necessity, or must partake of the characteristics of both. These developments and effects are known in the consciousness, interior and exterior. It is the

part of the philosopher to discriminate them in relation to the elements of mind from which they proceed.

The mind containing within itself both necessity and freedom, soon becomes familiar, by reflection, with the ideas of necessity and freedom; and by cautious examination, is enabled with accuracy to place the various phenomena of consciousness in their proper places under these ideas.

The phenomena of the necessary and the free, may be expressed and distinguished in general terms as follows:

The elemental and primary truths of the reason with all their logical developments, are necessary with an absolute necessity.

All the motions of the sensitivity are necessary in relation to something going before as their cause. This, however, is only relative necessity. But beside this, all the motions of the sensitivity as they *ought* to be, are necessary with an absolute necessity.

All acts of creation and all modifications of creation are under the element of freedom, and these acts and modifications belong to will.

Error is not necessary. It is not a necessary development of reason. It is not a motion of the sensitivity arising necessarily from its constitution. All error belongs primarily to the element of freedom, and is somehow connected with the determinations of the will.

If any one should differ from me here in the particular assignment of phenomena to the categories of necessity and freedom, it is of no moment to the matter particularly in hand, if only he agree with me in

the general distribution, and especially so far as to bring all the acts of will or volition under the category of freedom.

It will now appear, that all our knowledge of the future, as well as all our other knowledge, must relate to something belonging to one or the other of these categories; it must be the knowledge of that which was or is to be developed and caused under necessity, or freedom.

In my argument, I am concerned only with that which *is to be* developed and caused. Let us first take an example of that which is to be developed by necessity. I put into the hands of a friend, a certain problem in the mathematics to be solved, being myself perfectly acquainted with the solution. Now, upon condition that he applies himself to the problem, I know what the result must be in the workings of his reason. But what is the ground of my knowledge in this case? Necessity. The connection between the data which I give him, and the result, is a logical and necessary connection.

Let us take an example of that which is to be developed under freedom. Under circumstances of great distress, I determine to make application for relief to a tried friend, and whom I know to have the ability to grant the relief. Before I make the application, I know what will be the result of the determinations of his will in relation to my case. What is the ground of my knowledge in this case? The character of my friend, as made up of intelligence, kind feelings, and benevolent habits; but in this case my conclusion is not drawn from any *necessary*

connection between the character of my friend and the determinations of his will. The connection between the mathematical data and the known conclusion, are such as not to admit of the possibility of any other conclusion, by the intervention of any power whatever. But the connection between my friend's character and his volitions, is such as to admit of the possibility of a result different from that which I know will take place. In his will, as the free element of his mind, he has the power of disappointing my expectations. In his will also he has the power of meeting my expectations, and this I conclude that he will do, on account of the state of his intelligence and sensitivity, relatively to each other, and relatively to the will. Relatively to each other, they accord; relatively to the will, they are the sources of objects, and laws, and inducements of action. I grant that the will, as a cause, absolute and free, may oppose itself to the harmonious action of the other elements; but in this harmonious action I have an *evidence* to the contrary. There is a *possibility* in one direction. There is a *positive evidence* in the other direction. And here we see strikingly the difference between this case and the other. In that other case, the evidence exists in a particular direction, and there is no possibility in the opposite direction.

Now, the evidence, with a possibility opposed to it, is what we term *moral* evidence; but the evidence, without any possibility opposed to it, is what we call the evidence of necessity, or intuitive, or demonstrative evidence.

The state of our knowledge, when as perfect as

the case admits of on the former evidence, is *moral* certainty. In its various degrees of approximation to this point, it is called *probability*.

The state of our knowledge when based on necessary relations, is *absolute* certainty.*

All our knowledge of the future acts of will has plainly no other basis than this moral evidence, but it is an evidence on which we can regulate the affairs of life, and an evidence, in many cases, perfectly satisfactory. We confide in God, although his will is not necessarily determined, with a certainty proportionate to the infinite excellence of his nature. We confide in good men with a certainty proportionate to *their* degrees of excellence.

Those who contend for necessity as the only basis of knowing the future, are evidently under a great delusion. They are at war with the whole constitution of our being, and with the daily experience of men.

I have labored the more on this point, not because it is in its nature particularly obscure, but because it is a point where false philosophy, and infidelity in its wish to escape from moral responsibility and the consequences of guilt, have been so long collecting and perpetuating difficulties.

I close this part by referring to my Review of Edwards, pp. 147—155, where I have endeavored to account for the fact, that good men who resist the consequences of necessity, do, nevertheless, adopt the dogma.

* Review of Edwards, p. 282.

CHAPTER IX.

OF MOTIVES.*

SECTION I.

Motives Defined.

I. A MOTIVE is that which moves. But what is it to move? Its most simple and direct meaning is to produce a change of place; thence it is taken to mean the production of any change whatever, whether of place, time, form, or qualities; and, finally, it is used under a particular limitation, as the production of different mental states; and in this use is especially employed to designate the production of volitions. Motive then, under its widest signification, means simply, cause; and limited to mental phenomena, means the cause of these phenomena; and under the especial designation, the cause of volitions.

With motive, under its widest signification, as

* This subject has necessarily come up in the preceding investigations. I have deemed it important, however, to sum up the observations upon it in a distinct chapter. It will be found that it is here placed in new, as well as in more marked, points of view.

meaning simply cause, I have nothing to do in this treatise.

Motive, as the cause of mental phenomena, must be considered in relation to the three classes of phenomena, viz., to know; to feel; to do; and in relation to the three mental faculties, intelligence, sensitivity, and will.

We have seen, in the opening of this treatise, how every mental motion or action, implies *subject* and *object*. The subject is that which acts, or is moved. The object is that in view of which the subject acts, or is moved.

Now, in every act of intelligence, there is the subject to which the act belongs; there is the object, in view of which the act takes place. But what is the motive, or cause, of the act of knowing? Is it the subject? Is it the object? Is it both in correlation?

In every movement of the sensitivity, there is the subject to which the movement belongs. There is the object, in view of which, the movement takes place. But what is the motive, or cause, of the emotion, passion, or desire? Is it the subject? Is it the object? Or is it both in correlation?

In the acts of the will, there is the subject to which the acts belong. There are the objects and laws in reference to which, and under which, the acts take place. But what is the cause of the volition? Is it the subject? Is it the object and the law? Or is it both in correlation?

The whole question is thus brought before us.

II. In taking up this question I must recur to the broad distinctions made in the foregoing pages be-

tween the will and the other faculties of the mind. The will is the causality of the mind. It is in the will that we first gain the idea of cause, and all cause regarded as creative energy, as power to do, resolves itself into will. God is supreme will and first cause. Physical causes are comprehended within the Divine will. Man, made after the likeness of God, is cause likewise; but cause not comprehended, like physical causes, within the Divine will, but cause endowed with freedom and self-determination, that is, first cause of finite degree.

Now having thus gained and concentrated our idea of cause in will, is it legitimate to extend this idea to the other faculties of the mind, to represent the reason as the cause of its perceptions and knowledges, to represent the sensitivity as the cause of its emotions and desires; or, is it legitimate to represent the objects of these faculties as the causes of their movements?

As preliminary to the reply to be given, I remark, that we must set aside all those phenomena appearing in connexion with the reason and sensitivity, which are acknowledged to be effects of will, either as will direct, or as will appearing in physical causes. These effects we have already explained, as far as the human will is concerned, in the chapters which treat of the action of the will in the direction of these faculties. The effects of the Divine Will in these faculties must, of course, be comprised under direct influences, and under those of physical causes.

The question respects those phenomena or movements in these two faculties, which really and solely

belong to them, or which are supposed to arise from their objects.

III. I begin with the reason and its phenomena. The capacity or constitution of the reason, or intelligence in general, for I use them here as identical, is exhibited in the formation of cognitions or knowledges. These cognitions or knowledges have for their objects either truths, and being eternal necessary and increate, or facts, and being constituted and created. That the objects of intelligence have a real existence separate from, and independent of, the intelligence, I take to be a great truth of philosophy, which remains impregnable against all attacks. I do not deem it necessary here to enter upon its exposition or defence. I assume it. Truth, fact, and being, as real, thus forming the objects of the intelligence—its whole function is to know them as they are, in all their relations and consequences. In order to the act of knowing, the intelligence as the faculty constituted to know, and the object as something to be known, are both necessary.

But the intelligence in relation to its act of knowing, cannot be considered as the cause of that act. Neither can the object known, be considered as the cause of that act. The relation here is not the relation of cause and effect, but one entirely different. This can be comprehended only by clearly distinguishing these two relations. I will attempt to draw this distinction.

The relation of cause and effect is primitively given in the relation of will or personality to the volitions. It is in respect of myself as cause that I first

have the idea of cause. This idea is extended to God, and to physical changes as connected with the Divine efficiency under the designation of physical causes.

To WILL or TO DO, is a fact of consciousness clearly distinguishable from that other fact, TO KNOW. The spontaneous consciousness of every man gives the distinction, and the most careful reflection confirms it.

When we minutely compare the characteristics of these two facts, their difference is marked. To will, or to do, has the characteristics of contingency and freedom. We are conscious that every act under this denomination is wholly within our power. On the contrary, to know, has the characteristic of necessity. The conditions of knowledge being supplied, the act, either in its form or direction, is wholly out of our power.

Again, to will or to do, is to create or originate. It is to give existence to that which had no existence before, or to present something which already exists, under a modification which it did not possess before.

On the contrary, to know, is merely to develope that which did exist before. I will illustrate by examples.

A volition, at any given time, and in any given person, is a positive creation by that person, at that time, and a creation which, until that moment, had no existence whatever. Now it cannot be said that the volition had an existence previously in the potentiality of that person's will, because the very opposite volition lay equally in the same potentiality. The volition as it actually appeared, had no being whatever until it appeared, inasmuch as it appeared under

the equal possibility of the very opposite volition. What is true of the volition is true of its physical sequents, as depending upon it. And what is true of the finite will, is true of the infinite will. God's volitions are absolute creations. And all the sequents of his volitions, are absolute creations. When he said, "Let the dry land appear," there was a creation or modification which then and there first began to be. This effect was not necessarily contained in, and developed from, the potentiality of his will, inasmuch as the withholding of the creative *nisus*, or the putting forth of a contrary *nisus*, was equally possible to him.

But in the intelligence it is all different. Every act of knowing is a necessary development. There is no potentiality in the intelligence for an act directly opposite to that which takes place; and consequently no possibility of an opposite act. There is no choice whether it shall be one thing rather than another. This appears—*first*—in the most primitive truths—the earliest movements of thought. We have seen that upon sensation as the condition of intelligence, certain judgments appear, as those of time and space, cause and effect, substance and attribute, the finite and the infinite, right and wrong, the beautiful and the ugly, &c., and that these cannot but appear. There is no potentiality in the intelligence for opposite judgments, under the given conditions.

It appears secondly, in all axioms formed upon primitive judgments, and in all reasoning from premises. The principles of logic are absolute, and there is no potentiality in the intelligence to set them

aside as false, and to substitute other principles in their place.

It appears thirdly, in all our perceptions of external objects. The intelligence cannot make its perception of a tree, the perception of a horse; nor the perception of a horse, the perception of a tree. There is no potentiality or ground of choice, to make its perceptions different from what they actually are.

The will, indeed, can exert an influence over the intelligence, in directing it to certain objects rather than to others, and may place it in relations where wrong judgments may ensue; but then in every such case the will is to be taken as the cause of the error. There is no new potentiality developed in the intelligence, for the very error is embraced under the form of truth; and certainly there is no self-conscious ability in the intelligence to transmute falsehood into truth, or truth into falsehood. How different is all this from the production of volitions! The volition can be formed a thousand different ways, it is under an absolute control, it is purely a creation.

Again, all these different forms of cognition are really a development of that which existed before. The primitive judgments existed in the capacity of the reason as its essential, necessary, and inseparable attributes.

All axioms, or abstract truths; all pure reasonings, and the conclusions arrived at by them, are really contained in the capacity of the reason unalterably and inseparably. So, also, the perceptions of external objects, are predetermined in the fixed constitution of the perceptive power.

These primitive judgments, and axioms, and rules of reasoning; these conclusions to be arrived at; these forms of external perception, enter necessarily into our conception of reason. They are just as necessary to our conception of reason, as form and solidity are necessary to our conception of body. Whatever truth appears, therefore, in the action of the intelligence, cannot be regarded as then first beginning to exist; it is the necessary development of that which always existed. The truths of geometry, which by supposition I may at this moment for the first time perceive or be conscious of as truths, are not created by my perception. Nor is the act of perceiving created by the substance of the intelligence; or created in the substance of the intelligence by the truth. The very act of perception is the revelation or affirmation of the truth, and comes about in the necesssary development of the intelligence.

On the contrary, a given volition, which now takes place, is no necessary development of the will; for the very opposite was possible. Whatever the will does, it creates, gives origin to, makes to begin to exist. Whatever the intelligence knows, it does not create, or make to begin to exist; it merely developes it from its fixed and necessary capacity.

Reason we cannot but conceive of as essentially the same in all mind—what is true in God, as the eternal and infinite reason, is true in all beings to whom he hath given reason. What is true in finite intelligences, hath its fountain in the Eternal God. In reason there is one all pervading and necessary law

of knowing, thinking and drawing conclusions. Logic is immutable and universal.

Will always exists in connexion with reason; but will is not one and the same in all beings possessing reason, nor like reason is it penetrated by one universal and immutable law. Each will is a distinct personality, an individual doer, obeying or disobeying given laws, and within its given sphere creating with indefinite variety.

Now it is plain that will and its phenomena differ diametrically from reason and its phenomena. Intelligence is not will, and knowledges are not volitions. So likewise, the relation between will and volitions is diametrically opposite to reason and its knowledges. The first involves contingency, and the originating of existence, or creation. The second involves necessity and mere development, without creation. Will is cause—volitions are effects. The relation between them is that of cause and effect. Our idea of cause and effect is first gained in the relation of the will and its phenomena; and is fully realized in this relation.

Reason is not cause, but the faculty of knowledge and wisdom. Knowledges and truths are not its effects, but its necessary and inseparable manifestations. The relation, therefore, between reason and its phenomena cannot be that of cause and effect. What then is this relation? Simply the relation between the faculty of knowledge and wisdom, and knowledges and truths.

We are here engaged with the most primitive faculties, relations, and ideas. We cannot explain

them by any thing anterior, because they are themselves first of all. When we speak of reason and its knowledges, we speak of a faculty and its phenomena, and of a relation, which we perfectly comprehend, because we are conscious of all this.

When we speak of the will and its volitions, we speak of a faculty and its phenomena, and of a relation, which we perfectly comprehend, because we are conscious of all this, likewise. If we call this last relation the relation of cause and effect, we use variety of terms; but the relation expressed in this way, is first known in the will and its volitions.

If we call the first relation, the relation, of substance and its attributes, or its necessary manifestations, we use here also variety of terms; but the relation expressed in this way is first known in the faculty of intelligence and its thought. The distinction between the two subjects and the two relations is perfectly clear.

IV. I proceed next to the consideration of the sensitivity and its phenomena.

The phenomena of the sensitivity are sensations, emotions, desires, and passions.

The sensations are clearly in some sense the effects of physical causes. The five senses come in contact with material objects, and receive certain impressions from them, which are known in the sensitivity as sensations of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and feeling. To these must be added the sensations of cold and heat, of titillation and of pain.

The emotions, desires and passions, we have shown, have this remarkable difference from the sen-

sations, that while the latter precede perception or the formation of cognitions, the former follow them. It is in relation to the former that the question under consideration applies. Are emotions, desires, and passions caused by the sensitivity, or by the cognitions which they follow—do they appear as the effects of causes? They are not the effects of will. The will has no power to create an emotion or passion. All it can do, is to direct the intelligence in an act of attention, and then a cognition follows, and upon this an emotion or passion springs up; but the efficiency of the will does not extend beyond the act of attention. They are not the effects of physical causes. These, as we have seen, only act upon the sensitivity through the senses.

If they be effects at all, the causality which produces them must lie either in the substance of the sensitivity itself, or in the cognitions of the intelligence, or in both. But if we grant this causality to lie in the sensitivity, or in cognitions, then we remove causality from the will, where we had concentrated it, and disperse it generally through all the mental faculties, and even through mental phenomena: we destroy the very distinctions to which our previous investigations had conducted us.

The phenomena of the sensitivity, like those of the reason, differ from the phenomena of the will in the cardinal characteristics. The former have the characteristic of necessity, while the latter have that of contingency.

The phenomena of will have the characteristic of beginning to be, at the very moment of their appear-

ance: they have no necessary existence in the pre-existing potentiality of the will. On the contrary, the phenomena of the sensitivity have a necessary existence in the pre-existing potentiality of this faculty, considered in correlation with the cognitions of the intelligence.

The cognitions of the intelligence must be given as objects or occasions of the emotions and passions. It is utterly absurd to suppose phenomena in the sensitivity without these—just as absurd as to suppose cognitions without something to be known.

But, then, as the cognitions have a necessary existence in the pre-existent capacity of the intelligence, so, likewise, the emotions and passions have a necessary existence in the pre-existent capacity or potentiality of the sensitivity.

It follows, therefore, that the relation of the sensitivity to its phenomena, is not the relation of cause and effect, if we may take the will as the type of that relation: at least, if the relation of will to its phenomena, and the relation of the sensitivity to its phenomena, be both the relation of cause and effect, we have two very opposite relations of the same kind; and this seems to be a contradiction in terms.

What, then, shall we call the relation between the sensitivity and its phenomena? Let me remind the reader, again, that we are engaged with the most primitive faculties, relations, and ideas. Consciousness distinguishes clearly the phenomena of the mind, under the categories *to know*, *to do*, *to feel*. Consciousness clearly makes three faculties—the intelligence, the will, and the sensitivity. And conscious-

ness gives us the relations of the faculties to their peculiar phenomena. The relation of will to its phenomena is called the relation of cause and effect, inasmuch as here are the characteristics of contingency and creativeness.

The relation of the intelligence to its phenomena, and the relation of the sensitivity to its phenomena, are called the relation of substance and its attributes, inasmuch as these attributes are its necessary developments. We cannot conceive of the substance without these attributes, or manifestations; nor can we conceive of the manifestations without the substance.*

In will, we conceive of simply a power to do or not to do, without affixing to it any necessary attributes or manifestations.

* Review of Edwards, pp. 140—142.

The distinction between the relation of cause and effect, and the relation of substance and properties, is of the highest moment. It may be summarily expressed as follows:—

The Relation of Cause and Effect.	*The Relation of Substance and Properties.*
1. Creativeness.	1. Constituted and fixed existence.
2. The effect begins to be, after the cause is.	2. The property is co-existent with the substance, from the beginning.
3. Any given cause can be thought of, as having potentiality to effects; but without being connected with any particuly effects as its necessary manifestations.	3. Any given substance cannot be thought of, without certain primary and fixed properties. The substance implies the particular properties; the properties the substance.
4. The relation between cause and effect, is one of contingency and freedom.	4. The relation of substance and properties, is one of necessity.

V. The important conclusion at which we arrive is this: *Will is cause, and there is no cause but will.**

God's will is eternal and infinite cause. The wills of created intelligences are finite causes.

Physical causes, if they be considered as really causes distinct from the Divine will, cannot be separated from the efficiency of that will. They have no choice, no personality; they are necessitated and instrumental. In the classification of causes they must therefore be comprehended ultimately within the Divine causality.

Perhaps we shall gain a more intelligible view of physical causes, by considering them as simply the properties of material substance.† Material substance, as constituted by God, necessarily contains and develops them; and all their developments, that is, all

* Vide Chap. II., Sec. VII., p. 51.

† This will hold strictly with respect to the *primary qualities* of matter; for while these imply material substance, material substance cannot be conceived of without them. With respect to *secondary qualities*, as known to us, they seem most truly to express properties of our own sensitivity: but inasmuch as their appearance in us depends upon the presence of material substance, there must be some qualities in material substance correlative to the qualities of the sensitivity; and the secondary qualities must, therefore, be a unition of the sensitivity and material substance, in correlative qualities. This, however, preserves the conception of the relation of mere *substance and properties*.

The great forces of the universe, if taken as the mutual attractions and repulsions of material masses, may be reduced under the idea of correlative properties: the forces implying the masses, and the conception of existent masses, being impossible without the forces.

If the relation of mere substance and properties be set aside, then we must return to that of cause and effect, and bring in the Infinite Will, all comprehending, and every where directly energizing.

the phenomena of the external world necessarily imply this material substance.*

VI. Now, to apply the above results to the inquiry respecting motives.

1. The inquiry respecting motives taken as causes, is irrelevant in relation to the reason and the sensitivity; with the exception of those phenomena which are plainly connected with will, or with some physical cause, that is, cause residing in material substance as a property of that substance.

2. It is no less irrelevant to inquire after the mo-

* The distinction made between the relation of cause and effect, and the relation of substance and attributes, at first sight, may seem to conflict with the principle of causality, that "every phenomenon implies a cause;" and to require the following modification, viz., "every phenomenon implies a cause or a substance."

This point, however, can be easily adjusted without modifying the principle. If some phenomena directly imply only substance, let it be remembered that the substance itself implies a cause. The substance is that to which the phenomena belong as properties. The whole visible creation is conceived of as material substance, and is known on occasion of its phenomena. I, myself, and all intelligences, are conceived of as spiritual substance, and are known on occasion of the phenomena revealed in the interior consciousness. Now, these two kinds of substance, both demanding a cause of their being, every one of the phenomena revealing them, implies or proves the existence of cause; although some of these phenomena in their immediate relation do not belong to cause then freely creating them, or making them to begin to exist, but to substance, as properties permanently and necessarily inhering in substance. All the phenomena, therefore, with which we are acquainted, either directly or indirectly, imply causality. The thoughts and volitions of the Divine Mind cannot be phenomena to us, because they cannot come within our consciousness. Only the sequents of these come within our consciousness.

It is to be remarked, likewise, that every manifestation of being to us, depends upon that act of our wills, which we denominate attention; and, of course, is in this way connected with causality.

tives of will under this signification of the word motive, for the will is itself cause, and the only cause.

It would prevent much confusion of ideas, if the word motive could be banished from psychology. It has been introduced by a wrong method, by the method of reasoning from physical to mental causality.

If, out of respect to old usage, we must retain the word, let it be understood at once, that when we speak of the motives of volition, we do not refer to causality at all.

What, then, do we mean by motives? We mean by motives phenomena of the reason and the sensitivity, in the relation which they hold to the will.

Not only do the phenomena of each faculty stand in a peculiar relation to their own faculty—they are related likewise to the other faculties.

Thus, volitions form acts of attention, by which the intelligence is appropriated. Thus, volitions, by bringing the proper objects before the mind, indirectly call up emotions and passions. Thus, emotions and passions, give occasion for the exercise of thought and imagination; and thought and imagination lead to emotions and passions: and thus, also, thought, imagination, emotions, and passions, give occasion for volitions, and reveal rules and aims of action.

Motives of the will, or the phenomena of the sensitivity and the reason, in the relation which they hold to the will, are not causes of volition. This point I conceive to be clearly and for ever settled. What are they, then, if they are not causes? The ques-

question has already been answered in the preceding investigations.* The phenomena of the reason and the sensitivity supply the will with objects, laws, rules, and aims of action. Without these, action would be impossible, not for the want of a *cause* of action, but for the want of *something* to do: just as perception would be impossible without objects, not for the want of a *perceiving faculty*, but for the want of *something* to perceive.

That there is any *necessary*, although there may be a *certain* connexion between motives and the will, has already been amply proved to be untenable and futile.

SECTION II.

The strongest motive.

If the motives of the will be assumed as the causes of its volitions, then no argument is required to prove that any given volition is caused by the strongest motive, supposing, of course, that there are conflicting motives; for any given effect whatever, if supposed to be produced amid conflicting causes, must be taken as the effect of the prevailing cause; *e. g.*, if a body acted upon by a centripetal force and falling towards the centre, shall suddenly move off in a tangent, then this last effect must be owing to another and a greater force than the first; or if the body shall move in an orbit around the centre towards which it was falling, then this effect must be owing to the

* Ch. IV., Sects. III. and IV., and Ch. VII., Sect. III.

combination of the two forces, and must be their joint effect in opposition to all other causes. And so in all cases, the causes which really produce the given effect must be called the strongest causes, relatively to any other causes, which may be supposed to operate to prevent that effect. That the strongest motive governs, is therefore a mere postulate. If it be attempted to be proved, it becomes mere reasoning in a circle, as must indeed be the case in an attempt to prove any postulate or axiom; thus, the strongest motive governs the will; or, to give it a general expression, the given effect is produced by the strongest cause. How does this appear? From the fact that the effect is produced. But how does this prove it? That cause which makes the effect to appear, must at that time, and under the circumstances, be the strongest. Again, a whole is greater than a part. How does this appear? From the fact that the part is comprehended in the whole. But how does this prove it? That which comprehends must be greater than that which is comprehended. The two cases are exactly parallel.

But I have shown that motives are not causes. They are the phenomena of the reason and the sensitivity, related to the will, as objects, laws, and rules.

The motives indeed have widely differing characteristics, but the characteristics are defined in relation to the faculties to which they belong, and not in relation to the will. Thus, in relation to the reason, motives are characterized as right or wrong, useful or baneful, wise or foolish, and so on. In relation to the sensitivity, they are characterized as agreeable or

disagreeable, pleasant or painful. In relation to their respective faculties, they may be compared with each other. Some motives are better, wiser, and more useful than others ; some more foolish, evil, and baneful than others. Some are more agreeable and pleasant than others ; some more disagreeable and painful than others.

When motives are viewed as causes, they are characterized and compared in their effects as mere physical forces. When viewed as above, they are characterized and compared intrinsically.

Is the will determined by the strongest motive? If by motive we mean cause, the question is wholly irrelevant.

If by motive we mean the objects, laws, and rules of the reason and sensitivity, characterized and compared in relation to those faculties, that is, intrinsically, the question has a plain and ready answer.

1. The will, as the sole causality, is not determined, but is itself the determiner.

2. The will, as indifferent and free, is not necessitated by the interests of the other faculties.

3. Consciousness attests, that in relation to the reason, we do not will uniformly that which we know to be best, wisest, and most useful. Nor, in relation to the sensitivity, that which we know to be most agreeable and pleasant. That is, the will does not go uniformly in the direction of the strongest motive intrinsically considered.

Reason and sensitivity are elements of mind which bear the characteristic of necessity ; but will, under all its conditions and relations, still appears under the characteristic of freedom.

SECTION III.

Of the indifference of will to motives.

I. The question respecting the indifference of the will, arises from confounding it with the sensitivity. Let the will be distinguished as pure causality, and it cannot be conceived of as otherwise than indifferent. It is in the reason and the sensitivity that we experience all the interests of being. If it be asked, whether I can exercise volition without feeling any interest in the volition? If the question be in the negative, it only implies that to my reason the volition appears prudent or imprudent, right or wrong; and that to my sensitivity it is pleasant or painful. Will is not the faculty of thought or of feeling; therefore it is indifferent in its very nature; the very fact of distinguishing it from the reason and the sensitivity, affirms this.

If it be asked, how a power indifferent in its nature can act in obedience to the interests of the being? I reply, that when we distinguish the mind into faculties, we do not separate it into parts. The will is so conditioned in its relations to the other faculties, and in the unity of the mind, that it cannot go into action, unless supplied with objects, aims and laws, by the reason and sensitivity. Although not necessitated to act in obedience to any one interest of these faculties rather than another, its sphere of action does not reach beyond them. The *law* of action, the law which *ought* to be obeyed, lies clear and bright in the mind; and the man gifted with a free will or causality,

or a distinct personality, was constituted and commanded to obey it. Had no disturbance of the mental harmony, no perversion of the mental faculties ever taken place, there might have been no philosophical speculation respecting a free and indifferent will, because every action being in that case both right and agreeable, no strong occasion would have existed to arrest the mind to such inquiries. But when such a disturbance and perversion are found to exist, our attention is at once directed to that element of our being, which in the first instance could oppose itself to the pure interests of the mind; and which now, under an obscured reason and a corrupted sensitivity, is called upon to exert itself for the dispersion of the darkness and the finding of the true law; and having found the law, is called upon to obey it in the very face of the antagonistic passions.

As the result of our inquiries into this element of our being, we find it to be simple causality. It has the quality of indifference, in that it is perfectly distinguishable from those faculties which know, judge, and feel. It has the quality of freedom, in that, while it collects its objects, aims, and laws from the other faculties, it acts from no necessity in one direction rather than in another; but in acting in any particular direction at a given moment, possesses at that moment a potentiality to go in any other direction within the sphere of its activity.

II. The problem of the indifference of the will is often stated under a particular case, viz., suppose two proposed actions are perfectly balanced in the interests of the reason or the sensitivity, so that one

appears just as right or agreeable as the other, could a choice in this case be made?

If the will and the sensitivity are identical, or the former is necessarily governed by the latter, the answer must be in the negative; for, according to this psychology, choice is the sense of the most agreeable, or is determined by it; consequently, where there are two objects, one of which is not more agreeable than the other, choice is impossible.

But let the will, as a pure and free causality, be distinguished from the sensitivity, and the answer must be in the affirmative; for here neither the choice nor the volition is in the sensitivity, nor governed by it, but the first is a pre-determination, and the second an immediate *nisus* of cause.

The only question which can really arise, is, whether two actions can be perfectly balanced in the interests of the mind.

It seems to me that there are many such instances continually occurring. Indeed, if there are not, what use have we for the words indifference and indifferent.

The will cannot put forth a volition without an object and an aim. There must be something in reference to which the volition is put forth, and something aimed to be done. But if this something aimed to be done, in reference to some object, come under no law of reason, either as obeying or violating it; and if it possess no interest to the sensitivity; or if it be equally approved by the reason, and equally agreeable to the sensitivity, with something else which is equally feasible; then we have the case of perfect

indifference—an indifference to the object itself, or an indifference, whether one thing be done, rather than another. Now, there are a thousand trifling acts which men do in perfect indifference—acts which come under no law of the reason, and can be pronounced neither agreeable nor disagreeable to the sensitivity; such as various motions of the hands and feet—the touching, picking up, and handling things, in utter thoughtlessness. These acts may be neither right nor wrong, proper nor improper; they are indifferent to the reason: they may be neither agreeable nor disagreeable: they are indifferent to the sensitivity.

Again, in plans embracing many particulars, while laws and inducements of the reason and the sensitivity guide and determine the cardinal movements, there may be in the details, or the filling up, a variety, amid which to exercise choice, without any discernible quality to render one choice more judicious or desirable than another.

In the instance of the chess board,* there is a reason for proceeding to select one of the squares; but it is a matter of perfect indifference which particular square is selected.

A basket of oranges is before me, all very fine and select, so that casting my eye over them I can perceive no difference between them. I am desirous of taking one, but which one is a matter of indifference.

There are innumerable similar instances which might be adduced. In all these, if volition were a mere sense of the most agreeable, a perfect equality

* Review of Edwards, p. 245.

of qualities would be a negation of volition; but, inasmuch as volition is the *nisus* of free and self-determined cause, a perfect equality of qualities cannot prevent it. Any one may verify for himself the possibility of choosing in the indifference of two objects of choice. We shall find, by consulting our experience, that, although one orange is as good as another, we can still take one; that, although it is indifferent which square of the chess board we select, we can still select one.

The arguments which are brought against indifference of will, are all based upon the assumption that the will is identified with, or at least necessarily governed by, the sensitivity.* If our psychological investigations have fairly distinguished these faculties, then, of course, these arguments fall to the ground.†

SECTION IV.

Why does the will choose one thing rather than another?

I. If the term *why*, refer to the cause of choice, the question is answered in the will itself, as the sole cause of choice. But if the term *why* do not refer to the cause of choice, it only remains that it refers to the object, reason, or inducement of choice. But where do we find these? In the phenomena of the reason and the sensitivity, and there only.

* Edward's Works, Vol. II., Part II., Sec. VI., p. 63.
† Review of Edwards, pp. 246—248.

Now, if the will choosing any thing, chooses it out of respect to a law of the reason, and it be asked, why it chooses thus rather than otherwise? the true and only answer is, that it chooses thus because it is reasonable to choose thus.

Again, if the will choosing any thing, chooses it out of respect to an inducement of the sensitivity, and it be asked, why it chooses thus rather than otherwise? the true and only answer here is, that it chooses thus because it is agreeable or pleasant to choose thus.

It may indeed, be said, that when it chooses in obedience to the reason, it does so, because it seems most pleasant to do so: and so, also, when it chooses in obedience to the sensitivity, it may be said, that it does so, because it seems most reasonable to do so: and thus we may answer the *why*, when the reason is obeyed by referring to the sensitivity; and when the sensitivity is obeyed, by referring it to the reason. But, then, this explication throws us into a circle where we are revolving without end. For when we have explained obedience to the reason by referring to the sensitivity, and made the law of the will "the most agreeable," we are still at liberty to ask, why the will obeys the most agreeable? And, then, if we go on to explain this, we can only go back to the reason and say, the will obeys "the most agreeable," because this is most reasonable. Or, if when we have explained obedience to the sensitivity, by referring to the reason, and made the law of the will, "the most reasonable," we are still at liberty to ask, why the will obeys the most reasonable? And then, again, if we go on to explain this,

we can only go back to the sensitivity and say, the will obeys the most reasonable, because it is the most agreeable.

II. Let the will be taken as the entire causality of the mind—as the faculty of doing, under the characteristics of freedom and choice, and self-determination—a power to do, with a potentiality at the moment of every action, of not doing, or doing the very opposite; the faculty which reveals the primary movements of first cause, and which neither admits of, nor requires any antecedent cause, to account for its movements; only under its finite form requiring the infinite and uncreated Will, to account for the fact of its existence: let the will be thus taken as one of the most original faculties, to be known in and by itself, just as the reason is known in and by itself; and then let the reason and the sensitivity be taken as other two most original faculties, revealing the objects, laws, rules, and inducements or pleasures of action: and then of these three faculties let the mind be taken to consist, distinguishable, and yet inseparable, a perfect unity, and we have the ultimate and clear explication of our being. Any attempt to explain ultimate truths and facts must involve in inextricable difficulties, and absurdities. A bold chemist, who should attempt to resolve light into elementary substances different from itself, as, for example, water is resolved into gases, would find a difficulty which he had met with in no other experiment; the analysis would require the disappearance of that very substance by which alone the analysis could be revealed.

The various facts of our consciousness are explain-

ed in their relations to the original faculties of the mind with their original characteristics; but there is nothing in our being antecedent to these faculties by which they and their characteristics can be explained. Here we must rest our inquiries; not as in darkness, but as having arrived at the "light of all our seeing."

III. Those who take opposite ground and identify the will and the sensitivity, or bring the former under the absolute governance of the latter, do either run into absolute and universal necessity, or transfer to the sensitivity all the difficulties which they imagine to belong to a self determining, and contingent will. This can be made perfectly clear.

The sensitivity must have either a fixed or a changeable state; that is, the object and circumstances being the same, the sensitivity must either always exhibit the same affections, or it must be liable to such changes in its own intrinsic state or nature, as to exhibit different affections. If the sensitivity be unchangeable in its state, then its conditions are the same with that of any material substance, and, like material substance, it is uniformly affected by given antecedents. Thus wood and coal are always combustible by fire; sugar and salt are always solvable by water; water always freezes at one given temperature, and always boils at another. And thus also the sensitivity is always affected with love or hatred, joy or sorrow, pleasure or pain, in the presence of certain objects. Now as the sensitivity, under this view, has no self-moving power, but all its affections are absolutely as the correlation of its fixed state, with its objects and circumstances, it follows, that all its

affections relatively to itself are absolutely necessary. There is no potentiality within itself to affections contrary to those which are actually exhibited.

If the sensitivity be changeable in its state, so that the same objects and circumstances at one time produce one class of affections, and at another time another class, then these changes in its own intrinsic state remain to be accounted for. Such changes might be accounted for by introducing the idea of a supernatural influence at work in the bosom of the sensitivity and producing these changes. But in the first place, this could not be proved from consciousness to be the fact; and in the second place, it would leave the sensitivity under an absolute necessity. Should we attempt to explain these changes by the presence of other objects, and natural causes, then we must suppose that the state of the sensitivity is in fixed correlation with those other objects and natural causes, and hence that the change of state is brought about in this way likewise by a law of necessity. Under this representation, the sensitivity really is not in a changeable state. On the contrary, it becomes a part of its fixed nature, that the one class of objects and causes should first act upon it, in order to prepare it for the action of the first class supposed—just as wood which has been lying in the water until it has become saturated resists combustion, until it has first been exposed to the evaporating influences of heat. The action of the one being preparatory to the action of the other, without supposing any change in the nature of the wood itself.

The only supposition which remains, therefore, is

order to avoid an absolute necessity, is that the sensitivity has self-determination and contingency. Indeed this is evident from all the foregoing investigations—for it has been clearly shown that there is nothing opposed to an absolute necessity but a contingent and self-determining causality. It follows, therefore, that if the causes of volition be assigned to the sensitivity, and yet freedom be retained as an element of the human mind, then the sensitivity must be taken as the element of freedom—must be taken as a contingent and self-determining causality. Now, no one will contend that the alleged difficulties of self-determination and contingency become less, by transferring them from the will to the sensitivity.*

IV. The question at issue is not a question between two schools of philosophy holding different theories of the freedom of the will. I know this is thought by many to be the fact, and very generally by our theologians, who adopt Edwards' philosophy.† But as there can be but one theory of freedom, the question at issue really lies between the advocates of human freedom, and the advocates of an absolute and universal necessity.

With respect to the point under consideration, why the will chooses one thing rather than another, the two parties are opposed in the following manner: the party which denies the freedom of the will, resolves all volition into the fact of the affection of the most agreeable, or the strongest desire; this fact itself resting upon the fixed constitution of the sensi-

* Review of Edwards, pp. 227—240. † Ibid, p. 152.

tivity correlatively with its objects. To the question, why the will chooses one thing rather than another, the answer is for ever given, because, that which is chosen seems most agreeable or most desirable. But if the question be asked why it seems most agreeable ? there is no answer to be given but that such is the constitution of the sensitivity. It is an ultimate power or principle.

The sensitivity, in this point of view, as I have already remarked, is under the same conditions with any material substance. It has its fixed constitution, manifesting itself by uniform properties.

But, if the sensitivity give manifestations varying its constitution and properties; that is, if its objects and circumstances remaining the same, it at different times presents different and opposite affections, loving what it before hated, and hating that it before loved, the agreeable becoming the disagreeable, and the disagreeable becoming the agreeable; and, if under these conditions, the question be asked why the once agreeable, appears now disagreeable, and the once disagreeable, now agreeable, it must either be taken as an ultimate fact that the sensitivity, constituted with such properties as enable it to vary its construction of the agreeable, or that its varying affections are determined by the reason; that which seems right, being always connected with the affection of the most agreeable, or choice; and that which seems wrong, being always connected with the opposite affection. If this were true, which plainly it is not, then we should have to account for the varying affections of the sensitivity, or choices, by the varying perceptions of the reason:

we should have to answer the question, why the same action at one time seems right, and at another time seems wrong; and this we could do, only by affirming, that it is the fixed constitution and property of the reason, to make these varying and opposite representations; or, by going out of the reason to one of its cöordinate faculties, and thus returning to the point from whence we set out. The advocates of necessity must, in order to escape the greatest absurdity—that of for ever reasoning in a circle—take some ultimate position. This, they indeed profess to take, in the law of the sensitivity, that the will is always as the most agreeable. And, let it be remarked, that when they answer the question, why the will chooses one thing rather than another, by saying, that that which it chooses, seems to it most agreeable, they do in fact only re-affirm the phenomena of choice. To choose, means, according to their definition, simply to have an affection or sense of the most agreeable; to ask, therefore, why I choose one thing rather than another, is equivalent to the question, why this object appears more agreeable to me than another: and the answer, that it does so because it is more agreeable, is plainly a mere re-affirmation of a fact, which is thus acknowledged to be ultimate and inexplicable: I have the sense of the most agreeable, because I have the sense of the most agreeable—I choose the most agreeable, because choice itself is the sense of the most agreeable. Here the fatalist must rest the philosophy by which he attempts to explain all the varying phenomena of the will.

Now, the party opposed to the fatalists—the party

who advocate the freedom of the will—have also their ultimate power, or principle, where they rest their inquiries, and attempt no further explication. This ultimate power, or principle, is simply the will itself. We do not go out of the will, only to shift our difficulties to another faculty, and that, too, a faculty wholly incompetent to dispose of them. We allow the will, as the power or principle of choice and volition, to account for these phenomena itself. In our consciousness we find the phenomena of choice and volition, and possessing characteristics altogether peculiar; phenomena which we clearly and most familiarly know, for they are of constant occurrence; and these phenomena we easily trace to our own minds, as endowed with a faculty to produce them. That the phenomena reveal to us the characteristics of freedom and contingency, and that we possess causality, or free and contingent self determination, need excite no more wonder than any other of our original endowments. That we are endowed with this faculty, we establish by an appeal to consciousness, and there we rest the argument. When the question is asked, why the will chooses one thing rather than another, we contend that the very question implies the power of various choice, and the power, at the very time of choosing one thing, of choosing something else, and different. If there is no potentiality to an opposite choice, why ask, why the will did not make it? If we should throw coals of fire among sand and gunpowder, would we think of asking, why the fire made the gunpowder to explode rather than the sand?

The fire has no power to choose; the man has

power to choose. The choice of the man, then, is very different from the mere selection of the fire, and this power to choose can be explained only as the potentiality of various and opposite determinations.

As, then, this potentiality is granted by the very question to exist, in searching after the WHY of the particular determination or choice, we are searching only after the reasons or inducements, vulgarly called motives. Now, the various determinations or choices, and volitions of the will, are manifested in its following different reasons and inducements. It determines in one direction, when it determines an action because it is right. It determines in another direction, when it determines an action opposed to reason, because it is a pleasurable action. In all cases we answer the WHY, when we point out the reason or inducement of the action—when we point out what particular phenomena of the reason or the sensitivity constitute the aim. We have here arrived at our ultimate principles and facts.

If, when an individual has made the enjoyments of passion his aim, you ask why he chose these, over the laws of his reason and conscience? there remains no answer, than that having power to choose either, he, in the exercise of his freedom, chose the first, because it was agreeable; that is, he chose the agreeable, because it was agreeable. If again he makes the laws of the reason his aim, and you ask, why he chose these over the enjoyments of passion? there remains here also but one answer; that having the power to choose either, (as indeed the question implies,) he, in the exercise of his freedom, chose the

former, because it was reasonable; that is, he chose the reasonable, because it was reasonable. These are ultimate facts; try to get beyond them, and you leap into the circle of explaining the agreeable by the reasonable, and the reasonable by the agreeable, which besides being absurd in itself, is contrary to the palpable experience of every man; for who is there that does not often choose the agreeable, although it be most unreasonable to do so; and who that ever exercised self-denial, or laid a restraint upon his passions under the injunctions of conscience, did not in that act choose the reasonable in opposition to the agreeable?

Reason and sensitivity supply the objects and aims of action. Will is the power to act in any of the revealed directions. Choice is the determination in which direction to act. Volition is the actual *nisus* of the acting power. Reason and sensitivity, as original faculties, are adequate to account for their phenomena. Will, a no less original faculty, is adequate to account for choice and volition.

CHAPTER X.

CONCLUSION.

By appealing to consciousness, we determine the question of contingent and free causality. In every act of choice and volition, we know ourselves to be contingent and free causes. On the other hand, we find ourselves unable to account for all the phenomena of the universe, without the admission of a contingent and free causality. That there are phenomena which cannot be accounted for without referring to causality, is generally admitted; but that this causality must be contingent and free, is the point disputed. Now, this is the very point to which we wish to call attention; that there are phenomena which demand a principle of contingency and freedom to account for them, as well as a principle of causality, or, in other words, the causality which accounts for them can only be one of contingency and freedom. To illustrate this let us consider phenomena,

1. In relation to the purely objective.

In the purely objective, we have material substance, with its various forms and qualities; and an immense system of contrivances and adaptations.

Now, when we come to describe the various forms and qualities of bodies, and to expound the end and aim of the contrivances and adaptations; while we are irresistibly led by the conceptions of our intelligence to connect all with a most glorious and perfect wisdom, with a design far reaching, diffusive, penetrating, and beautiful as light itself, still we cannot but conceive likewise of the possibility of bodies of other forms and qualities, and of other contrivances and adaptations in relation to known ends, or of contrivances and adaptations in relation to other ends. *The phenomena which actually appear, do not present themselves to our minds as the only phenomena which could have appeared.* Hence, while we cannot conceive of another geometry from that which actually exists, we can frame theories of cosmogony, and vary the forms and arrangements of creation without end. We may believe that infinite wisdom has filled out its idea in what is, but we must believe also there was a *choice* amid an indefinite variety of conceptions, and that the infinite will, or causality, was adequate to creating upon any other scheme.

In fine, the phenomena of the objective, whether observed in large systems, or in minute arrangements, no less demand choice, implying freedom and a potentiality to different creations, than they demand intelligence, and cause with its creative *nisus*.

2. Phenomena in relation to the subjective.

These are the phenomena of the interior consciousness.

Those phenomena which we name choice and volition, have a certain control over the other phenome-

na. I choose and put forth a volition to think on this or that subject, or to observe this or that object. I choose and put forth a volition to dismiss objects exciting this or that passion; and to bring before me objects related to other passions.

Choice and volition control in like manner the muscular movements.

Now, the phenomena of the intelligence and the sensitivity, as well as muscular movements, in their relation to choice and volition, never present themselves as the only possible phenomena under the given circumstances.

There is an indefinite variety of ways in which the intelligence and sensitivity, as well as the muscular system, might be directed and appropriated, other than the particular way revealed. We cannot but conceive that the intelligence might have thought upon some other subject, might have observed some other object; that the sensitivity might have been aroused to a different class of emotions; that the muscular organism might have performed different actions. If intelligence and sensitivity are demanded, in order to account for the existing phenomena; there is no less demanded, a free causality implying a potentiality to different phenomena.

As to choice and volition themselves, as a part of the mental phenomena, they, of course, as appearing under the characteristics of contingency and freedom, and being incapable of being defined without these characteristics, must demand a contingent and free causality. They are the pre-determination and the causative *nisus* of free cause.

It thus appears, that the subjective, no less than the objective phenomena, demand a causality contingent and free.

The two modes of considering the will, which I have here indicated, do plainly work harmoniously into each other.

By the one mode, I look at the simple facts of choice and volition, and I gain at once, and directly, the testimony of my consciousness that I am a cause free and self-determining.

By the other mode, I throw myself amid the phenomena of the objective and subjective universe; and, in attempting to account for them, I am led by the necessary laws of the intelligence, not only to wisdom, benignity, and creative power; but with a corresponding energy of thought, I am led also to view the creative power as imbued with choice, contingency and freedom. Choice, contingency, and freedom, bring to view will, as one of the great primary principles of all being, and all manifestations of being.

The absorption of will in other principles, and its virtual annihilation, is the greatest error ever made in philosophy, and the most pregnant parent of error. I have aimed to vindicate the integrity of the will, and I hope I have accomplished it. If so, then the way is prepared for investigations of the last importance. To these I intend ere long to invite the attention of the candid reader.

THE END.

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